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Summary 
The network industries have been undergoing a process of reform, where liberalisation is 
one of the main features. This thesis studies the effect of liberalisation, with and without 
competition, on the incumbent’s incentives to innovate. 
A model of incumbent network operator is developed and analysed when the incumbent 
is a monopolist, as well as when it faces an entrant. The objectives of the incumbent are 
specified in a general manner to allow for revenue, profit, and/or welfare maximisation. 
The marginal cost of the incumbent is assumed to depend upon the investment in new 
technologies and processes. A strictly convex and decreasing cost function is assumed. 
The incumbent maximises its objective function with respect to prices and to investment 
in innovation. The entrant is assumed to maximise profits with respect to prices. The 
incumbent’s incentives to innovate under monopoly and duopoly are compared. One of 
the main results is that the difference between the investment in innovation under 
monopoly and under duopoly is determined by the incumbent’s elasticity of demand 
under monopoly as well as by the incumbent’s market share and elasticity of demand 
under duopoly. For certain values of these variables it exists an interval where duopoly 
provides more incentives to innovate than monopoly. The market share of the incumbent 
has a non-linear relationship with the investment in innovation under duopoly. Until a 
certain point an increase in the incumbent’s market share creates more incentives to 
innovate under duopoly and from that point on the contrary happens. A decrease (in 
absolute value) in the incumbent’s elasticity of demand has a negative effect on the 
incentives to innovate under both market structures. Another major result is that the 
incentives to innovate increase when the incumbent places greater weight on social 
welfare. 
The effect of liberalisation and competition on innovation in the postal sector is 
empirically assessed. The impact of the quantity supplied and of some control variables is 
also analysed.  An original dataset is put together to perform the analysis. It includes data 
for seventeen European countries, over ten years. Innovation is measured using an 
innovation index, the accumulated number of innovations (both based on the results of a 
survey developed for this purpose), and labour productivity. A liberalisation index is built 
in order to measure the percentage of liberalised market. The econometric analysis 
performed, where several models were estimated by GLS and using PW-PCSE, shows 
that: (1) market liberalisation has a positive effect on innovation, and (2) an increase in 
the market share of the competitors stimulates the incumbent’s investment in innovation, 
at least until the market share of the competitors reaches a certain threshold. Letter 
volume and GDP per capita are also significant and have a positive relationship with 
innovation. In general, the models estimated have a high explanatory power. The 
econometric analysis only considers end-to-end competition. The effect of upstream and 
downstream access on innovation is studied by way of three case studies (USPS, La 
Poste, and Royal Mail). The initial expectations of a positive relationship between both 
upstream and downstream access and innovation are confirmed.  
Key-words: Liberalisation, Competition, Market structure, Innovation, Network 
industries, Postal sector 
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Résumé 
Les industries de réseaux ont fait, et font encore, l’objet de réformes dont la libéralisation 
est l’aspect le plus important. Cette thèse étudie l’effet de la libéralisation (avec et sans 
concurrence) sur les incitations à innover de l’opérateur historique.  
Le comportement d’un opérateur historique sous monopole et sous duopole est modélisé 
et analysé dans le contexte des industries de réseaux. Les objectifs de l’opérateur 
historique sont spécifiés de façon générale pour permettre la maximisation des revenus, 
des bénéfices et/ou du bien-être social. Il est admis que le coût marginal de l'opérateur 
historique dépend de l'investissement dans les nouvelles technologies ou dans les 
nouveaux processus. Une fonction de coût strictement convexe et décroissante est admise. 
L’opérateur historique maximise sa fonction objective en choisissant son prix et son 
investissement dans l’innovation. Il est aussi admis que le nouvel entrant maximise son 
bénéfice en choisissant le prix. Les incitations à innover de l’opérateur historique sous 
monopole et sous duopole sont comparées. Le résultat principal est que la différence entre 
les investissements dans l'innovation est déterminée par l'élasticité de la demande et la 
part de marché de l’opérateur historique sous duopole et par l'élasticité de la demande de 
l'opérateur historique sous monopole. Pour certaines valeurs de ces variables il existe un 
intervalle pour lequel le duopole crée plus d’incitations à innover que le monopole. Il y a 
une relation non-linéaire entre la part de marche de l’opérateur historique et ses 
incitations à innover sous duopole. Jusqu’à un certain point une augmentation de la part 
de marché de l’opérateur historique génère plus d’incitations à innover sous duopole. Au-
delà de ce point le contraire se produit. L'élasticité de la demande de l’opérateur 
historique a un effet négatif sur l'incitation à innover dans le cadre des deux structures de 
marché. Un autre résultat important est que l'incitation à innover augmente lorsque 
l'opérateur donne plus de poids au bien-être social. 
L'effet de la libéralisation et de la concurrence sur l'innovation est évalué empiriquement 
dans le secteur postal. L'impact de la quantité fournie et de certaines variables de contrôle 
est également analysé. Une base de données est constituée pour effectuer les analyses. 
Elle inclut des données pour dix-sept pays européens sur dix ans. L'innovation est 
mesurée à travers un indice de l'innovation, du nombre cumulé des innovations – les deux 
sont basés sur les résultats d'une enquête élaborée à cet effet  – et de la productivité du 
travail. Un indice de libéralisation est construit dans le but de mesurer le pourcentage de 
marché libéralisé. L'analyse économétrique effectuée, où plusieurs modèles ont été 
estimés par GLS et PW-PCSE, montre que: (1) la libéralisation du marché a un effet 
positif sur l'innovation, et (2) une augmentation de la part de marché des concurrents 
stimule l'investissement de l’opérateur historique dans l'innovation, au moins jusqu'à ce 
que la part de marché des concurrents atteigne un certain seuil. Le volume de courrier et 
le PIB par habitant sont également significatifs et sont positivement corrélés avec 
l'innovation. En général, les modèles estimés ont un pouvoir explicatif élevé. L'analyse 
économétrique considère la concurrence à travers toute la chaîne de valeur mais pas 
l’effet de l'accès en aval et en amont sur l'innovation. Ces effets sont étudiés par le biais 
de trois études de cas (USPS, La Poste, et Royal Mail). Les attentes initiales d'une 
relation positive entre les deux types d’accès et l'innovation sont confirmées. 
Mots-clés: Libéralisation, Concurrence, Structure du marché, Innovation, Industries de 
réseaux, Secteur postal 
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Sumário 
A liberalização é um dos aspectos mais importantes do processo de reforma das indústrias 
de rede. Esta tese estuda o efeito da liberalização, acompanhada ou não do 
desenvolvimento de competição, no incentivo para inovar do operador histórico. 
O comportamento de um operador histórico em monopólio e em duopólio é modelado e 
analisado no contexto das indústrias de rede. Os objectivos do operador histórico são 
especificados de uma forma geral de modo a permitir a maximização da receita, do lucro 
e/ou do bem-estar social. Assume-se que o custo marginal do operador histórico depende 
do investimento em novas tecnologias e processos, e que a sua função de custo é 
estritamente convexa e decrescente. O operador histórico maximiza a sua função 
objectivo em ordem ao preço e ao investimento em inovação. Assume-se que os novos 
operadores maximizam o lucro apenas em ordem ao preço. O objectivo é comparar os 
incentivos para inovar do operador histórico em monopólio e em duopólio. Um dos 
resultados mais importantes é que a diferença entre o investimento em inovação em 
monopólio e em duopólio depende da quota de mercado do operador histórico em 
duopólio e das elasticidades da procura do operador histórico tanto em monopólio como 
em duopólio. Para determinados valores destas variáveis, existe um intervalo em que o 
duopólio favorece mais a inovação efectuada pelo operador histórico do que o monopólio. 
A relação entre a quota de mercado do operador histórico e o investimento em inovação 
em duopólio não é linear. Um aumento da quota de mercado do operador histórico origina 
um aumento da inovação em duopólio até um certo ponto. A partir desse ponto verifica-se 
o contrário. Verificou-se também que o aumento da elasticidade da procura do operador 
histórico tem um efeito negativo sobre o investimento em inovação em ambas as 
estruturas de mercado estudadas. Um outro resultado de relevo é que os incentivos para 
inovar aumentam quando o operador histórico dá maior peso à maximização do bem-estar 
social.  
O efeito da liberalização e da competição na inovação no sector postal é analisado 
empiricamente. O impacto da oferta e de algumas variáveis de controlo é também 
estudado. Para este efeito, compilou-se uma base de dados que inclui informação relativa 
a dezassete países para um período de dez anos. A inovação é medida usando um índice 
de inovação e o número acumulado de inovações (medidas baseadas nos resultados de um 
questionário desenvolvido para este efeito), assim como a produtividade do trabalho. É 
construído um índice de liberalização para medir a percentagem de mercado liberalizado. 
Através da análise econométrica, na qual são estimados vários modelos usando GLS e 
PW-PCSE, concluiu-se que: (1) a liberalização do mercado tem um efeito positivo na 
inovação, e (2) um aumento da quota de mercado dos concorrentes incentiva o operador 
histórico a investir em inovação, pelo menos até que a quota de mercado dos concorrentes 
atinja um determinado valor. O volume de correspondência e o PIB per capita também 
são variáveis significativas e estão positivamente relacionadas com o incentivo do 
operador histórico para inovar. Os modelos estimados têm, em geral, um poder 
explicativo elevado. A análise econométrica tem em consideração a competição ao longo 
de toda a cadeia de valor (“end-to-end competition”) mas não considera os efeitos do 
acesso a montante e a jusante (“upstream access” e “downstream access”). Estes efeitos 
são estudados através de três estudos de caso (USPS, La Poste, et Royal Mail). Confirma-
se a previsão de que ambos os tipos de acesso estão positivamente relacionados com a 
inovação. 
Palavras-chave: Liberalização, Competição, Estrutura do mercado, Inovação, Indústrias 
de rede, Sector postal 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Context 
The network industries are extremely important for the national economies 
because they provide vital services for society and/or services of general 
economic interest. They are characterised by having a network infrastructure 
through which the delivery of products and services is made. Examples of 
network industries include telecommunications, postal services, energy (electricity 
and gas), railways and public local transport, air transport, water distribution and 
sanitation. 
Over the past decades, network industries have been going through a process of 
reform. Most network industries have evolved from being dominated by 
integrated state-owned monopolies to restructured industries with private sector 
participation and/or to partially or almost completely liberalised industries. The 
progressive liberalisation is definitely the most important aspect of this reform.  
The reform process does not necessarily follow a specific order of events, and 
differs across network industries and regions. In fact, some sectors were and are 
being liberalised without having been privatised first (e.g. air transport in several 
European countries); while others were privatised but not liberalised (e.g. water 
utilities in England and Wales in 1989).  
The United States of America (USA) is traditionally more liberal regarding 
market liberalisation than Europe. In the USA there is a strong belief in the market 
and on ex-post intervention, whereas in Europe, public ownership is assumed to 
protect the general interest against private interests, and interventions are mainly 
done ex-ante. Many developing countries present a different path, primarily due to 
the influence of World Bank policies. The World Bank started by pro(im)posing 
privatisation; however, lately it has focused on competition as the restructuring 
solution for these industries. 
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Traditionally, the default resolution to the conflict between consumer protection 
and investment needs has been public ownership, which allows access to 
investment funds and political control over final prices (Newbery, 2004). 
However, in the early stages of the process of restructuring the network industries, 
there was a shift from public to private ownership. There were several reasons 
grounding the decision to privatise. One of the most important reasons was the 
increase in operational efficiency expected with a change in ownership. Neo-
classical authors presented other reasons to privatise, such as reducing the public 
sector borrowing requirement, and reducing government involvement in enterprise 
decision making (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988).  
With the trend towards the privatisation of public utilities came the need for 
government regulation. State ownership was substituted by economic regulation, 
i.e. by government intervention in the market. At this stage, the need for 
regulation was fundamentally related to ensuring that the monopolist would not 
abuse its privileged position in the market. 
Over time, contradictory findings on the relationship between ownership and 
efficiency questioned the purpose of privatisation. Some authors argued that the 
restructuring of the network industries should not result from a change of 
ownership, i.e. from privatisation, but rather from opening the markets to 
competition, i.e. from liberalisation (e.g. Armstrong, 2003, Newbery, 2002, 
Vickers and Yarrow, 1991).  
To recall, liberalisation refers to a process by which legal entry barriers are 
eliminated in order to make competition possible in situations or sectors so far 
characterised by monopolies. Its economic rationale is grounded on the 
recognition that, in principle, competition is more prone to achieve efficiency than 
monopoly1. In most of the markets, competition ensures that the interest of the 
                                                           
1 Although this is a relatively consensual principle in economics, some authors (e.g. von Ungern-
Sternberg, 2004) argue that the unsatisfactory results of some privatisation and liberalisation 
projects sustain the hypothesis that state monopolies might outperform competitive markets, 
even in markets that do not exhibit economies of scale. This issue is discussed in dept further 
on in this thesis. 
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consumer is satisfied because it obliges the firms to be cost efficient, to attain a 
certain level of quality and/or to be innovative. This is the only way firms can 
survive and be profitable in the competitive market (Armstrong et al., 1994).  
The process of liberalisation can also be characterised as a process of 
“deregulation”. The idea behind this is that, where there is competition, normal 
competition policy should replace regulatory control exercised by the regulatory 
entities. However, in practice, many “deregulating” measures in the network 
industries involved a change in the intensity, rather than in the number of, 
measures (Ogus, 2004). This means that regulatory forms are less interventionist 
(e.g. less prescriptive standards; general targets as opposed to detailed mandatory 
requirements) and not necessarily that they are completely removed.  
In effect, in the event of market failures there are two ways to overcome the 
problem of market power: to regulate the market or to introduce more competition 
in the market (Armstrong et al., 1994). The introduction of competition may not 
be desirable if the industry presents important natural monopoly characteristics, or 
if there is the threat of “cream-skimming”. In these cases, regulation tends to 
persist. In many network industries competition is limited, at least in a first stage. 
Therefore, government regulation is nonetheless deemed necessary as a means to 
ensure that the pursuit of profits does not conflict with social welfare (e.g. Vickers 
and Yarrow, 1991, Train, 1997).  
Newbery (2002) goes a step further, suggesting that regulation should not be 
confined to the natural monopoly elements. The author advocates that the 
potentially competitive elements also need regulatory oversight so as to ensure 
that markets are not manipulated nor market power abused. According to this 
author, deregulated industries will still need to be regulated (a process also called 
re-regulation).  
1.2 Problem Statement 
As already mentioned, one of the major motivations for the reform of the network 
industries, and in particular for the liberalisation process, is the belief that 
competition stimulates process innovation (development or adoption of new 
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technologies and processes) and product innovation (development or adoption of 
new products and services), encourages efficiency, and drives prices down. 
Innovation is an important vehicle for economic and productivity growth, and 
ultimately for the improvement of living standards (Tang, 2006).  
There is a considerable amount of literature on the relationship between 
competition and innovation. However, there is no clear consensus on whether 
competition has a positive effect on innovation or not. The lack of consensus is 
more apparent when theoretical and empirical results are compared. Also, the 
models developed until today only consider profit maximisation as the objective 
of the firm. Therefore, they do not capture the richness inherent in the alternative 
ownership and governance structures, as well as the potential regulation of the 
network industries. 
On the empirical side, there is also a need for further research. The network 
industries have been under considerable change. Some sectors are completely 
liberalised and others are close to achieving full market opening. Competition has 
been developing in those sectors, sometimes faster than in others. However, the 
effect of liberalisation and competition on innovation has not yet been assessed. 
Reforms are being pursued without understanding the actual results, in terms of 
innovation, of the measures already taken. 
1.3 Objectives 
The two main objectives of this thesis are to: (1) theoretically assess the 
incumbents’ incentives to innovate under various market structures in a setting 
where the incumbent can maximise sales revenue, profit and/or welfare and (2) 
empirically observe the effect of liberalisation and competition on the 
incumbents’ investment in innovation. 
Other objectives besides profit maximisation can credibly be advanced as 
representing those of network industries’ incumbents and, in particular, of postal 
sector incumbents. For example, a traditional public bureaucracy whose 
management is concerned primarily with maximising the size of the organisation 
will engage in maximising sales revenue. On the contrary, a public enterprise that 
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is explicitly regulated to achieve efficiency (in pricing) will be concerned about 
welfare maximisation. A theoretical model that allows the incumbent to have 
different maximising objectives is developed in order to analyse the effect of these 
alternative objectives on the incumbent’s incentives to innovate. 
The aim of the empirical assessment is to analyse the impact of liberalisation and 
competition on innovation and, simultaneously, to test the predictions of the 
theoretical model. The empirical analysis is performed for the postal sector. 
This thesis focuses on process innovations, i.e. the development or adoption of 
new or substantially improved technologies, techniques, and processes. Both 
incremental and radical innovations are considered. An incremental innovation is 
a minor change in the existing products or processes while a radical innovation 
corresponds to a completely new product or process. Therefore, “innovation” 
refers to the adoption of a new or improved technology or process. An innovation 
should result either in a reduction of operational costs, an increase in 
product/service quality, or an increase in the level of output. 
Both in the theoretical and empirical parts of this thesis, we consider that only the 
incumbent (or historical operator) innovates. For the sake of simplicity in the 
theoretical model, the entrants do not have the possibility to innovate, and in the 
empirical analysis, the innovations of the entrants are not considered due to the 
difficulty associated with the collection of that type of data. The relevance of the 
study’s conclusions is not affected by this simplification, since incumbents still 
currently represent (and will probably continue for the foreseeable future) a large 
share of the markets. Also, the fact that this experiment focuses on process 
innovations reduces the importance of entrant’s possible innovations since process 
innovations are less likely to be disruptive than product innovations.  
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
The methodology followed to attain the objectives described above is as follows. 
Firstly, a literature review regarding the impact of liberalisation on innovation, 
and the relationship between competition and innovation is made (Chapter 2). 
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This literature review confirms the lack of consensus concerning the impact of 
competition on innovation. 
Chapter 3 begins with an analysis of the relationship between liberalisation and 
the development of competition. In particular, we describe the liberalisation 
process, examine the factors that often block the development of competition, and 
identify the state of competition in the network industries. This analysis is 
important because the results concerning the impact of competition on the 
incumbent’s investment in innovation are only pertinent if indeed there is the 
possibility that competition develops in the market. This analysis serves as a 
background for the study of the relationship between liberalisation and innovation 
made later in Chapter 3. It is also a complement to the theoretical model 
developed in Chapter 4. The predictions concerning the effect of liberalisation per 
se on innovation will be tested in the empirical analysis (Chapter 5). 
In order to fill the gaps identified in the literature, we developed a theoretical 
model to examine the incumbents’ incentives to innovate under various market 
structures in a setting where the incumbent can maximise sales revenue, profit, 
and/or welfare (Chapter 4). 
In Chapter 5 we make an empirical assessment of the effect of liberalisation and 
competition on the incumbents’ investment in innovation in the postal sector. In a 
first part, we make an econometric analysis where the explanatory variables of 
interest are the percentage of market liberalised and the market share of the 
entrants competing along the whole value chain (end-to-end competition). In order 
to perform this analysis, we questioned eighteen postal incumbents through a 
survey about the date of introduction of seventeen critical process innovations. In 
a second part, we performed three case studies in order to analyse the effects of 
two other models of competition (upstream and downstream access) on 
innovation. The case studies are: United States Postal Service (USPS - USA), La 
Poste (France), and Royal Mail (United Kingdom). We proceeded in this way 
because of the lack of quantitative data concerning upstream and downstream 
access. 
Finally, in Chapter 6 the main conclusions of this thesis are summarised. 
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2. Literature review 
The analysis of the effect of liberalisation and competition on innovation implies 
the study of the literature regarding: (1) the relationship between competition and 
innovation, and (2) the effect of the threat of competition on efficiency.  
Firstly, the literature on the relationship between competition and innovation is 
reviewed (section 2.1). This old theme of the industrial organisation literature, on 
which a lot has been written, is the background of the theoretical model developed 
in Chapter 4 and also motivates some arguments in section 3.3 (Chapter 3). The 
literature review made here is not exhaustive2. We make reference to some of the 
major contributions in the field and to those that are most relevant to the work 
developed in this thesis. 
Secondly, we analyse the effect of the threat of competition on efficiency (section 
2.2). Our focus is on the Theory of Contestable Markets. This theory does not 
analyse the effect of liberalisation on innovation directly. However, it deals with 
concepts that are related to liberalisation, innovation and, consequently, to the 
relationship between liberalisation and innovation. The concept of “threat of 
competition” implies that a market is liberalised but no actual competition 
develops. Also, efficiency is improved through the introduction of new 
technologies and processes, i.e. through innovation. This body of literature is 
important for the analysis made in section 3.3 (Chapter 3).  
2.1 Effect of competition on innovation 
There is a large body of literature on the effect of competition on innovation. 
Table 1 (at the end of this chapter) summarises the key ideas of the major 
contributions. In order to facilitate the review, we start by presenting the 
theoretical contributions and then we examine the empirical ones. 
                                                           
2 For an exhaustive literature review on market structure and innovation see Baldwin and Scott 
(Baldwin and Scott, 1987) and Cohen and Levin (Cohen and Levin, 1989). 
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2.1.1 Theoretical contributions 
The debate about the influence of the intensity of competition on technical 
progress started with Schumpeter (1942) and continued with Arrow (1962). 
Schumpeter argues that monopoly favours the development of research and 
development (R&D) activities because it provides the necessary cash flow to 
invest in such activities and reduces uncertainty in the market. Twenty years later, 
Arrow investigated the effects of market structure on the firm’s incentives to 
invest in R&D in order to reduce costs. Arrow concluded that under competition 
the single firm gets more benefits from innovation than under monopoly. The 
logic behind his conclusion is that under monopoly, part of the benefits coming 
from innovation serves only to replace the monopolist’s rents earned before 
innovating, i.e. the monopolist has greater opportunity costs of innovating. 
Therefore, a firm operating under competition has larger net returns from 
innovation than a monopolist. This is the so-called “replacement effect”. 
The Schumpeterian analysis of new processes was extended by Swan (1970) to 
new products, in order to examine the timing of product innovations under 
monopoly and competition. The author proves that the monopolist’s time 
preference for the introduction of new substitute products coincides with those of 
a firm in competition, under particular conditions. The monopolist will introduce 
the new substitute products “along with the previous products in smaller amounts 
and at higher prices and profits than would a competitive industry.” (Swan, 1970: 
page 627). The author argues that the monopolist does not have interest in 
delaying product innovation because he wants customers to spend the maximum 
possible on his product(s). The introduction of new products, closer to customer’s 
preferences, will certainly help with that objective. In order to avoid that 
economies of scale on existing products are lost when the firm introduces a new 
product, the author assumes that all firms have constant returns to scale. 
Kamien and Schwartz (1970) build on the work by Arrow (1962) and Demsetz 
(1969).  Kamien and Schwartz present additional considerations and develop 
conditions under which monopoly gives more incentive to innovate than 
competition and vice-versa. The incentive to innovate is measured by the increase 
Literature review 
9 
in profit due to a cost reduction, or through the total royalty. The authors 
demonstrate that the incentive to innovate increases with the industry’s elasticity 
of demand, independently of its internal structure. The basis of this result is the 
larger output expansion associated with higher elasticity. The exception to this 
rule occurs in a competitive industry when the innovation is “nondrastic”, in 
which case the industry output does not change and neither do the incentives. If 
the elasticity of demand and the “preinvention size” before innovation are the 
same for the monopolist and competitive industry, then the monopolist’s incentive 
to innovate is larger. Nevertheless, the authors find that if the elasticity of demand 
of the competitive firm is sufficiently higher than the elasticity of demand of the 
monopolist, then the competitive industry can provide a greater incentive for 
drastic innovation. 
The value of the innovation or the benefits associated with it are the major 
features in Kamien and Schwartz (1975). The authors make a survey of the 
literature on market structure and innovation. In what concerns the relationship 
between competition and innovation, the authors show that  
“[…] within the context of a specific model, there is a degree of rivalry 
that results in the most rapid development of an innovation. For inventions 
of small value, the absence of rivalry, monopoly, leads to most rapid 
development, while a positive level of rivalry will achieve this for more 
valuable innovations.”                     (Kamien and Schwartz, 1975: page 33) 
One year later the authors analyse the relationship between the rate of innovative 
activity and the intensity of rivalry (Kamien and Schwartz, 1976). The authors 
assume that individual firms face a stochastic relationship between investment in 
R&D and the introduction of a new technology and find two possible 
relationships. If the innovation is likely to cause large benefits, then a rise in 
rivalry’s intensity, up to a certain point, shortens the development period chosen 
by the firm.  An increase in rivalry’s intensity beyond that point lengthens the 
development period. In the case where the innovation does not involve large 
benefits, the intensity of rivalry is positively correlated with the development rate 
of innovation.  
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The models of product differentiation and monopolistic competition of Salop 
(1977) and  Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) lead to the conclusion that increased product 
market competition discourages innovation by reducing post-entry rents.  
We must also make reference to the literature on X-efficiency (Leibenstein, 1966) 
and in particular to the work of Primeaux (1977) on X-efficiency and competition. 
Primeaux analyses the effect of competition on a firm’s costs by comparing the 
costs of municipally owned firms under competition and under monopoly. The 
author concludes that competition generates X-efficiency. 
Other authors have elaborated on the relationship between competition and 
innovation, introducing additional factors like the level of fixed and variable costs.  
An equilibrium model of investment in R&D under competition, where firms 
maximise their expected discounted profits with respect to their investment 
decisions while facing technological and market uncertainty, is developed by 
Loury (1979). Technological uncertainty arises from the assumed stochastic 
relationship between investment in R&D and the time at which an innovation 
occurs. The assumption that firms do not know when one of their rivals will 
succeed in its R&D efforts is the origin of the market uncertainty. Another key 
aspect of Loury’s model is that he assumes R&D costs to be lump sum initial 
investment. The author finds that the incentives of individual firms in equilibrium 
to invest in R&D decrease as competition increases. Nevertheless, under certain 
conditions, additional competition increases the probability that the innovation 
will be introduced at any future date. 
The work developed by Lee and Wilde (1980) reaches rather different conclusions 
from Loury (1979). Lee and Wilde make a critical analysis of two major 
conclusions by Loury: 1) the equilibrium level of firm investment in R&D 
decreases as the number of firms increases and 2) “excess capacity” in the R&D 
technology will always exist in a zero expected profit industry equilibrium with a 
finite number of firms when there are initial increasing returns to scale in the 
R&D technology. The authors argue that these two conclusions as sensible to the 
R&D cost specification and they investigate the consequences of different 
specifications. They focus on the importance of variable costs (R&D cost as a 
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flow investment) instead of fixed costs (R&D cost as a lump sum initial 
investment) as in Loury’s model. The authors model a one-shot non-cooperative 
game with n firms that invest in R&D. The objective is to be the first to innovate 
in order to receive a prize (that is given exogenously) and not to incur a loss 
corresponding to R&D cost. Patent protection is perfect and infinitely lived, and 
the probability that a firm succeeds depends on its expenditure on R&D. The 
conclusion is that an increase in rivalry increases the equilibrium individual R&D 
effort. In an attempt to reconcile this conclusion with Loury’s work, the authors 
hypothesize that if fixed costs in the R&D technology are larger than the variable 
costs, then an increase in competition leads to a decrease in the equilibrium level 
of firm investment in R&D. The opposite occurs if fixed costs in the R&D 
technology are smaller than the variable costs. 
The generality of the conclusions drawn by Lee and Wilde (1980) is questioned 
by Delbono and Denicolo (1991). They argue that Lee and Wilde’s results depend 
on the particular specification of incentives and payoffs adopted. Firstly, the prize 
is independent of the number of firms and is exogenously determined. Secondly, 
the firms that don’t succeed in being the first to innovate get nothing. Finally, 
possible positive profits previous to the innovation are neglected. Delbono and 
Denicolo model a patent race between Cournot oligopolists using the 
fundamentals of Lee and Wilde’s framework. Nevertheless, some of the 
conclusions obtained are not the same when Delbono and Denicolo specialise the 
model: an increase in the degree of rivalry can reduce the equilibrium R&D effort 
of each firm and the equilibrium total effort. 
Gilbert and Newbery (1982) argue that, in an auction model of R&D, potential 
entrants have less stimulus to search for innovations than the incumbent 
monopolist. This happens because, with additional entrants, the total industry 
profits decrease and only the incumbent internalises this externality, which is the 
so-called “efficiency effect”. Therefore, under certain conditions, a monopolist 
has incentive to patent new technologies before potential competitors in order to 
maintain his monopoly power. Some of those patents will not be used by the 
monopolist nor licensed to other firms.  
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Schumpeter’s view that monopoly is a precondition for innovation is supported by 
Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991a). The authors argue that firms 
innovate because they seek profitable opportunities that arise from monopoly.  
Grossman and Helpman (1991b) show that when competition facilitates imitation, 
R&D and growth are negatively affected. 
The association between the degree of substitutability and cost-reducing 
innovation is studied by Bester and Petrakis (1993). The authors conclude that the 
degree of substitutability has an important impact on the incentives to innovate. 
 “When goods are imperfect substitutes, both Cournot and Bertrand 
competition result in underinvestment in the sense that a social planner 
would be wiling to pay more for a given cost reduction than a profit-
maximizing firm. Overinvestment may occur when the goods are 
sufficiently close substitutes.”          (Bester and Petrakis, 1993: page 519).  
The authors also conclude that if the degree of substitutability is low, then 
Bertrand competition provides less incentive to innovate than Cournot 
competition. If the degree of substitutability is high enough, then Bertrand 
competition provides stronger incentives than Cournot competition. This happens 
because “price competition is more effective and results in a more drastic increase 
in the innovator’s market share than quantity competition” (Bester and Petrakis, 
1993: page 521). The degree of product substitutability is exogenously 
determined. 
The issue of market structure and innovation is analysed in a broader perspective 
by Boone and Dijk (1998). They use the concepts of persistence of leadership and 
intensity of competition instead of persistence of monopoly and market structure, 
respectively. Another particularity of this paper is that the authors interpret 
competition as an increased exposure of firms to each others’ actions. This makes 
efficiency differences between firms more pronounced and cost advantages more 
valuable. The authors investigate whether persistence of leadership or 
leapfrogging is more likely to occur, and how this is affected by intensity of 
competition. The authors also study the effect of intensity of competition on total 
R&D expenditures. The model developed for these purposes is a model of 
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technological competition, with two periods and that assumes two firms with cost 
asymmetries. In the first period, both firms choose their R&D investments. In the 
second period, these investments result in a probability of finding a unique 
process innovation that lowers the production cost. Under the assumption that 
R&D is effective enough (i.e. innovation is not too costly), the authors conclude 
that a rise in competition leads to higher R&D expenditures and increases the 
probability of persistence of firm leadership, and the leader tends to invest more in 
R&D than the follower. 
The relationship between market structure and product innovation is examined by 
Greenstein and Ramey (1998). The authors consider product innovations that are 
vertically differentiated from older products and motivate their findings on the 
effects of replacement and product inertia. The replacement effect reflects the fact 
that under monopoly, part of the added returns from innovation replaces rents 
earned by the monopolist before innovating. The latter effect of product inertia, 
which is introduced by the authors, corresponds to the reduction of the profits of 
the new-product supplier due to competition from firms producing the old 
product, when the old product is competitively supplied. The authors show that 
when the monopolist is protected from new product entry and innovation is non-
drastic3, both competition and monopoly in the old product market provide 
identical incentives to innovation. On the contrary, a threatened monopoly creates 
strictly greater incentives than does competition. 
The work of Yi (1999) shows that if Cournot competition is assumed instead of 
Bertrand competition (Arrow, 1962), then, under weak conditions, an increase in 
the number of firms leads to a decrease in the benefit of a small process 
innovation. These conditions are that the demand functions have to be weakly 
concave and there must be a weakly decreasing elasticity of the slope of the 
inverse demand. The negative effect of the number of firms in the market on the 
incentives for small process innovations is not surprising. The author explains that 
the benefit of reducing the costs through innovation is proportional to total output. 
                                                           
3 The authors define an innovation as being non-drastic innovation when the monopolist supplies 
positive quantities of both old and new products. 
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Since in Cournot equilibrium (and under the weak conditions mentioned before) 
the output produced by the firm decreases with the number of firms, there is a 
negative direct effect of an increase in the number of firms on the incentives for 
small process innovation. If output is held constant, then the incentives for small 
process innovations will increase with the number of firms. The negative effect 
dominates the potential positive indirect effects. The author also concludes that 
the effect of product-market competition on the incentives to innovate is strongly 
influenced by the elasticity of the slope of the inverse demand function.  
Philippe Aghion is probably the author who has written more on the relationship 
between competition and innovation. He and his co-authors have made important 
contributions in the field. Aghion et al. (1997) examine the relationship between 
product market competition and growth through a simple example. They build a 
model with step-by-step innovations, i.e. a model where laggard firms must catch 
up with the leaders before aiming for technological leadership. Leapfrogging the 
existing leader is not possible. Contrary to findings of the Schumpeterian models, 
the authors show that product market competition and/or imitations are likely to 
stimulate growth.  
Aghion et al. (1999) introduce agency considerations in the analysis of the impact 
of competition on the incentives of non-profit maximising managers to innovate. 
The motivation for this comes from the idea that competition, together with the 
threat of liquidation, reduces the “slackness of the manager” and fosters 
technological adoption and growth. They use a model of monopolistic 
competition with no entry, where it is possible to observe the Schumpeterian 
effect when no additional assumptions are made. The authors demonstrate that if 
the firm maximises profits, then product market competition has a negative impact 
on growth whereas subsidising innovation has a positive impact on growth. On 
the other hand, if the firm is “conservative”, then the effects are inverted.  
Aghion et al. (2001) uses the same basic framework as Aghion et al. (1997). The 
main differences are that in the later paper, the technological gap between firms is 
not restricted to one step and a continuous parameterisation is used to measure the 
degree of product market competition. Another novelty in this paper is the 
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assumption that each industry is duopolistic, whereas others assume a 
monopolistic competition. Moreover, it analyses the effect of imitation on growth 
for the first time. The main findings are that, holding imitation constant, a little 
competition always stimulates growth. Allowing both product market competition 
and imitation to vary, the authors find that the maximal degree of competition 
always corresponds to the maximal growth rate. The intuition behind this result is 
that the “Schumpeterian effect of more intense competition is almost always 
outweighed by the increased incentive for firms to innovate in order to escape 
competition.” (Aghion et al., 2001: page 470). Concerning imitation, it is shown 
that a little imitation is, in the large majority of the cases, growth enhancing but a 
lot of imitation has the opposite effect. 
Other authors have made a clear distinction between individual and industry 
innovation or investment in R&D and find a positive effect of competition on 
aggregate innovation and a negative effect of competition on individual 
innovation (Cellini and Lambertini, 2005, Blundell et al., 1999). We describe the 
work of Blundell et al. (1999) when analysing the empirical contributions. Cellini 
and Lambertini (2005) study the relationship between R&D efforts for process 
innovations and market structure through a dynamic analysis. The authors 
consider an oligopoly where n firms compete in prices and invest in cost-reducing 
activities. The authors conclude that the individual R&D investment decreases 
with the number of firms, whereas the industry R&D investment monotonically 
increases with the number of firms. This conclusion diverges from the ambiguous 
conclusions of static models, where the smoothing of investment efforts on the 
long run is not possible. The authors call the reader’s attention to the value added 
of the dynamic analysis over the static approach upon a multistage game. An 
additional conclusion of the paper is that an increase in product substitutability 
reduces R&D efforts if competition is sufficiently strong. 
Between Schumpeter’s followers and Arrow’s defenders, a third group of authors 
emerged who have attempted to combine the previous arguments in order to 
rationalise the “inverted-U” relationship between market concentration and R&D 
as well as technological advance found by some authors in the empirical studies.  
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Scherer (1967) studies industrial firm’s research and rivalry’s development in a 
dynamic profit maximisation framework with the aim to predict which market 
structural conditions are more favourable to a rapid technological development. 
By performing a cross-sectional analysis and allowing for additional non-
linearities, the author observes that the speed of technological research accelerates 
with rivalry, provided that the number of firms competing is not excessive. 
Scherer is the first hinting an inverted-U relationship between competition and 
innovation. 
The effect of competitive pressure on the firm’s incentives to invest in both 
product and process innovation is also examined by Boone (2000). The author 
shows that the firm’s efficiency level relative to that of its competitors is a major 
determinant of the impact competition intensity has on the firm’s incentive to 
innovate. According to the author, the relative level of efficiency gives origin to a 
“complacent”, “eager”, “struggling” or “faint” firm. The parameter that measures 
competitive pressure has to satisfy this order of cases and the profits of the least 
efficient firm in the industry has to decrease with an increase in the competition 
parameter. The main conclusion is that an increase in the competitive pressure can 
not induce an increase in both product and process innovations at the industry 
level at the same time. The explanation is that the least efficient firm in the market 
faces an additional pressure through the cost reduction of the other firms and ends 
up exiting the market, reducing the products available. The author derives 
conditions to ensure that a rise in competitive pressure raises industry wide 
efficiency.  
Later, Boone introduces firms with different cost levels to study the relationship 
between intensity of competition and the value of an innovation (Boone, 2001). 
Boone also makes an important contribution in what concerns a formal definition 
of intensity of competition. Four axioms that a measure of intensity of 
competition should satisfy are proposed. The author finds a non-monotone 
association between intensity of competition and R&D incentives: “for weak 
intensity of competition a follower leapfrogs, while for high intensity of 
competition the leader increases its dominance.” (Boone, 2001: page 722). 
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The impact of competition on product innovation is examined by Dubey and Wu 
(2001) through a model of Cournot competition where firms can innovate in order 
to improve the quality of their product. They argue that when the number of firms 
is large, competition forces prices to be low, implying that the price of the 
improved product (resulting from innovation) has to be low enough in comparison 
to the low-quality product. Otherwise, customers may not buy the high-quality 
product. Nevertheless, the low price of the high-quality product may not be 
sufficient to cover the costs of innovation. On the other hand, if the number of 
firms in the market is small and there are few firms enjoying high profits, firms 
will be motivated to invest in innovation only if the profit from the new high-
quality product is at least equal to the cost of innovating. Since actual profits are 
high, innovation in this scenario is unlikely. The authors conclude that innovation 
“occurs only when the industry is of intermediate size” (Dubey and Wu, 2001: 
page 309).  
Aghion et al. (2005) say that the explanation for the inverted–U pattern hinted by 
Scherer could be pieced together by combining agency models (Hart, 1983, 
Schmidt, 1997, Aghion et al., 1999) with Schumpeterian models. However, they 
find this unsatisfactory and re-examine the relationship between product market 
competition and innovation.  The model developed, where firms innovate “step by 
step” and both the leaders and their followers can innovate, is an extension of 
Aghion et al. (1997). A key assumption made concerns the innovation incentives. 
Contrary to other authors who assume that innovation incentives depend upon 
post-innovation rents, Aghion et al.(2005) assume that innovation incentives 
depend upon the difference between post-innovation and pre-innovation rents. 
The authors find a nonlinear relationship between competition and innovation in 
the form of an inverted U relationship.  This result is related to the disincentive to 
innovate that laggard firms experience in competition and the incentive to 
innovate that “neck-and-neck” firms4 experience in competition. These different 
behaviours are due to the fact that among “neck-and-neck” firms pre-innovation 
                                                           
4 The expression “neck-and-neck firms” is used by the authors to designate firms that operate at 
similar technological levels. 
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rents are reduced more than post-innovation rents by competition, and among 
laggard firms the initial profits are already low and competition mainly affects 
post-innovation rents. In the first case, firms invest to escape competition and in 
the second case the Schumpeter effect of competition dominates. In the empirical 
part of the paper, which uses panel data, the authors measure innovation through 
the average number of patents (each patent is weighted by the number of times it 
has been cited) and use the Lerner index to measure competition. 
The following section summarises the major empirical contributions to the 
understanding of the relationship between market structure and innovation. 
2.1.2 Empirical contributions 
On the empirical front, the number of contributions is considerably smaller. In this 
section we make reference to the major ones. 
Mansfield (1963) was one of the first authors (if not the first) to empirically 
investigate the impact of competition on innovation. He focused on the iron and 
steel, petroleum refining, and bituminous coal industries during 1919-1938 and 
1939-1958. After in-depth research of innovation in these industries, he suggested 
that innovative activity would increase if the five largest firms in the petroleum 
and coal industries would break up. Two years later Williamson (1965) analysed 
the dataset used by Mansfield and concluded that the market share of the four 
largest firms has to be between 5 and 30 percent in order to maximise the 
incentives to innovate. 
The set of hypotheses by Schumpeter that focus on the effect of market 
concentration on R&D investment and technological development was re-
examined by Levin et al. (1985). To do this, the authors used new data on 
appropriability and technological opportunity collected in 130 industries. The 
results obtained call attention to the fact that it is necessary to “look to underlying 
differences in technological opportunities and appropriability conditions” (Levin 
et al., 1985: page 24) when analysing the association between innovative effort or 
innovative output and industrial concentration. 
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Nickell (1996) supports the existence of a positive relationship between 
competition and innovation. The author states that there are some theoretical and 
empirical reasons, although not too strong, to believe that competition might 
improve corporate performance. Therefore, he analysed 670 British 
manufacturing firms and their productivity performance in order to reach a 
conclusion on the association between competition and both the level and the 
growth of total factor productivity. The author shows that there is a positive 
relationship between the rate of total factor productivity and competition, 
measured either by the number of competitors or by the level of rents. Also, an 
increase in market power, measured by market share, is associated with reduced 
levels of productivity. 
The empirical relationship between innovation, market structure and stock market 
value, and its statistical robustness is studied by Blundell et al. (1999). The 
authors use firm-level panel data and two measures of innovation: count of the 
major technological innovations and patents. The latter is used to test the 
robustness of the results obtained. The authors control for unobserved firm 
specific heterogeneity. They find, in a dynamic feedback model that controls for 
firm specific effects, that the industries with higher concentration levels and lower 
import penetration have fewer aggregate innovations. Within industries, a positive 
effect of market share on observable innovation and patent counts was found, 
although technological innovations tend to positively react to a rise in product 
market competition in the industry. 
New measures of competition are introduced by Tang (2006) in order to 
empirically investigate the relationship between innovation behaviour and 
different types of competition. The author argues that “both competition and 
innovation have many dimensions and that different innovation activities are 
associated with different types of competitive pressure” (Tang, 2006: page 69) 
and “firm’s perceptions about their competitive environment are important for 
innovation and are better measures of firm-specific competition” (Tang, 2006: 
page 68). The four types of competition considered are: easy substitution of 
products, constant arrival of competing products, quick obsolescence of products, 
and rapid change of production technologies. The technological innovation 
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activities analysed are: innovation input (R&D and acquisition of technologies) 
and innovation output (product innovation and process innovation). The author 
analyses both the relationship between the different innovation activities, as well 
as the different types of competition and the relationship between different 
combinations of innovation activities and the different types of competition. The 
way firms bundle their innovation activities is also investigated.  The estimations 
are based in a simple logit model and a multinomial logit model. The major 
conclusions are that easy substitution of products is negatively related to R&D 
and product innovation, whereas constant arrival of competing products is 
positively related to those innovation activities. Quick obsolescence of products is 
positively associated with R&D and product innovation but negatively associated 
with acquisition of technology and process innovation. Finally, rapid change of 
production technologies is positive for acquisition of technology and process 
innovation. The results are derived from the Statistics Canada 1999 Survey of 
Innovation for Canadian manufacturing firms.  
Markard and Truffer (2006) analyse how liberalisation has changed innovation 
processes in the electricity sector. The methodology used consisted of studying 
three radical innovations under monopoly and analysing a survey of the 
innovation behaviour in liberalised markets. The authors concluded that market 
liberalisation has contributed to change “the scope of variation and the focus of 
innovation management” (Markard and Truffer, 2006: page 623). The comparison 
of innovation processes under monopoly with innovation processes in a liberalised 
market showed changes in organisational routines, investment principles and 
strategic goals. Concerning the focus of innovation management, liberalisation 
altered the orientation of the innovations undertaken from incremental to more 
radical, and from technology to customer service. The authors also conclude that 
liberalisation “can serve as a driver for the overall level of innovation activity as 
competition represents a significant challenge for incumbent electric utilities as 
well as newcomers” (Markard and Truffer, 2006: page 623).  
To our knowledge, there are very few empirical studies about the network 
industries and none in the postal sector. The need for further research is clear. 
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In the following section, we present the Theory of Contestable Markets that 
relates the threat of competition to efficiency. 
2.2 Threat of competition and efficiency 
According to the Theory of Contestable Markets, the threat of competition (or 
potential competition) induces by itself a monopoly to be efficient (Baumol et al., 
1982, Baumol, 1982, Baumol and Willig, 1986). Therefore, there is no need to 
intervene in the market (i.e. to regulate). Basically, the threat of entry regulates a 
monopolist effectively, i.e. it induces optimality with no need of regulatory 
procedures under certain conditions. As long as the monopolist behaves optimally 
(makes zero profit) entry will not actually occur. 
The conditions required for a market to be contestable are that there is free entry 
and costless exit. There is free entry when the new entrant does not have a cost 
disadvantage with respect to the incumbent. In order for this to occur, the entrant 
needs to have  access to the same technology and inputs as the incumbent, and 
customers need to perceive the incumbent and entrant’s goods/services as being 
the same (Train, 1997). The possibility for costless exit exists when there are no 
sunk costs. With free entry and free exit, a competitor can profitably enter the 
industry, undercut the incumbent, and take away its business (hit-and-run 
competition). The best way for the incumbent to respond to that threat is to 
eliminate such profit opportunities by being productively efficient and pricing at 
average cost (given uniform pricing). Given the constraint that profits cannot go 
negative, this outcome is welfare optimal, i.e. allocative efficiency is maximised 
subject to the break-even constraint without any duplication of fixed costs 
(Armstrong et al., 1994).  
One of the major criticisms made of this theory is that entry can happen faster 
than the incumbent’s price response5. Another important critique, especially in the 
                                                           
5 Train (1997) advances two ways of overcoming this critique: (1) the entrant can sign long-term 
contracts with customers before it establishes its operations and (2) the regulator can intervene 
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context of the network industries, is that by slightly relaxing the hypothesis of no 
sunk costs, the predictions of the theory change substantially. One interesting 
result is that, rather than being an argument for the elimination of regulation, the 
Contestability Theory can be used as a guide for regulation (Baumol and Willig, 
1986). In effect, regulation should simulate contestability by setting the regulated 
prices between incremental and stand alone costs in markets that are not 
contestable. 
One way to make a natural monopoly contestable is to assign a franchise through 
a competitive tender. Demsetz (1968) proposes a return to concession contracts, 
which were common in the nineteenth century, as an alternative form of 
competition (as opposed to both competition in the market and potential 
competition). The idea is to auction the right to operate the natural monopoly to 
the firm offering the lowest price of supply. The author criticises the performance 
of United States regulatory agencies and argues that competition for the right to 
serve the market can substitute for competition within a market. Franchise bidding 
is regarded as being beneficial for efficiency. The fact that the concession is 
competitively awarded ensures that prices and services standards are fair to both 
consumers and investors. Even though franchise bidding still has strong 
advocates, it presents some drawbacks especially under asset specificity and cost 
uncertainty. 
2.3 Concluding remarks 
The discussion about the impact of competition on the investments in R&D and 
incentives to innovate was opened by Schumpeter (1942) and Arrow (1962).  
Schumpeter argues that monopoly is a precondition for innovation whereas Arrow 
defends that the single firm gets more benefits from innovation under competition 
than under monopoly. 
                                                                                                                                                                
in order to require that the incumbent does not lower the price in response to entry obliging the 
incumbent to a priori choose a low price that prevents entry. (Train, 1997) 
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Many other authors have developed models to investigate this issue and have 
made important contributions to the field. Some corroborated Schumpeter’s 
conclusion, some found the same result as Arrow, and most authors arrived at the 
conclusion that the results depend upon specific conditions related, for example, 
to the elasticity of demand, the value of innovation, or the degree of 
substitutability.  Another group of authors, notably Aghion et al. (2005), 
distinguished themselves with the theory that the relationship between the 
intensity of competition and innovation is non-linear and has the form of an 
inverted-U.  
The lack of consensus concerning the effect of competition on innovation is 
evident. Moreover, the literature does not take into account the specific context of 
the network industries where governance structures and regulation play an 
important role and may further complicate the relationship between competition 
and innovation.  
The Theory of Contestable Markets alerts to the differences between liberalisation 
and competition and analyses the possibility of having efficient markets without 
actual competition. 
Our aim is to contribute to the existing literature by developing an extension of 
the traditional profit-maximising model to investigate whether investment in new 
technologies and processes is higher under competition or under monopoly. This 
extension is intended to encompass contexts, not unusual for many network 
industries, in which the incumbent has the form of a public enterprise or is a part 
of a government ministry.  
Through theoretical and empirical analysis, we also aim to clarifying the impact 
that competition has on innovation. 
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Table 1: Synthesis of major contributions on the effect of competition on 
innovation 
Author Year Key ideas 
Schumpeter 1942 - monopoly favours R&D (provides necessary cash flow and reduces uncertainty) 
Arrow 1962 - the single firm gets more benefits from innovation under competition (replacement 
effect) 
Mansfield 1963 - focus on iron and steal, petroleum refining, and bituminous coal industries 
- concentration has negative impact on innovation 
Williamson 1965 - market share of 4 largest firms has to be between 5 and 30% in order to maximise 
incentives to innovate 
Scherer 1967 - first author hinting an inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation 
Swan 1970 - extends Schumpeterian analysis of new processes to new products 
- monopolist’s time preference for product innovation is the same as under competition 
Kamien and 
Schwartz 
1970 - incentive to innovate measured through increase in profit 
- industry elasticity of demand and type of innovation (drastic vs. non-drastic) determine 
which market structure creates more incentives to innovate 
Kamien and 
Schwartz 
1975 - innovation of small value: monopoly leads to most rapid development of innovation 
- valuable innovation: competition leads to most rapid development of innovation 
Kamien and 
Schwartz 
1976 - assumes stochastic relationship between investment in R&D and introduction of new 
technology 
- innovation involves small benefits: rise in rivalry’s intensity up to a certain point 
shortens development period chosen by the firm 
- innovation involves large benefits: intensity of rivalry positively correlated with 
development rate of innovation 
Salop 1977 
Dixit and 
Stiglitz 
1997 
- models of product differentiation and monopolistic competition 
- increased product market competition discourages innovation by reducing post-entry 
rents 
Loury 1979 - firms maximise expected discounted profits with respect to their investment decisions 
and face technological and market uncertainty 
- assumes R&D cost to be lump sum initial investment 
- R&D investment decrease with competition (but depends on certain conditions) 
Lee and 
Wilde 
1980 - Loury’s conclusions are sensible to R&D cost specification 
- assumes: R&D as a flow investment, perfect patent protection, 1st to innovate receives a 
prize 
- if fixed costs in R&D are larger than variable costs then firms invest less in R&D as 
competition increases (the contrary happens if fixed costs in R&D are smaller than 
variable costs) 
Gilbert and 
Newbery 
1982 - auction model of R&D 
- potential entrants have less stimulus to search for innovations than the incumbent 
monopolist 
Levin et al. 1985 - technological opportunities and appropriability conditions are very important when 
analysing relationship between innovation and industry concentration 
Romer 1990 
Grossman 
and Helpman 
1991a 
- monopoly is precondition for innovation (firms seek profitable opportunities that arise 
from monopoly) 
Grossman 
and Helpman 
1991b - when competition facilitates imitation R&D is negatively affected 
Delbono and 
Denicolo 
1991 - Lee and Wilde’s results depend on specification of incentives and payoffs 
- model a patent race between Cournot oligopolists 
- rivalry decreases individual and total R&D efforts 
Bester and 
Petrakis 
1993 - degree of substitutability has important impact on incentives to innovate 
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Nickell 1996 - estimates linear specification 
- competition improves corporate performance (positive linear effect of competition on 
innovation) 
Aghion et al. 1997 - model with step-by-step innovations (concepts of laggard firms and leaders) 
- product market competition and/or imitations are likely to stimulate growth 
Boone and 
Dijk 
1998 - introduce concept of persistence of leadership and intensity of competition 
- model of technological competition 
- rise in competition leads to higher R&D expenditures and increases probability of 
persistence of leadership 
Greenstein 
and Ramey 
1998 - focus on product innovation 
- introduces product inertia effect 
- a threatened monopoly creates more incentives than competition 
Yi 1999 - assumes Cournot competition and some weak assumptions on demand function 
- increase in number of firms leads to decrease in benefit of small process innovation 
(but not if output is held constant) 
Blundel et al. 1999 - dynamic feedback model 
- estimates linear specification 
- measure of innovation: major technological innovations and patent counts  
- concentration negatively affects innovation at an industry (aggregate) level 
Aghion et al. 1999 - introduces agency considerations 
- model of monopolistic competition 
- if firm maximises profits then product market competition has negative impact on 
growth whereas subsidising innovation has positive impact on growth (if firm is 
“conservative” then the effects are inverted) 
Boone 2000 - considers both product and process innovation 
- an increase in the competitive pressure cannot induce an increase in both product and 
process innovations at the industry level at the same time 
Boone 2001 - introduces firms with different cost levels 
- finds non-monotone association between intensity of competition and R&D incentives 
Dubey and 
Wu 
2001 - product innovation occurs only when the industry is of intermediate size 
Aghion et al. 2001 - technological gap between firms is not restricted to one step 
- continuous parameterisation to measure the degree of product market competition 
- competition stimulates growth (increased incentive to innovate in order to escape 
competition outweighs Schumpeterian effect) 
Cellini and 
Lambertini 
2005 - dynamic analysis 
- positive effect of competition on aggregate innovation and negative effect of 
competition on individual innovation 
Aghion et al. 2005 - extension of Aghion et al. 1997 
- assumes that innovation incentives depend on the difference between post-innovation 
and pre-innovation rents and firms innovate step-by-step 
- find nonlinear relationship between competition and innovation 
Tang 2006 - introduces new measures of competition: easy substitution of products, constant arrival 
of competing products, quick obsolescence of products, and rapid change of production 
technologies 
- effect on R&D/product innovation and on acquisition of technology/process innovation 
depends on the type of competition 
Markard and 
Truffer 
2006 - how liberalisation has changed innovation process in electricity sector 
- focus on three radical innovations 
- market liberalisation has contributed to change the scope of variation and the focus of 
innovation management 
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3. Liberalisation: the development of competition and innovation 
In this thesis, a clear distinction is made between liberalisation and competition. 
Liberalisation is defined as the relaxation or abolishment of previous legal entry 
barriers, which can give raise to (more) competition or not. We are not only 
interested in the relationship between competition and innovation, but also in the 
impact that liberalisation per se, i.e. not necessarily accompanied by competition, 
has on incentives to innovate.  
In this chapter, we analyse: (1) how the liberalisation process of the network 
industries has influenced the development of competition in these industries, and 
(2) the effect that liberalisation has on innovation.  
We start by analysing the relationship between liberalisation and the development 
of competition in the network industries (section 3.1). In particular, we describe 
the liberalisation process, examine the factors that often block the development of 
competition and discuss the state of competition in the different network 
industries. We analyse the postal sector in more detail, since it is the case studied 
in the empirical chapter (Chapter 5). The focus is on the member countries of the 
European Union (EU). 
The analysis of the relationship between liberalisation and the development of 
competition is important because liberalisation is not always synonymous with 
increased competition. Therefore, the results concerning the impact of competition 
on the incumbent’s investment on innovation are only pertinent if indeed there is 
the possibility of introducing competition in the market. This analysis is a 
complement to the theoretical model developed in Chapter 4.  
In the second part of this chapter, we turn to the relationship between 
liberalisation and innovation (section 3.2). The conclusions obtained have as 
background the literature review performed in Chapter 2 and the analysis from 
section 3.1. The predictions concerning the effect of liberalisation per se on 
innovation are tested in the empirical chapter (Chapter 5). 
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3.1 Liberalisation and development of competition 
3.1.1 Liberalisation of the network industries 
The regulatory reform of the telecommunications, airlines, gas, and railway 
sectors began in the United States of America (USA) in the 1970s (Armstrong et 
al., 1994). Today it is in progress worldwide, including in Western Europe where 
the single market program of the EU has promoted the liberalisation of the 
majority of the network industries. This process often implied the liberalisation 
and harmonisation of network access among the member countries.  
In Europe, the liberalisation of the network industries began in the 1980s. Today, 
European consumers have some choice over utilities’ suppliers (in some sectors), 
while a few years ago they had no choice. Nevertheless, this process is more 
accentuated in some industries like the telecommunications, airlines and 
electricity, and less accentuated in other industries, such as water or rail transport. 
In the telecommunications sector, technological changes and demand growth 
played an important role in the liberalisation of the sector. They reduced the 
extension of natural monopoly and created the necessary conditions for new 
competitors to enter the market. Another implication of the reform of the network 
industries is that incumbents expand their activities beyond their traditional ones.  
Next, we present the different models of liberalisation. 
3.1.1.1 The different models of liberalisation 
There are three different routes to establishing market conditions and competition, 
i.e. to liberalise: competition in the market, competition for the market, and 
comparative competition. In practice, competition may not always develop despite 
the introduction of these rules. 
Competition in the market exists when operators compete for end users. It 
encompasses full market opening, third-party access or a combination of the two.  
Technical unbundling, i.e. the separation of the network into its reserved and 
competitive elements, is a pre-condition to third party access. The existence of a 
bottleneck or of an essential facility that can not be replicated (for physical or 
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economic reasons) and that is controlled by the historical operator are the reasons 
why the incumbent is asked to allow access to its network. There is third party 
access in energy (electricity and gas) and railways sectors. In the 
telecommunications sector there is also third party access but only to a specific 
part of the value chain, the last mile. Some countries, e.g. the United Kingdom 
(UK), also have third party access in the postal sector. In the UK, third party 
access is also being tested in the water sector, where it is already in law but only 
for large customers. The telecommunications sector in the EU is an example of a 
market that is fully opened to competition. The postal sector already has a date 
fixed for the full market opening.  
We now focus on the access regulation pertaining to competition in the market, 
namely the use of the infrastructure through third-party access. 
The “classic” third party access problem in the network industries involves 
requiring the owner of a monopoly infrastructure to allow a third party to provide 
a service using their infrastructure6. One of the main issues related to third-party 
access pertains to access pricing. The price should offer the access provider an 
adequate return on capital in order to encourage investment in the infrastructure 
and also encourage its efficient use by third parties. Often there is a concern with 
the fact that the incumbent may use its privileged position and regulated 
monopoly to increase the access price or to induce larger costs to the entrant in the 
access process. 
The principles governing access pricing are an application of natural monopoly 
pricing theories. In the event of scale or other economies, marginal cost pricing 
does not allow the firm to cover its total costs. If other sources of revenue are 
unavailable (e.g. tax revenues), then prices must be raised above marginal costs. 
In some cases, it is efficient to charge two-part tariffs. An important variant of 
two-part pricing is capacity based pricing, where the fixed component determines 
                                                           
6 Other types of access problems refer to cases where competing firms purchase essential inputs 
(e.g. the use of the infrastructure) from a monopolist and, in addition, the monopoly firm must 
purchase inputs from the competing firms. In this review, only the classic problem of one way 
access is considered. 
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the capacity, and the variable component depends upon the purchased quantity 
(being very high for quantity purchases above that capacity limit) (OECD, 2004).  
One of the main challenges for the regulator is the substantial requirements of 
information (e.g. on the cost structure of the regulated firms), as well as problems 
of asymmetry of information. Price-caps (i.e. the regulated firm sets prices subject 
to an overall constraint defined by the regulator) allow regulators to overcome 
these issues. 
Finally, it is important to mention the widely discussed efficient component 
pricing rule (ECPR), which was popularised by Baumol and Sidak (1994). ECPR 
states that the appropriate access price equals the monopolist’s opportunity cost of 
providing the access, ensuring that production or service provision is not diverted 
to an inefficient firm7. 
Competition for the market (operators compete for the right to operate in the 
sector) is an alternative to the cases where competition in the market is difficult or 
impossible to implement. Usually, it involves a competitive bidding where one of 
the operators bidding obtains a delegation contract. Competition for the market is 
the most common form of competition in the water sector.  
The definition and allocation of exclusive rights is very important when there is 
competition for the market. In terms of franchising, it is important to define the 
way firms are selected and the conditions under which they are to operate. There 
are different reasons for allocating the right of supply to a firm, such as the 
existence of a natural monopoly, potential for cream-skimming, or technological 
or resource scarcity. The franchisee normally becomes a monopolist in a specific 
market for the duration of the franchise.  
The franchise may be directly awarded by the public authority or it may be 
allocated through competitive bidding (based on public interest or pricing 
criteria). The degree of competition of the allocation process is an important 
variable to take into account. The fairness and transparency of the competitive 
                                                           
7 For a critical view on ECPR see, for example, Economides and White (1995). 
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process is essential in determining its consequences on allocative and productive 
efficiency. 
Comparative competition (also called yardstick or benchmark competition) 
consists of comparing the performance of different firms operating in similar 
services but in different locations. The variables often used for comparison are 
operating costs, prices, and service quality. Comparative competition exists in the 
water sector and in the energy sector, at a local level, for transport prices. 
3.1.1.2 The state of liberalisation in the EU 
In this section, we briefly describe the process and current state of liberalisation in 
each of the network industries in the EU. 
In order to create a single market for air transport, the EU initiated in the 1980s 
the liberalisation of its air transport sector. The first package of liberalisation 
measures was adopted in December 1987 and the second in 1990. In January 1993 
it applied the third package of measures regarding internal air transport, which 
was determinant for the liberalisation and competition in the sector and to 
establish common rules and standards, namely in safety and security. In 1997 the 
domestic markets of Member States were opened to competition (freedom to 
provide “cabotage”8). In July 2006, the European Commission made a proposal 
for modernising and simplifying the legal framework for the internal air transport 
market and, in 2007, an agreement was reached. The main objective of the new 
legislation is to impose price transparency and to better control the airlines in 
order to ensure more safety and quality for the passengers. The air transport can 
be considered to be almost fully liberalised. There are, however, some conditions 
that prevail in the industry (namely bottlenecks like airports) which, in some 
cases, prevent competition from being effective. 
The first step towards opening of the electricity market was the Directive 
96/92/EC, which established common rules for the internal market in electricity 
                                                           
8 “Cabotage” is the right for an airline of one Member State to operate a route within another 
Member State. 
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and set the pace for the progressive market opening of the sector. In 2003, the 
European Commission introduced a new Electricity Directive (Directive 
2003/54/EC) and Gas Directive (Directive 2003/55/EC). These directives were a 
decisive step towards accomplishing the internal market of the energy sector. The 
deadlines established for the full market opening for business customers was July 
1st, 2004 and for households July 1st, 2007. The evolving environment and the 
need to enhance the energy security and competitiveness led the EU to propose a 
new package of measures in the beginning of 2007. 
The history of rail freight liberalisation in Europe starts in 1991 with Directive 
91/440/EC and the subsequent First Railway Package which concerned: 
management autonomy and independency, vertical separation of the 
infrastructure, debt and state aid, and access to the infrastructure. In 1995, the 
Commission felt the need to complement this directive with two other directives 
(Directive 95/18/EC and 95/19/EC) on licensing, capacity allocation and charging, 
which were transposed only in 1997. In 2001 the EU implemented the rail 
interoperability and infrastructure package composed of three directives: 
2001/12/EC on the development of European railways (amends Directive 
91/440/EC), 2001/13/EC on licensing (amends Directive 95/18/EC), and 
2001/14/EC on capacity allocation, infrastructure charging, and safety 
certification. A second railway package was adopted in 2004. This package 
extended access rights to all types of rail freight service starting January 1st, 2007. 
It also extended the scope of interoperability directives and provides a common 
approach to European rail safety. 
In order to promote the liberalisation and harmonisation of the EU 
telecommunications market, the European Commission introduced various 
directives, which together make up the "1998 regulatory package". This package 
was primarily designed to manage the transition from monopoly to competition 
and was, therefore, focused on the creation of a competitive market and the rights 
of new entrants. In 1998, all the telecommunications services and networks, in 
Europe were liberalised. The growing convergence between telecoms, 
broadcasting and information technology led to the adaptation of the rules which 
were reviewed in 2002 (2003 policy framework). A new revision was launched in 
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2007 in order to adapt the framework to the fast development of the 
telecommunications sector. 
The water sector has not been subject to the same rules regarding the European 
policy of liberalisation of services until now. It is not expected that the 
liberalisation process in this sector in the EU will converge towards a single 
model, for two main reasons. Firstly, the EU is clear about its neutrality regarding 
asset ownership. Secondly, according to the subsidiarity principle, nation states 
are left with significant areas of competence, including on water services, given 
the fact that these are by definition local services (Luís-Manso, 2004). The 
liberalisation of the water sector is made at a national or local level. Since the 
measures adopted vary from country to country, it is not possible to describe them 
here. 
The case of the postal sector is treated in section 3.1.3. 
3.1.2 Development of competition in the network industries 
Liberalisation does not necessarily lead to an increase in competition because of 
the existence of barriers to entry. Some of these are intrinsically related to the 
special characteristics of the network industries. 
3.1.2.1 Barriers to the development of competition 
Barriers to entry refer to disadvantages (such as higher costs, difficulties accessing 
key inputs, etc) that affect potential entrants but not incumbents, and that might 
restrict entry or prevent it from occurring in cases where incumbent firms are 
earning excess profits. The supra-normal profits earned by the incumbent due to 
barriers to entry should not be confused with cost disadvantages that arise because 
incumbent firms are more efficient than potential entrants (Nera, 2004, Bain, 
1956). 
Barriers to entry can be classified into two types: legal and natural barriers to 
entry. Included in the legal barriers are the barriers created by regulation such as 
the reserved area in the postal sector and the licensing processes that make 
entrance difficult or impossible. Regulatory uncertainty and asymmetries can also 
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work as entry barriers. An example of regulatory asymmetries is the difference in 
the Value Added Tax (VAT) treatment between new entrants and the historical 
operator in the postal sector. In general, legal entry barriers are specific to a sector 
since they result from sector legislation. In the scope of this thesis, we are more 
interested in understanding the barriers to entry that characterise the majority of 
the network industries, i.e. the natural barriers to entry.  
The natural barriers to entry can be divided into two groups: those related to the 
demand side and those related to the supply side. The first group includes 
reputation of the incumbent, switching costs, portfolio effects, and customer 
inertia. In the second group, there are economies of scale, economies of density, 
economies of scope, sunk costs, network effects, and capital requirements or 
financing.  
A description of demand side barriers to entry is as follows. The fact that the 
incumbent operates for a large number of years and the quality of his service is 
well known may play a role in customers’ choice. Entrants, however, do not have 
any reputation and may have a hard time establishing themselves. Often, 
customers are risk averse and prefer the solution that presents less uncertainty. 
The existence of switching costs, i.e. costs associated with a change of suppliers, 
can also play in favour of the incumbent. If customers face high switching costs 
they will most certainly prefer not to change to another competitor.  
The portfolio effects are related to the fact that it may be convenient for the 
customer to consume two or more products/services from the same firm instead of 
contacting a second supplier. Since incumbents have large portfolios they are 
more likely to benefit from this behaviour than new competitors. 
Another phenomenon observed frequently among customers is customer inertia. 
Customer inertia can be related to switching costs and uncertainty related to the 
quality of the entrant’s products/services, but it can also be exclusively an 
irrational behavioural matter.  
Next, the supply side barriers to entry are examined. Economies of scale exist 
when the unitary cost of production decreases as output and the network size 
increases in the same proportion (Nera, 2004). More formally, an industry is said 
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to be a natural monopoly if at any level of output (Y) the cost function is sub-
additive, i.e. the cost of producing a certain level of output is smaller if it is a 
single firm producing it: 
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In other words, a market has natural monopoly characteristics if there are 
increasing returns to scale. When there is severe natural monopoly, competition is 
inefficient and in the limit might not be feasible because two or more firms can 
not profitably coexist. Gas and electricity transmission and distribution, and water 
supply are examples of utilities with severe natural monopoly cost conditions 
(Armstrong et al., 1994). 
Economies of density are defined as a decrease in unit cost resulting from a traffic 
increase on a fixed network (Nera, 2004). 
Economies of scope refer to the cost advantages enjoyed by a firm by providing 
two or more products/services using the same network infrastructure. 
Sunk costs are costs related to entry that can not be recovered if the firm exits the 
market. If access to the incumbent’s physical network is not possible, the 
existence of sunk costs might discourage new companies from entering the 
market. Entrants will enter the market only if their expected profit is high enough 
to cover these costs. Examples of industries or activities that have a high degree of 
sunk costs are the electricity industry, the railway industry, and long distance 
telecommunications.  
Network effects exist when additional consumers of a product or service increase 
the attractiveness of that same product or service for other consumers. This is the 
case in the telecommunications sector, for instance. Incumbents have a clear 
advantage over entrants regarding this issue, since they enjoy more network 
effects. 
Capital requirements or financing can also work as an entry barrier. Since entrants 
are less well known than incumbents and incumbents have a lot of power in the 
market, financial institutions may find it too risky to finance entrants. Therefore, 
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entrants may face considerable difficulties finding financing for their investments, 
which can prevent entry. 
3.1.2.2 The state of competition in the EU 
There are significant differences among countries in Europe regarding the 
development of competition in the network industries. In some countries (like the 
UK) competition in these industries is more developed while others (like France) 
lag behind. The aim of this section is to give a general overview of what the 
results of the liberalisation process described in section 3.1.1.2 are. 
The liberalisation process of air transport has definitely promoted the 
development of competition in this sector in Europe. Several new airlines have 
entered the industry with a consequent decrease in prices. There are, however, 
some bottlenecks that persist, which are related to airport infrastructures and to air 
traffic control systems. 
Regarding the energy sector, there is still some work to be done in order to give 
real choice for EU energy users (citizens and businesses), and to boost the 
investment in energy. A clearer separation of energy production from energy 
distribution and interconnection seems to be critical for these ends. In the 
upstream activities, the energy sector enjoys some level of competition. In the gas 
industry, the clear distinction between the commodity and its transport strongly 
favoured the development of competition among industrial customers. A single 
competitive European energy market has not yet been achieved, although some 
progress has been made.  
Competition in the rail freight market is progressively reaching all European 
countries. According to the Community of European Railway and Infrastructure 
Companies, there are now almost 700 licensed companies in the EU that offer rail 
transport services. Competition in rail freight is especially marked on certain 
corridors that are relevant from the economic point of view (e.g. the Rotterdam-
Genoa corridor, which links the biggest European seaport with the industry 
regions in Western Germany and Northern Italy). Intramodal competition has 
been emerging on those corridors (CER, 2007). 
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Competition in the telecommunications sector has strongly developed since its 
liberalisation. The number of fixed-line telecom operators doubled between 1998 
and 2003. New entrants invested in new services and infrastructure, and the prices 
of telecommunications services decreased. Incumbents have also made important 
investments in the electronic communications services over the past decades. 
Today, approximately half of the turnover generated in the electronic 
communications markets in Europe comes from new entrants. A true pan-
European telecom industry is emerging (Reding, 2006). 
The specificities of the water sector hampered the liberalisation of the sector, at 
least liberalisation in the image of other network industries. In fact, there are no 
EU directives calling for the opening of the markets. It is very difficult to 
implement competition in the market due to strong network and economies of 
scale, the obligation to provide services of general interest (SGI), and quality 
issues. However, and despite the evidence that many parts of the sector are 
considered as natural monopolies, new dynamics are pushing towards the opening 
of markets to competition, i.e. to a de facto liberalisation (Luís-Manso, 2004). 
Competition for the market, or ex-ante competition, is the most common form of 
competition in the water sector (e.g. France, Spain and Italy). It consists of 
competing for the right to operate in the sector, i.e. for a delegation contract. 
Comparative competition (also called yardstick or benchmark competition) is also 
sometimes used in the water sector (e.g. in England and Wales).  
The case of the postal sector is developed in the next section. 
3.1.3 The case of the postal sector 
In this section we analyse the postal sector in detail since this will be the case 
studied in the empirical analysis (Chapter 5). We restrict ourselves to the study of 
the letter segment. Throughout this thesis when we mention “postal sector” we 
refer only to the letter segment, if not specified otherwise. 
For the purposes of this thesis, the traditional value chain of the postal sector is 
considered. The postal value chain can be divided into the following activities: 
clearance, outward sorting, transport, inward sorting, and delivery. Clearance 
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consists of the process of collecting postal items from postal offices, street letter 
boxes, or directly from the customer, and introducing them in the sorting plant. 
Then the postal items are sorted by destination area (outward sorting) and 
transported to the destination area or to a central sorting plant. The transport of 
postal items within the same area is considered to be part of clearance or delivery. 
The inward sorting corresponds to the sorting of postal items to be delivered in a 
certain area. Finally, the postal items are delivered, i.e. transported from the 
sorting plant to the recipients.   
We start by describing the different models of liberalisation in the postal sector. 
Then, we analyse the barriers to the development of competition that are specific 
to this sector. Finally, we examine the state of competition in the European postal 
sector. 
3.1.3.1 The different models of liberalisation 
In the postal sector, there are two models of competition: end-to-end competition 
and competition with access to the incumbent’s network. These two models are 
not mutually exclusive and can coexist in the same country. Access to the 
incumbent’s network can be of two types (according to the stage at which access 
occurs): worksharing or upstream access, and downstream access.  
End-to-end competition is the European regulatory approach to liberalisation. It 
consists of opening the market by allowing competition with the historical 
operator along the entire value chain, without granting access to the incumbent's 
network. The market is opened progressively accordingly with some price or 
weight limitations. Simultaneously, the incumbent keeps the Universal Service 
Obligation (USO). One of the main drawbacks of end-to-end competition is that 
the incumbent struggles as he must provide the universal service while losing 
monopoly, i.e. market share.  
Worksharing consists of unbundling the postal value chain while maintaining the 
delivery monopoly of the historical operator. The new entrants can select the 
activities (collection, franking, pre-sorting, consolidation and other types of mail 
preparation) they want to perform, provided that the incumbent performs the 
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delivery function. The competitors negotiate with the historical operator the 
discounts they get from performing the selected activities. In some cases, if no 
agreement is reached, the regulatory authority intervenes. In general, the 
incumbent is obliged to offer the same conditions or rates to all the competitors. 
Again, the historical operator has the burden of providing the universal service, 
but this time the access fees of the competitors help the incumbent to finance its 
USO. Worksharing creates opportunities for mailers and third-party consolidators 
to enter the market. Worksharing is the model used in the USA to introduce 
competition in the postal sector. In France, there is also a long history of 
worksharing.  
The so-called “worksharing with bypass” corresponds to a situation where both 
end-to-end competition and worksharing are possible. 
Another variation within worksharing refers to the entity that gets the worksharing 
discounts. In some countries, the discounts are conceded exclusively to the 
incumbent’s customer, who may have already paid a third party to perform 
upstream activities (e.g. Switzerland, The Netherlands, and Portugal). A direct 
consequence of this procedure is that no consolidation is allowed. In other 
countries, the incumbent may have contracts with both customers and third parties 
(i.e. they also accept mail directly from the third parties - e.g. France). 
Worksharing or upstream access is usually advantageous to both the entrant and 
the incumbent, at least when it is subject to the process of business negotiations. 
The entrant chooses to undertake upstream access when it can perform an 
upstream activity at a lower cost than the incumbent. The incumbent provides 
access discounts equal to the average avoided cost of upstream activities 
bypassed. 
Downstream access concerns the access to the local delivery network. Only in a 
few European countries, does postal legislation require the Universal Service 
Provider (USP) to give its competitors access to its delivery network. When it is 
not possible to reach an agreement, the regulator intervenes and often settles the 
access price. Downstream access to the incumbent’s network started to be 
imposed in order to facilitate the liberalization of upstream services. This is the 
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case in the United Kingdom (analysed in detail in chapter 5) and in Germany, 
where mandatory downstream access has been recently introduced. Deutsche Post, 
the German historical operator, is obliged by law to provide downstream access 
under conditions mostly settled by the regulator (BundesNetzAgentur). The EU 
Postal Directive does not provide for a specific regulation of downstream access 
but it requires transparency and non-discriminatory treatment concerning special 
tariffs (Wik, 2006). 
Downstream access is considered, by some, to be important in the early stages of 
competition in order to facilitate entry. However, when imposed by law and if the 
entrant has the option to bypass the incumbent’s network it may lead to distortions 
and to cream-skimming. 
The common practice concerning access pricing is to charge a uniform rate 
according to the amount of upstream work performed (Avoided Cost Pricing, 
ACP). Another way to proceed in terms of access pricing is to base the access 
price on the work that is still to be performed in delivering the mail, and not in the 
work that was done (Delivery-Area Access Pricing, DAP). With this approach the 
mail destination is taken into account in the access price. A third possibility is the 
Negotiated Access Pricing (NAP), where the free negotiation between the 
incumbent and the firm asking for access determines the access price 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2006). The Netherlands and Sweden are examples of 
countries where NAP is in force.  
3.1.3.2 The state of liberalisation 
The postal sector in Europe is subject to both EU and national legislation. In the 
majority of the countries, it is the European legislation that has been driving the 
liberalisation process. 
The aim of the postal policy of the EU is to complete the single market for postal 
services and to ensure their supply at affordable prices with a minimum level of 
efficiency, reliability and quality to all European citizens. In order to accomplish 
these objectives, a regulatory framework for European postal services was 
established. 
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The liberalisation of the postal sector started in 1992 with the Green Paper on the 
development of the single market for postal services. It followed in 1997 the first 
Directive (97/67/EC) on the liberalization of the sector, which introduced 
common rules for the gradual market opening and development of a single market 
within the European Union. In 2002 the European Parliament and the Council 
adopted the second Directive (2002/39/EC) that amends the Directive of 1997 and 
speeds up the liberalization process by defining further steps concerning market 
opening. 
Besides the definition of the maximum reserved area (whose evolution is 
described in detail in Chapter 5, section 5.2.2.2) the directives also set: a 
minimum universal service, the conditions determining the provision of non-
reserved services and access to the network, tariff principles and the transparency 
of accounts, minimums for quality of service, and the harmonisation of technical 
standards. Moreover, directive 97/67/EC required the creation of independent 
national regulatory authorities. 
The full market opening of the postal sector is programmed for 2011 with a few 
exceptions. However, some EU countries decided not to wait for this date to 
accomplish the full market opening. Sweden, Finland, and Estonia have already 
fully liberalised their postal markets for some years, and the British postal market 
has been completely opened to competition since the 1st of January, 2006. Spain 
has the intra-city mail historically opened to competition. In the remaining 
countries, the percentage of postal market that is liberalised (in terms of volumes) 
does not yet reach fifty percent. 
3.1.3.3 Barriers to the development of competition 
There are several legal barriers to entry in the postal sector. Among the barriers 
created by regulation are the reserved area, licensing processes, and regulatory 
uncertainty and asymmetries. Included in the set of legal asymmetries in the postal 
sector are the difference in the VAT treatment between new entrants and the 
historical operator, the access to the P.O. Boxes and to letterboxes, and the 
obligation to provide universal service. 
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The reserved area is, at present, the main legal barrier that prevents the entry of 
new operators in the postal market. Today the reserved area is limited to items of 
correspondence weighting less than 50 grams and costing less than two and a half 
times the basic tariff. Although the reserved area has been progressively reduced, 
potential entrants have difficulties to enter the market or to increase their market 
share because they can not offer their clients a comprehensive business solution. 
Licensing processes constitute in many countries an important barrier to entry. In 
some cases the licence requirements are such that potential entrants are prevented 
from adopting the most interesting business models. The most restrictive 
requirements are related to the minimum number of times per week that delivery 
should take place, to the required national coverage of the network, and to the 
type of services provided. For example, in Estonia and Finland, operators must 
provide all services under the USO in order to obtain a licence. The Netherlands is 
one of the few countries where no licence or authorisation is required (Ecorys, 
2005). 
The full market opening was recently set for 2011 (although with some 
exceptions), which has considerably reduced regulatory uncertainty. However, 
there is still uncertainty concerning the USO and licensing requirements that may 
affect or delay investors’ decisions. 
The difference in the VAT treatment between new entrants and the historical 
operator creates a clear disadvantage to the competitors of the USP. In fact, the 
incumbent does not have to levy VAT and, consequently, cannot reclaim paid 
VAT. Because of its VAT exemption, the incumbents’ services will be cheaper 
than those of the competitors. The price difference between the national postal 
operators and the entrants originated by the different VAT treatments is 
minimised if the customer buying the postal services can reclaim the VAT. The 
advantage of the incumbent over the competitors is nevertheless clear regarding 
customers that cannot reclaim the VAT (Ecorys, 2005). 
Another important barrier to entry in delivery is the access to the P.O. Boxes and 
to letterboxes. If the entrants are not granted access to either the P.O. Boxes or the 
letterboxes, entry in some segments is unlikely. In some European countries 
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(namely Austria, France and Poland), only the postmen from the USP has access 
to the letterboxes located inside certain apartment buildings, which have the front 
door locked (Ecorys, 2005). 
The USO also originates a discriminatory treatment between the national postal 
operator and competitors because it imposes strong restrictions on the business 
model of the USP. These restrictions are related with the size of the network, the 
frequency of delivery, and the uniform price. In the majority of the countries, the 
burden of the USO falls exclusively over the USP. The exceptions among the 
member states are: Estonia, Finland, and Sweden. The USP is granted a reserved 
area in order to compensate for the USO. After the full liberalisation, the reserved 
area will disappear but some obligations related with the universal service 
provision may persist (Ecorys, 2005). 
Regarding the natural barriers to entry, all barriers to entry related to the demand 
side described in section 3.1.2.1 are present in the postal sector. The barriers to 
entry related to the supply side are also present in the postal sector in a larger or 
smaller scale with the exception of the network effects, which are small or 
inexistent in the postal sector. 
The potential economies of scale in the sector depend on the number of collection 
points, sorting centres, transport routes and delivery points. When an increase in 
the size of the network or in the mail volume allows a reduction in the long run 
average cost of each unit then there are economies of scale. According to Nera 
(2004), there are no economies of scale for end-to-end mail processing in the 
former Member States,  but there seem to be economies of scale in the new 
Member States. If that is the case, then a competitor postal operator with a 
relatively smaller network and smaller volumes can enjoy the same cost 
advantages based on economies of scale as the incumbent. However, these 
findings are controversial. 
There are important economies of density in the postal sector. The economies of 
density in the postal sector are related to the total mail volume handled through 
the network and to the geographic characteristics of a country. For instance, 
economies of density are significant in countries where mail per capita is small, 
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population density is also small, and/or the geography of the country makes it 
difficult to reach certain regions.  
Examples of economies of scope in the postal sector are the delivery of both 
transaction mail and direct mail, or addressed mail and un-addressed mail (Nera, 
2004). Entrants do not enjoy as much economies of scope as the incumbent since 
their portfolio of products is smaller. 
The postal sector is probably, among the network industries, the sector where 
sunk costs are least important. In fact, this is one of the features that distinguish it 
from other network industries. The main features of the postal network, namely 
delivery and road transport, do not have significant sunk costs (Nera, 2004). The 
incumbent’s delivery network can be replicated more readily than the delivery 
network of an incumbent in the energy sector, for instance. Nevertheless, the 
collection network and the sorting equipment give rise to sunk costs. 
3.1.3.4 The state of competition 
Competition in the postal sector (letter segment) has been developing very slowly. 
In all the countries from the EU, except Spain, the incumbents preserve a market 
share of at least ninety percent in addressed mail. In fact, in the large majority of 
these countries, the entrants’ market share does not exceed two percent, indicating 
that competition is still very limited. However, it should be noted that in 2006 all 
countries, except Finland, Estonia, United Kingdom and Sweden, still had 
reserved areas of 50 or 100 grams. According to Wik (2004), lowering the weight 
threshold to 50 grams opens only 25 percent of the letter post market to 
competition. This fact partially explains the reduced competition observed in 
those countries. 
Incumbents in the postal sector enjoy some other special and exclusive rights that 
may contribute to discouraging new competitors to enter the market. The special 
tax treatment accorded to the USPs is often mentioned. Also, the USPs enjoy a 
preferential treatment regarding customs as compared to other operators (Wik, 
2006). Moreover, competition in the delivery segment is difficult, given the 
economies of scale that delivery entails.  
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We are now going to focus on the countries that are more advanced in terms of 
liberalisation. 
Spain has the highest level of actual competition in the European letter post 
market because intra-city letter mail, which represents a large share of the total 
volume of mail, is historically open to competition. The market share of the 
incumbent in Spain is approximately eighty-nine percent. “In Spain private 
operators deliver a higher percentage of letter post items than in Member States 
which have repealed the reserved area entirely.” (Wik, 2006: page 55).  
Sweden follows Spain. Among the four member states that have already 
accomplished full market opening (Estonia, Finland, United Kingdom, and 
Sweden), Sweden is the one where competition is the most developed. The 
Swedish postal market has been completely open to competition since 1993. In 
Sweden, the license requirements to deliver addressed mail are not restrictive. 
Moreover, there are no licence requirements to deliver catalogues, magazines and 
un-addressed mail. Nevertheless, the development of competition has been slow 
and today the incumbent still preserves a very dominant position. This slow 
development of competition can be related to different factors. Ecorys (2005) 
advances as  possible explanations the fact that, initially, the legislation was not 
adapted to support or create the preconditions for competition. Also, CityMail (the 
largest competitor of the incumbent, Posten AB) faced numerous internal 
problems that limited its business development and expansion. Since 1991, the 
year when CityMail entered the market, it faced bankruptcy several times (Box 1). 
It was, however, able to stay in the market and to expand its geographical area of 
activity. Finally, Sweden has a large territory with a low population density, 
which may demotivate entry.      
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Box 1: CityMail Business Model 
“CityMail delivers only pre-sorted mailings with at least 500 items. Customers 
need to sort their mail to all five numbers of the postal code and book the day of 
delivery in advance. This allows CityMail to abstain from capital-intensive 
investments in automatic sorting facilities. CityMail’s strategy is based on three 
main factors. First, customers can rely on the exact day of delivery of all items 
three days after the mail has been handed in, a preciseness that Sweden Post offers 
only at a surcharge. Second, CityMail offers updating and tracing address data as 
an important component of mail delivery, in order to guarantee their customers 
effective mailings. The third factor is the price aspect, since CityMail’s prices are 
significantly lower than those of Posten AB. Customers have to be aware that they 
can benefit from CityMail’s lower prices only by sharing a greater amount of pre-
sorting than at Posten AB. Although Posten AB has worksharing discounts for 
large mailings as well, there are differences concerning the permitted content of 
mailings and the minimum volumes: Posten AB accepts only direct marketing 
mail whereas CityMail accepts all mass mailings regardless of content and has a 
lower minimum volume requirement than Posten AB.” (Wik, 2004: page 95) 
 
After Spain and Sweden, the countries where competition is most developed are 
Germany, The Netherlands, and Estonia. However, one would expect Finland and 
Estonia to be at the level of Sweden or, at least, to follow it closely, in terms of 
development of competition in the postal market. The fact that two countries 
(Germany and The Netherlands) that are less liberalised than Finland and Sweden 
have the same or a higher level of competition than those that are more liberalised 
is surprising. The justification is the following: although Finland and Estonia 
liberalised their mail markets some years ago, competition has not emerged in 
these countries, mainly due to the restrictive licence conditions and taxation 
policy (Ecorys, 2005).  
In Finland, the postal law requires all the postal operators to collect and deliver 
mail on a daily basis. Moreover, the operators have to achieve next working day 
delivery of 95 percent of domestic items. These requirements are a serious barrier 
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to entrants that, in the beginning of the activity, do not have the necessary 
volumes and financial means to satisfy these requirements. In Finland, potential 
entrants are also required to provide postal services in the whole territory of the 
country9. If they opt for license restricted to a certain area they will have to 
support an additional turnover tax of 5-20%, depending on the territorial coverage 
of mail delivery. The spirit of these measures is to avoid cream-skimming and to 
ensure national coverage, but today they work as serious obstacles to competition. 
In Estonia, all the postal operators providing services inside the universal service 
area are also required to provide services at a uniform price, to deliver at least five 
times per week, and to cover the whole territory of Estonia. The postal service 
providers are also subject to requirements concerning the collection and delivery 
network, namely regarding the distance from postal users. Nevertheless, the 
Estonian postal law is not as restrictive as the Finnish one. In fact, in 2004, 
Estonia had already more than twenty courier and three direct mail service 
providers who were not subject to the licence requirements (besides one licence 
holder providing universal service) (Wik, 2004). 
In 2004, competition in the UK postal market was below the British postal 
regulator’s (Postcomm) expectations. Postcomm presented as main justification 
for this the difficulties in obtaining access to Royal Mail’s network, Royal Mail’s 
exemption from value added tax (not shared by other operators), the interim 
nature of licences, and some customer inertia to change (Wik, 2004). Additional 
measures were adopted in an attempt to stimulate competition. In 2004 mandatory 
downstream access was introduced and in 2006 the reserved area was completely 
eliminated. The results of these measures are still to be observed.  
                                                           
9 With the exception of the Aland Islands in Finland. 
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3.2 Liberalisation and innovation 
The impact of liberalisation on innovation depends on whether liberalisation 
results in:  
• actual competition 
• no actual or potential competition 
• potential competition only. 
The impact of liberalisation on innovation when liberalisation turns into 
competition, i.e. when there is actual competition, is studied in Chapter 4. 
Liberalisation results in no actual or potential competition when there are strong 
barriers to entry on the supply side with no mechanisms put in place to overcome 
those barriers. In this case, the threat of competition is not real and, therefore, 
liberalisation has no effect on innovation. For example, if there are strong sunk 
costs and access to the incumbent’s network is not possible, then liberalisation has 
no effect on innovation.  
Potential competition exists when: (1) there are no strong barriers to entry on the 
supply side; however, actual competition does not develop; or (2) there are 
barriers to entry yet there is regulation capable of overcoming those barriers and 
making the threat of competition real. Based on the literature on the relationship 
between competition and innovation as well as on the theory of contestable 
markets, we argue that if there is liberalisation with only potential competition 
than there is a positive impact on innovation. 
The vast literature on the effect of competition on innovation (discussed in 
Chapter 2) identifies a positive and a negative effect of competition on innovation. 
The positive effect is a result of the firm’s quest to optimize profits by increasing 
its efficiency and reducing its cost of production. Profitability pushes the 
development and adoption of more efficient technologies and processes. The 
negative effect is related to the fact that competition decreases the rents of the 
monopolist and might reduce its market share. Therefore, revenue will also 
decrease. As a result, firms will have fewer resources to invest, for instance, in 
research and development. Similarly, they may encounter more difficulties when 
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trying to recover potential investments in new technologies and new processes 
because of erosion of scale or scope economies resulting from lost market share 
under competition. These two effects co-exist when liberalisation leads to the 
development of competition. However, if liberalisation is not followed by the 
development of competition, firms do not lose market share nor scale economies 
and their capacity to invest in new technologies and processes should be larger, as 
compared to a situation where there are other firms operating in the market. In this 
case, the negative effect does not exist but the positive effect subsists. Hence, 
liberalisation per se is expected to have a positive effect, larger than that of 
competition, on innovation.  
The theory of contestable markets (discussed in Chapter 2) argues that under free 
entry and exit, the threat of competition per se is sufficient for firms to become 
more efficient and to originate a decrease in prices. In order to increase efficiency, 
firms have to invest in new technology and new processes, i.e. they have to 
innovate. In this sense, it can be said that the theory of contestable markets 
suggests a positive effect of potential liberalisation on innovation. 
For example, when there are no sunk costs or they are not too strong yet 
competition does not develop, liberalisation is expected to have a positive impact 
on innovation (independently of the access to the incumbent’s infrastructure). 
Also, if there are strong sunk costs but access regulation requires the incumbent to 
provide access to its network, then liberalisation is expected to have a positive 
effect on innovation.  
We conclude that the impact of liberalisation on innovation when liberalisation is 
not followed by competition, depends on the presence of natural barriers to entry 
on the supply side (e.g. sunk costs) and on the mechanisms put in place (or not) to 
overcome the obstructive effect of these barriers (e.g. access regulation). The size 
or intensity of those barriers to entry is also relevant. 
In the case of the postal sector the barriers to entry are not very accentuated. In 
particular, sunk costs are negligible. Hence, we expect a positive impact of 
liberalisation on innovation. This hypothesis is tested empirically in Chapter 5. 
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3.3 Concluding remarks 
The liberalisation of the network industries is en route in Europe. Some industries, 
like the telecommunications, air transport, and rail freight are already fully 
liberalised. Others already have a deadline to accomplish full market opening, like 
the postal sector. The energy sector is also quite advanced regarding its 
liberalisation. The water sector is not an object of European regulation; decisions 
concerning the introduction of competition in the sector are made at a national or 
even local level. 
The development of competition has been faster in some sectors than in others. 
The telecommunications sector enjoys a considerable level of competition. 
Competition is also visible in air transport. In the postal sector (letter segment), 
competition is still very limited even in countries that have completely liberalised 
the postal markets. In the remaining sectors, only recently have signs of 
competition become apparent. Interconnection of the incumbent’s infrastructure 
with those of the entrants has been revealed as essential to allow competition and 
to overcome some natural barriers to entry. 
Regarding the effect of liberalisation on innovation, we argue that it depends upon 
the presence and intensity of natural barriers to entry on the supply side and on the 
mechanisms implemented to overcome those barriers. If there are no strong 
barriers to entry, then there is potential competition and, consequently a positive 
effect on innovation is expected. If there are barriers to entry, but there is 
regulation capable of overcoming those barriers and making the threat of 
competition real, then liberalisation will have a positive impact on innovation. 
Inversely, if there are barriers to entry and no mechanisms to make the threat of 
competition real, then liberalisation will not have any effect on innovation.   
In short, in order to understand the impact of liberalisation on innovation one has 
to analyse the existence and intensity of natural barriers to entry as well as of 
mechanisms capable of overcoming the obstructive effect of those barriers and of 
making the threat of competition real. 
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4. Theoretical model - Investments in innovation made by an 
incumbent under various market structures 
In Chapter 3 we started by analysing the relationship between liberalisation and 
the development of competition in the network industries. After, we examined the 
relationship between liberalisation and innovation. We are now going to study the 
effect of competition on innovation. For that purpose we will develop and analyse, 
in this chapter, a model of incumbent network operator investment in innovation 
when the incumbent is a monopolist and when it faces an entrant. 
The incumbent and the entrant compete in prices. The objectives of the incumbent 
are specified in a general manner to allow for revenue, profit, and/or welfare 
maximisation, subject to the profit being non-negative. The general objective 
function of the incumbent has the following form: 1 2 3I IR Wα α α+ ∏ + , where 
1 2 3,  and α α α  are weights given to revenue ( IR ), profit ( I∏ ) and welfare (W ), 
respectively. Welfare is measured in the usual fashion as the unweighted sum of 
producer profits and consumer surplus. The incumbent’s marginal cost is a 
function of the amount invested in innovation. We assume this marginal cost 
function to be strictly convex and decreasing in innovation investment. The 
incumbent maximises its objective function with respect to prices and to 
investment in innovation. The entrant maximises its profit with respect to its price. 
The Nash equilibrium of the ensuring price-innovation game is characterised. 
The incumbent’s incentives to innovate under monopoly and duopoly are 
compared. The theoretical developments are examined through some 
computational experiments based on a calibrated model of innovation in the postal 
sector. The model development is nevertheless generic and applies to other 
industries. 
In the next section (4.1) we will present the theoretical model. Then we will 
describe the model’s calibration with data from the postal sector (4.2). Following 
this, the main results are presented (4.3) and the main findings are summarised in 
the concluding remarks (4.4). 
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4.1 Theoretical model 
For the purpose of investigating whether the incumbent’s investment in new 
technologies and processes is higher under competition or under monopoly in the 
context of network industries, two stages of competition are assumed. In the first 
stage, the historical operator or incumbent has a monopoly in the market, and in 
the second stage a new operator (entrant) enters the market and competes on price 
with the incumbent (duopoly). We will first characterise the demand side. 
4.1.1 Demand side 
Consumer preferences are assumed to be quasi-linear with respect to the 
incumbent’s and entrant’s products/services and money, so that: 
 
( , , ) ( , )I E I EU q q m V q q m= +   
 
where m  represents money spent on other goods and the willingness-to-pay 
function V for the incumbent’s and entrant’s products/services is assumed to be 
quadratic over the quantity of products/services consumed from the incumbent 
( Iq ) and from the entrant ( Eq ): 
 
2 2( , )
2 2
I E
I E I I I E E E I E
b bV q q a q q a q q e q qφ= − + − − , 
 
where 0a > , 0φ >  and 0b >  are the parameters that determine the size of the 
market and the slope of the demand curve. The parameter e , which varies 
between zero and one, determines the degree of differentiability of the services 
offered by the incumbent and the entrant. If e  is close to zero, then the services 
are highly differentiated. As e  approaches one, then the services become more 
homogeneous, being perfect substitutes when 1e = .  
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Only a representative consumer model is considered here; introducing consumer 
heterogeneity would only add notation with no additional insights.  The 
(representative) consumer maximises utility with respect to Iq  and Eq  subject to 
the following budget constraint, which clearly holds with equality at the optimum: 
 
I I E Ep q p q m M+ + ≤ , 
 
where Ip  and Ep  are the prices of the product/service supplied by the incumbent 
and the entrant, respectively. M  is the initial wealth endowment of the consumer. 
By solving the consumer’s problem, the following demand functions are obtained: 
 
( )2 21( , )I I E E I E E I E
I E
q p p b a e a b p e p
b b e
φ φφ= − − +−           (1) 
( )2 21( , )E I E I E I I E I
I E
q p p b a e a b p e p
b b e
φ φφ= − − +−           (2) 
 
A viable outcome in terms of non-negative quantities exists under the following 
conditions: 
 
( ) ( )E I I E Eb a p e a pφ− > −  , ( ) ( )I E E I Ib a p e a pφ− > −   and 2 2 0I Eb b e φ− >      (3) 
 
Adapting the utility function and the budget constraint of the consumer to a 
monopoly situation, i.e. setting Eq  equal to zero, the demand function in 
monopoly becomes: 
 
( )1( )I I I Iq p a pb= −  
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The condition to obtain a viable outcome under monopoly is I Ia p> . 
4.1.2 Supply side 
On the supply side, in both stages of competition the marginal cost of the 
incumbent ( Ic ) is assumed to depend on the investment in new technologies ( k ). 
The following marginal cost function, which is strictly convex and decreasing, is 
assumed: 
 
0( )
k
I Ic k c e
γ−=           
 
where 0Ic  is the initial marginal cost of the incumbent and γ  establishes the 
relationship between the investment in innovation or new technologies and the 
reduction in the marginal cost. The higher the value of γ  is, the lower the 
investment needed to attain a certain percentage of cost reduction is. This equation 
accommodates the assumption that if initial cost is high (e.g. due to internal 
inefficiency), then a smaller level of investment is needed to obtain a certain 
reduction in the marginal cost as compared to a situation where the initial cost is 
low. 
Our objective is to analyse how the incumbent’s incentives to innovate change 
under monopoly as compared to a competitive environment. Therefore, only the 
case where the incumbent has the choice to invest in innovation in order to reduce 
its marginal cost is considered. 
Many postal incumbents are public enterprises or have other forms of ownership 
and governance than profit-maximizing private firms.  To capture some of the 
richness inherent in these alternative ownership and governance structures, as well 
as the potential of regulation on these firms, various objectives are posited for the 
incumbent in the analysis that follows.  In particular, the incumbent modelled here 
can maximise sales revenue, profit, and/or welfare, subject to a breakeven 
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constraint on profit. For example the sales revenue maximisation objective might 
be relevant for a traditional public bureaucracy whose management is concerned 
primarily with maximising the size of the organisation (e.g., Niskanen, 1971), 
while a welfare maximisation objective might be relevant for a public enterprise 
that is explicitly regulated to achieve efficiency (in pricing).  The point of this 
rather general analysis is to consider the impact of alternative objectives that 
might credibly be advanced as representing the objectives of postal incumbents10 
on investment strategies.  
The objective function of the historical operator is assumed to have the following 
form: 1 2 3I IR Wα α α+ ∏ + , where 1 2 3,   and α α α  are non-negative weights, which 
without loss of generality are assumed to add up to one, attributed to the size of 
the firm as measured by revenue ( IR ), profit ( I∏ ) and welfare (W ), respectively. 
1α  is assumed to be different from one11, i.e. [ )1 0,1α ∈ , while [ ]2 3, 0,1α α ∈ . This 
weighted objective function allows the study of alternative preferences of the 
incumbent.  
4.1.2.1 Monopoly 
Under monopoly, the revenue and profit of the incumbent and the welfare are 
respectively given by:   
 
( ) ( )I I I I IR p p q p=  
 
( )( , ) ( ) ( )I I I I I I Ip k p c k q p k F∏ = − − −  
 
                                                           
10 See Crew and Kleindorfer (2008) for a related discussion of such a weighted objective function 
in the context of price-cap regulation. 
11 This is a purely technical assumption. 1α  can be extremely close to one but it can not be exactly 
one, otherwise there is no solution to the problem we are investigating.   
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( ) ( )( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )I I I I I I I I I I I I IW p k V q p p q p V q p c k q p k F= − +Π = − − −  
 
Hence, the Lagrangian for the breakeven-constrained incumbent can be written as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 2 3 3 2 3 2 3, , ( ) ( ) ( )I I I I I I I IL p k p c k q p V q p k Fλ α α λ α α λ α α α λ α α λ= + + − + + + − + + − + +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
 
where 0λ ≥  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the breakeven constraint, 
which measures the sensitivity of the optimal solution of the objective function to 
changes in required minimum profit level of the incumbent. 
 
Result 1: ( ), ,IL p k λ  is strictly concave in k  for any fixed prices and is also 
strictly concave in Ip  for any fixed k . Nevertheless, ( ), ,IL p k λ  is not jointly 
strictly concave. 
■ 
 
To see that ( ), ,IL p k λ  is strictly concave in k  for any fixed prices it is necessary 
to compute the first and second order derivatives with respect to k : 
 
( )[ ]
( )
2 3
2
2
2 32
( ) ( ) 1
( ) ( ) 0
I I I
I I I
L c k q p
k
L c k q p
k
α α λ γ
α α λ γ
∂ = + + −∂
∂ = − + + <∂
 
 
It is easy to see that ( ), ,IL p k λ  is also strictly concave in Ip  for any fixed k : 
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( )( ) ( )
( )
1 2 2 3 3
2
1 2 3
2
1 2 ( )
2
0
I I I I
I
I
L a p c k p
p b
L
p b
α α λ α α λ α
α α λ α
∂ = + + − + + + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦∂
− + + −∂ = <∂
 
 
Nevertheless, ( ), ,IL p k λ  is not jointly strictly concave, i.e. the Hessian matrix 
( H ) is not negative definite in the domain of ( ), ,IL p k λ . For H  to be negative 
definite, its first  order leading principal minor has to be negative and the second 
order leading principal minor has to be positive. Concerning the first order leading 
principal minor there are no problems since it is always negative:  
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 2
2 32
2 2 3
2 2
2 3 1 2 3
2
( )
( ) ( )
( ) 2
I
I I I
I
I
I I
L L c k
c k q pk k p bH
c kL L
p k p b b
α α λ γα α λ γ
α α λ γ α α λ α
⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ + +⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ − + + −⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟= =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+ + + + +∂ ∂ − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 
 
The second order leading principal minor is the one creating problems because it 
is not always positive: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
2 32
22 3
2 3 1 2 3
2 3 1 2 3
2
2 3
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 2
( ) 2
( )
I
I I I
I I I
I
I
c k
c k q p c k q pb
bc k
b b
c k
b
α α λ γα α λ γ α α λ γ α α λ α
α α λ γ α α λ α
α α λ γ
+ +− + + − + + + + +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦=+ + + + +− −
+ +⎡ ⎤− ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
 
However, given that ( ), ,IL p k λ  is strictly concave in Ip  for any fixed 0k ≥ , it is 
possible to derive the optimal Ip  from the necessary and sufficient first-order 
conditions.  
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Result 2: Assuming an interior solution for price, the optimal solution is 
characterized by 0
I
L
p
∂ =∂ , which yields: 
 
( ) ( )
( )1 2 2 3* 1 2
( )
( )
1 2
I I
I
a c k
p k
α α λ α α λ
α α λ
+ + + + += + + +                                                        (4) 
■ 
 
Since *( )Ip k  is unique and feasible for every 0k ≥ , the problem of 
( ){ }max , , 0, 0, 0I IL p k p kλ λ≥ ≥ ≥  can be restated as 
( ){ }*max ( ), , 0, 0IL p k k kλ λ≥ ≥ . The solution is recovered as ( )* * * *( ), ,Ip k k λ  
where *k  solves ( ){ }*max ( ), , 0, 0IL p k k kλ λ≥ ≥ . From equation (4) is possible 
to obtain: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
* * *
1 2 2 3 3
2*3
2 3 2 3
1( ), , ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2
I I I I I I
I I I
L p k k p k c k a a p k
b
a p k k F
b
λ α α λ α α λ α
α α α λ α α λ
⎡ ⎤= + + − + + + −⎣ ⎦
− − − + + − + +
      (5) 
 
The first order conditions for ( ){ }*max ( ), , 0, 0IL p k k kλ λ≥ ≥ are: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )* * *( ), , ( ), , ( ), ,
0; 0; 0I I I
L p k k L p k k L p k k
k
k k
λ λ λ
λ
∂ ∂ ∂≤ ≥ =∂ ∂ ∂                      (6) 
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An interior solution 0k >  is obtained from (6) only if ( )* ( ), , 0IL p k k kλ∂ ∂ = . 
From (5) one can obtain: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
*
*
1 2 2 3*
*
*
1 2 2 3 3
*
*3
2 3
( )
( ) ( )
( ), , 1
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
I
I
I
I
I
I
I I
I
I I
I
p k
c k a p k
kL p k k
k b p k
p k c k a
k
p k
a p k
b k
α α λ γ α α λλ
α α λ α α λ α
α α α λ
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤∂+ + + + + − +⎪ ⎪⎢ ⎥∂∂ ⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦= ⎨ ⎬∂ ⎛ ⎞∂⎪ ⎪⎡ ⎤+ + + − + + + −⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦ ⎜ ⎟∂⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭
∂+ − − + +∂
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )* 8 9 2 3( ), , ( ) ( )I I IL p k k c k h h c kk
λ α α λ∂ = − − + +∂                                                (7) 
 
where  
 
( )( )
( )2 38 1 2
1
0
1 2 I
h a
b
γ α α λ λ
α α λ
+ + += >+ + +  and 
( ) ( )
( )
2
2 3 3
9 2
1 2
2 2
0
1 2
h
b
γ α α λ λ α
α α λ
+ + + −= >+ + +  
 
The zeros of the quadratic on the right-hand side of equation (7) are: 
 
( )28 8 2 3 9*
9
4
( )
2I
h h h
c k
h
α α λ± − + +=                                                                      (8) 
 
The following proposition concerning the existence and uniqueness of a solution 
holds. 
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Proposition 1: A solution exists to the problem ( ){ }*max ( ), , 0, 0IL p k k kλ λ≥ ≥  
(and therefore to the original problem). The optimal solution * 0k ≥  is the 
following: 
 
i) If ( )28 2 3 94h hα α λ≤ + + , then * 0k =  
ii) If ( )28 2 3 94h hα α λ> + + , define $k  and $λ  as the k  and λ , 
respectively, corresponding to the negative root in (8), namely, 
corresponding to $ ( )28 8 2 3 9
9
4
( )
2I
h h h
c k
h
α α λ− − + += ; then *k  is the 
solution to: ( ) ( ) ( ){ }* * * * * * *ˆ ˆ ˆ( ), , max ( ), , , (0),0,I I IL p k k L p k k L pλ λ λ= . 
In particular, if an interior solution is obtained, then  * ˆk k= . 
■ 
 
The proof of this proposition is as follows.  
 
Proof 1: 
When the profit constraint is imposed (e.g. as in the profit-constrained welfare 
maximising case or Ramsey case) the existence of a solution is proved using the 
Weierstrass Theorem and noting the continuity of ( )* ( ),II p k k∏  as well as that 
from ( )* ( ),II p k k∏  attention can be restricted to the compact set 0,k k⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦ , 
where  
 
( ) ( ) ( )21 2 2 3 01 2
1
1 I I I
k a c a
b
α α α αα α ⎡ ⎤= + + +⎣ ⎦+ +  
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There clearly is a k  such that there is at least some price for which profits are 
greater than or equal to zero (assuming 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )21 2 1 2 0 2 3 0 1 22 1I I I I Ia c a c b Fα α α α α α α α+ − + − + > + +⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ). One such 
k  is 0k = , since that definitely leads to ( )* ( ), 0II p k k∏ ≥  and, therefore, to non-
negative profits in the original objective function. If k  is larger than k , there is no 
feasible price that will allow ( )* ( ), 0II p k k∏ ≥ , and consequently,  the incumbent 
cannot breakeven in the original maximisation problem.  
When the profit constraint is not imposed, i.e. 0λ =  (e.g. as in the welfare-
maximising case), the existence of a solution is proved using, again, the 
Weierstrass Theorem and noting the continuity of the maximand corresponding to 
(5) as well as that from that maximand attention can be restricted to the compact 
set  0,k k⎡ ⎤∈ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ , where  
 
( )
( ) ( )( )
( )
2 2
1 2 1 2 2 3 0 2
3
2 3 1 2
1
1
I I I
I
a c a
k a
b
α α α α α α αα α α α
⎡ ⎤+ + + += +⎢ ⎥+ + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
 
The feasible solution 0k =  establishes a lower bound on the maximand 
corresponding to (5), since it leads to non-negative maximand, and therefore, the 
original objective function is also non-negative. For k  larger than k , the solution 
for the maximand corresponding to (5) is lower than zero and, therefore, lower 
than the value of the maximand at 0k = . Hence, the original objective function is 
also negative for  k  larger than k . 
Given the existence of a solution and the differentiability of the objective 
function, if the hypothesis in i) holds, then the quadratic in equation (7) is 
negative (it certainly is negative for ( ) 0Ic k =  and if it ever became positive, it 
would have to cross the horizontal axis, giving rise to at least one zero on the right 
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hand side of equation (7)). Thus, under i), it is clear that the optimal solution must 
be * 0k = . 
If there is an interior solution, i.e. * 0k > , then the right hand side of equation (7) 
must equal zero giving rise to the two roots in equation (8). It is easily verified 
that the second order condition ( )2 * 2( ), , 0IL p k k kλ∂ ∂ ≤  can only be fulfilled at 
the negative root in (8). This can be showed by computing: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )2 * 2 28 9 9 9 2 32( ), , ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )I I II IL p k k c k h h c k h c k h c kk
λ γ γ γ α α λ∂ ⎡ ⎤= − − + = − + +⎣ ⎦∂  
 
where we use the fact that ( ) ( )8 9 2 3( ) ( )I Ic k h h c k α α λ− = + +  for an interior 
solution. Therefore, ( )2 * 2( ), , 0IL p k k kλ∂ ∂ ≤  if and only if 
( )29 2 3( )Ih c k α α λ≤ + + . Using again the fact that 
( ) ( )8 9 2 3( ) ( )I Ic k h h c k α α λ− = + + , i.e. ( )29 8 2 3( ) ( )I Ih c k c k h α α λ= − + + , the 
second order condition holds if and only if ( )8 2 3( ) 2Ih c k α α λ≤ + + . With further 
computing we obtain: 
 
( ) ( )28 8 2 3 98 8 2 3
9
4
( ) 2
2I
h h h
h c k h
h
α α λ α α λ⎛ ⎞± − + +⎜ ⎟= ≤ + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
 
if and only if 
 
( ) ( )2 28 2 3 9 8 8 2 3 94 4 0h h h h hα α λ α α λ− + + ± − + + ≤                                           (9) 
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Equation (9) can only hold for the negative root. Thus, if an interior solution is 
obtained, it must be at the negative root of (8). 
Finally, note that it is not possible in general to rule out the boundary solution, so 
that the optimal solution in case ii) occurs at the point *k  at which ( )* ( ), ,IL p k k λ  
is maximized on the boundary (i.e. at 0k = ) or in the interior (i.e. at ˆk k= ). 
Q.E.D. 
 
Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume that the optimal solution is interior 
for this problem.  
Note that the optimal k  corresponds to ( )* *0ln ( )I Ik c c k γ= . The optimal price, 
under monopoly, can be obtained by substituting $( )Ic k  into (4). 
4.1.2.2 Duopoly 
In duopoly, the equilibrium is given by the intersection of the reaction functions 
of the incumbent and entrant. The entrant maximizes his profit 
 
( ) ( ), ( , )E I E E E E I E Ep p p c q p p F∏ = − −   
 
with respect to Ep , where Ec  is the marginal cost of the entrant and EF  represents 
its fixed costs. The reaction function of the entrant has the following form: 
 
( )
2
I E I I I E
E I
I
b a e a e p b cp p
b
φ φ− + +=                                                                     (10) 
 
The revenue and profit of the incumbent and the welfare under duopoly are as 
follows:   
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( , ) ( , )I I E I I I ER p p p q p p=  
 
( )( , , ) ( ) ( , )I I E I I I I E Ip p k p c k q p p k F∏ = − − −  
 
( )
( )
( , , ) ( , ), ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ), ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( , )
I E I I E E I E I I I E E E I E I E
I I E E I E I I I E E E I E I E
W p p k V q p p q p p p q p p p q p p
V q p p q p p c k q p p c q p p k F F
= − − +Π +Π
= − − − − −  
 
Therefore, under duopoly, the Lagrangian for the breakeven-constrained 
incumbent can be written as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 2 2 3 2 3
2 3 3
, , ( ) ( , )
( , ), ( , ) ( , )
I I I I I E
I I I E E I E E E I E E
L p k p c k q p p k
F V q p p q p p c q p p F
λ α α λ α α λ α α λ
α α λ α
= + + − + + − + +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
− + + + − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
     (11) 
 
where 0λ ≥  has the same meaning as before. 
 
Result 3: ( ), ,IL p k λ , under duopoly, is also strictly concave in k  for any fixed 
prices and strictly concave in Ip  for any fixed k . ( ), ,IL p k λ  under duopoly, as 
under monopoly, is not jointly strictly concave. 
■ 
 
This result is proved by analysing the first and second order derivatives with 
respect to k  (for any fixed prices) and Ip (for any fixed k ): 
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( )[ ]
( )
2 3
2
2
2 32
( ) ( , ) 1
( ) ( , ) 0
I I I E
I I I E
L c k q p p
k
L c k q p p
k
α α λ γ
α α λ γ
∂ = + + −∂
∂ = − + + <∂
 
 
( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( )
1 2
2 2
2 3 3
2
1 2 3
2 2 2
21
( )
2
0
E I E E I E
I I E E I E I E E
E E
I I E
b a e a b p e pL
p b b e b c k b p p c e
b bL
p b b e
α α λ φ φ
φ α α λ α φ
α α λ α
φ
+ + − − +⎡ ⎤∂ = ⎢ ⎥∂ − + + + + − + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
− + + −∂ = <∂ −
 
 
As explained before, L  is jointly strictly concave if the Hessian matrix ( H ) is 
negative definite in the domain of L . Again, it is necessary to find the sign of the 
first and second order leading principal minors: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 2
2 32
2 32 2 2
2 2
2 3 1 2 3
2 2 2 2 2
( )
( ) ( , )
( ) 2
E I
I I I E
I I E
E I E E
I I I E I E
b c kL L c k q p p
k k p b b e
H
b c k b bL L
p k p b b e b b e
α α λ γα α λ γ φ
α α λ γ α α λ α
φ φ
+ +⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ − + + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= = ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ + + + + +∂ ∂ ⎜ ⎟− −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ − −⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2 32
2 3 2 2
2 3 1 2 3
2 2 2 2
22
2 3 1 2 3 2 3
2 2 2 2
( )
( ) ( , )
( ) 2
( ) ( , ) 2 ( )
E I
I I I E
I E
E I E E
I E I E
I I I E E E E I
I E I E
b c k
c k q p p
b b e
b c k b b
b b e b b e
c k q p p b b b c k
b b e b b e
α α λ γα α λ γ φ
α α λ γ α α λ α
φ φ
α α λ γ α α λ α α α λ γ
φ φ
+ +− + + − − =+ + + + +− −− −
+ + + + +⎡ ⎤ + +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦= − ⎢ ⎥− −⎣ ⎦
 
 
The first order leading principal minor is negative but the second order leading 
principal is not always positive. Hence, L  is not jointly strictly concave.  
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The procedure applied to find the optimal solution under monopoly is followed 
here in order to find the optimal solution under duopoly. Firstly, the optimal Ip  is 
derived from the necessary and sufficient first-order conditions and then the 
problem of ( ){ }max , , 0, 0, 0I IL p k p kλ λ≥ ≥ ≥  is restated as 
( ){ }*max ( ), , 0, 0IL p k k kλ λ≥ ≥ . 
Again an interior solution for price is assumed. Under duopoly, the optimal 
solution is characterised by 0
I
L
p
∂ =∂ , which yields: 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )1 2 2 3 31 2
1 ( )
( , )
1 2
E I E E E I E
I E
E
b a e a e p b c k e c
p k p
b
α α λ φ λ φ α α λ α φ
α α λ
+ + − + + + + + −= + + +   (12) 
 
Result 4: Putting the reaction function of the incumbent and of the entrant 
together (equations (10) and (12)) gives: 
 
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 2 2 3*
3
2 2 ( )
( )
2 1I
E I E I I E I
I E I E I I E
b a e a b b b c k
p k
b e c e b a e a b c
α α λ φ α α λξ α φ λ φ φ
+ + − + + +⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥− + + − +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
               (13) 
 
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 2 2 3*
2 2
3 1 2
( )
( )
1 2
E I E E I
E
E E I E I I E
e b a e a e b c k
p k
e c b b a e a b c
φ α α λ φ φ α α λξ α φ α α λ φ
+ + − + + +⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥− + + + + − +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
                 (14) 
 
where ( ) ( ) 2 21 21/ 2 1 2 1 0I Eb b eξ α α λ λ φ⎡ ⎤= + + + − + >⎣ ⎦ . 
■ 
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The solution for ( ){ }*max ( ), , 0, 0IL p k k kλ λ≥ ≥  is recovered as ( )* * * *( ), ,Ip k k λ  
where *k  solves ( ){ }*max ( ), , 0, 0IL p k k kλ λ≥ ≥ . Equation (13) yields: 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
*
* * *
1 2 2 3 32 2
* * * *3
2 2 2 2
3
2 2 2
( ), ,
1 ( ) ( ) * ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) * ( ) ( )
2( )
I
I I
I I
I I E I E E E
I E
E E E I E E E I E I I E
I E I E
I E I
I E
L p k k
p k c k a b a e a b p k e p k
b b e
ea c b a e a b p k e p k b a e a b p k e p k
b b e b b e
b b a e
b b e
λ
α α λ α α λ α φ φφ
α φ φ φ φ φφ φ
α
φ
=
⎡ ⎤= + + − + + + − − +⎣ ⎦−
⎡ ⎤+ − − − − + − − +⎢ ⎥− −⎣ ⎦
−− −
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2* *
2 3 2 3 32* *
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
I
I
E E E
I E
E I E I I E
a b p k e p k
k F F
b b a e a b p k e p k
φ φ α α λ α α λ α
φ φ
⎡ ⎤− +⎢ ⎥ − + + − + + −⎢ ⎥+ − − +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (15) 
 
Recall that the first order conditions for ( ){ }*max ( ), , 0, 0IL p k k kλ λ≥ ≥ are: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )* * *( ), , ( ), , ( ), ,
0; 0; 0I I I
L p k k L p k k L p k k
k
k k
λ λ λ
λ
∂ ∂ ∂≤ ≥ =∂ ∂ ∂                    (16) 
 
If ( )* ( ), , 0IL p k k kλ∂ ∂ =  then an interior solution 0k >  is obtained. The 
derivative of (15) with respect to k  is: 
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( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
*
*
* *
1 2 2 3
2 2 * *
*
1 2 2 3 3
2 2
3
2 2
( ), ,
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
I
I
I
I E
I
I E I E E E
I E
I I E
I E
I E
L p k k
k
p k
c k b a e a b p k e p k
k
b b e p k p k
p k c k a b e
k k
e b
b b e
b b e
λ
α α λ γ α α λ φ φ
φ α α λ α α λ α φ
φ
φα
φ
∂ =∂
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤∂+ + + + + − − +⎪ ⎪⎢ ⎥∂⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦= +⎨ ⎬− ⎛ ⎞∂ ∂⎪ ⎪⎡ ⎤+ + + − + + + − +⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦ ⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭
− −−+ −
( )
( )
( )
* *
* *
* *
* *
2 2
* *
3
2 2 2
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
I E
I
E I
I
I
E I E I I E
E E E I E E E I
I E
I E I E E E
I E
p k p k
e b a e a b p k e p k
k k
p k p kea c b a e a b p k e p k b e
b b e k k
b b a e a b p k e p k
b b e
φ φ φ
φ φ φ φφ
φ φ
α
φ
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞∂ ∂+ − − +⎪ ⎪⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠ −⎨ ⎬⎛ ⎞∂ ∂⎡ ⎤⎪ ⎪+ − − − − + − +⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪⎜ ⎟− ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭
− − + −
− − ( )
( )
* *
2 3* *
* *
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
I E
E I
I
E
E I E I I E I
p k p k
b e
k k
p k p k
b b a e a b p k e p k b e
k k
φ
α α λ
φ φ φ
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞∂ ∂+⎪ ⎪⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠ − + +⎨ ⎬⎛ ⎞∂ ∂⎪ ⎪+ − − + − +⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭
 
 
In order to make computations easier, the optimal prices are re-written as follows: 
 
*
4 3( ) 2 ( )I I Ip k h b h c k= +  
 
*
5 3( ) ( )E Ip k h e h c kφ= +  
 
where  
 
( )3 2 3 Eh bξ α α λ= + +  
 
( )( ) ( ) ( )4 1 2 32 2 1E I E I I E I E I I Eh b a e a b b e c e b a e a b cξ α α λ φ α φ λ φ φ= + + − − + + − +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
 
( )( ) ( ) ( )2 25 1 2 3 1 21 2E I E E E I E I I Eh e b a e a e c b b a e a b cξ φ α α λ φ α φ α α λ φ⎡ ⎤= + + − − + + + + − +⎣ ⎦  
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Defining 1 1 2h α α λ= + +  and 2 2 3h α α λ= + + , and knowing that 
*
3( ) 2 ( )I I Ip k k b h c kγ∂ ∂ = −  and * 3( ) ( )E Ip k k e h c kφγ∂ ∂ = −  gives: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )* 6 7 2 3( ), , ( ) ( )I I IL p k k c k h h c kk
λ α α λ∂ = − − + +∂                                         (17) 
 
where 
 
( )( ) ( )6 2 1 3 3 3 2 1 3 3 3 52 2 2 2I E I E I E I I
I E
h h b h h b a e a e b h c h b h h b h e h
b b e
γ φ φ α α φφ= − − + + − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦− (18) 
 
( )( )
( ) ( )
2 2
7 3 1 3 22 2
2 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 23 3
2 2 2
2 2 2
2 2 2
( )
I I E
I E
I E I I E I I E
I E
h h b h h h b b e
b b e
h e b b b b b e e b b b e
b b e
γ φφ
α γ φ φ φ φφ
= − − −−
⎡ ⎤− + − − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦−
 
 
In order to apply the reasoning used for the monopoly case, to prove uniqueness 
of the equilibrium, there is the need to make sure that 6h  and 7h  are positive. It 
can be proved that 6h  is always positive. The first two terms of equation (18) are 
always positive, i.e. ( )( )2 1 3 3 32 0I E I E Eh b h h b a e a e h cφ φα− − + > . 
( )2 1 3 3 32 I Ih b h h b hα− −  and 5h  are always positive as well. It is also easy to prove 
that 7h  is always positive. 
The zeros of the quadratic on the right hand side of equation (17) are: 
 
( )26 6 2 3 7
7
4
( )
2I
h h h
c k
h
α α λ± − + +=                                                                    (19) 
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The following proposition refers to the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium 
under duopoly. It is basically Proposition 1 applied to the duopoly case. 
 
Proposition 2: A solution exists to the problem ( ){ }*max ( ), , 0, 0IL p k k kλ λ≥ ≥  
(and therefore to the original problem). The optimal solution * 0k ≥  is the 
following: 
i) If ( )26 2 3 74h hα α λ≤ + + , then * 0k =  
ii) If ( )26 2 3 74h hα α λ> + + , define $k  and $λ  as the k  and λ , 
respectively, corresponding to the negative root in (19), namely, 
corresponding to $ ( )26 6 2 3 7
7
4
( )
2I
h h h
c k
h
α α λ− − + += ; then *k  is the 
solution to: ( ) ( ) ( ){ }* * * * * * *ˆ ˆ ˆ( ), , max ( ), , , (0),0,I I IL p k k L p k k L pλ λ λ= . 
In particular, if an interior solution obtains, then  * ˆk k= . 
■ 
 
Proof 2: The proof of existence of a solution under duopoly goes exactly as under 
monopoly (Proof 1), except that now: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
1 2 2 3 0
2 2 2
2 1 2 1 22 2 2 2
1 2 2 2
2 3 0 1 2
2 2 *
1
2 1
*2 1
1
I E I I E I I E E
I E I E I
I E I E
E I I E E E
b b a b b c e b a c
k b b a e b a
b b e b b e
e b c b b a c
α α α α φ
α α φ α αφ α α φ φ α α α α
⎧ ⎫+ + + + +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪= ⎡ ⎤+ + + +⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤− + + − ⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦ + + + + + +⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
, 
 
and 
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( )( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )
1 2
1 2 2 3 0 32 22 2
1 22 3
1 2 2 3 0 1 22 2
1 2
3
2 2
2 3
1 2 2 *
2 1
* 1
2 1
2 1
I E I I E I I E E I
I EI E
E I E I I E E E E I
I E
E
I E
k b b a b b c e b a c a
b b eb b e
e e b a e b c b b a c b a
b b e
a e
b b e
α α α α α α φ αα α φφ α α
φ φ α α φ α α α αα α φ
α φ
φ α α
⎧ ⎫+⎪ ⎪= + + + + + +⎡ ⎤⎨ ⎬⎣ ⎦+ + −− + ⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪+ + + + + + + + +⎡ ⎤⎨ ⎬⎣ ⎦+ + −⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
+ +− + ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 2 3 02 21 2 2 2I E I I E I I E E I EI E b b a b b c e b a c b ab b e α α α α φα α φ
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪+ + + + + +⎡ ⎤⎨ ⎬⎣ ⎦+ −⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
 
Also, under duopoly there clearly is a k  such that there is at least one price for 
which profits are greater than or equal to zero, assuming:  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 2
3 0 1 0 3
2 2
1 2
2 2 2 2
2 3 0 3 2 2
2 2
1 2
2 1 2 2 1
*
2 1
2
*
2 1
I E I I I E I I E E
I E
I E E I I I E I E E E
I E I
I E
b b e a c b b c e b a c
b b e
b b e b a c b b e b b e a c
b b e F
b b e
α φ α α φ
α α φ
φ α α φ α φ φα α φ
⎡ ⎤− − − − + − −⎣ ⎦
+ + −
⎡ ⎤− − + − − + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ > −+ + −
     (20) 
 
The proof of uniqueness of the solution under duopoly also follows the proof of 
Proposition 1. Under duopoly, 
 
( ) ( ) ( )2 * 2 26 7 7 7 2 32( ), , ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )I I II IL p k k c k h h c k h c k h c kk
λ γ γ γ α α λ∂ ⎡ ⎤= − − + = − + +⎣ ⎦∂  
 
and the second order condition holds if and only if ( )6 2 3( ) 2Ih c k α α λ≤ + + . By 
computing further we obtain: 
 
( ) ( )26 6 2 3 76 6 2 3
7
4
( ) 2
2I
h h h
h c k h
h
α α λ α α λ⎛ ⎞± − + +⎜ ⎟= ≤ + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
 
if and only if 
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( ) ( )
6 6
2 2
2 3 7 6 2 3 74 4 0h h h h hα α λ α α λ− + + ± − + + ≤                                        (21) 
 
Equation (21) can only hold true for the negative root. Thus, if an interior solution 
is obtained, it must be at the negative root of (19). 
Q.E.D. 
 
The optimal solution is also assumed to be interior under duopoly.  
The optimal prices under duopoly can be obtained by substituting $( )Ic k  into 
equations (13) and (14). 
In the next section the model is calibrated with data from the postal sector and in 
the section thereafter some computational results are presented. 
4.2 Model calibration – Postal sector data 
In this section, the model presented earlier is calibrated with data from the postal 
sector.  We have decided to calibrate the model with data from four countries in 
order to account for the different characteristics of the firms in terms of volumes, 
costs, and prices. We defined four groups of historical operators in terms of their 
volumes (Figure 1). From each group we selected a representative country. The 
four countries selected are Latvia, Portugal, Sweden, and France.  
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Figure 1: Letter volume in 1997 of 17 European historical operators 
 
In order to estimate the demand functions, parameters a  and b  are calibrated 
with data from the Latvian, Portuguese, Swedish and French postal markets from 
1997, when there was no competition yet. To calibrate Ib , Eb , and φ  it is 
necessary to know the quantity, average price and own price elasticity of the 
incumbent’s and the entrant’s demand, and the cross elasticity of demand. In order 
to compute the quantity of the entrant we assume that it has a market share 
(mktshareI) of 80%. The price of the entrant is assumed to be 20% lower than the 
price of the incumbent. Once the values of Ib , Eb , φ , and e  are known it is 
possible to compute Ia  and Ea  from equations (1) and (2). 
The total volume of mail, including non-addressed mail, of the French (Latvian, 
Portuguese, Swedish) postal operator in 1997 was 25'770 (107, 1'116, 5'483) 
million objects.  
The average price in France (Latvia, Portugal, Sweden) in 1997 was 
approximately 0.46 (0.29, 0.38, 0.42) euros (CTcon, 1998, Deutsche Post, 2007).  
The own price elasticity of the incumbent’s demand under monopoly (elastIM) is 
assumed to be -0.4 and under duopoly (elastID) is assumed to be -0.5. The own 
price elasticity of demand of the entrant (elastE) is assumed to be -0.6. The cross 
elasticity of the incumbent’s demand relatively to the entrant (change in the 
Group 1 
Group 2 
Group 3 
Group 4 
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quantity of the incumbent due to a change in the price of the entrant) (crosselast) 
is assumed to be 0.1. The rationale for these assumptions is as follows. 
There is considerable divergence in the literature concerning price elasticity of 
demand in the postal sector. According to Robinson’s extensive review of the 
literature on  price elasticity models for postal products (Robinson, 2007), the 
price elasticity measures for postal products in various studies and countries were 
between -0.2 and -0.8. We consider that under monopoly, the price elasticity of 
demand in absolute value (-0.4) is lower than under duopoly (-0.5 and -0.6). We 
also assume that under duopoly the incumbent has a price elasticity of demand 
smaller (in absolute value) than that of the entrant due to reputation effects and 
customer inertia. The value -0.5 was chosen for the incumbent and the value of     
-0.6 for the entrant. Even though some authors defend that the elasticity of 
demand in the postal sector is lower, we believe that these values are adequate 
since the innovations considered here are likely to focus on business products that 
have higher elasticities (in absolute value). 
We assume that the services provided by the incumbent and the entrant are similar 
but not perfect substitutes. Therefore, we assume that the degree of 
differentiability of the services (parameter e ) is 0.8e = . A sensitivity analysis for 
this parameter will be performed afterwards (section 4.3.6). 
Regarding the supply side, the total operational costs of the French (Latvian, 
Portuguese) group were 9'848 (19, 442) million euros. Based on German data12 
from 1998, the costs associated with the letter segment are assumed to be 75% of 
the total costs of the group. The operational costs linked to the letter segment of 
the Swedish postal operator in 1997 were 1'502 million euros. 
                                                           
12 There was no data available for France, Latvia, and Portugal on the operational costs of the letter 
segment. In fact, this information is available for very few countries and few years. We have 
decided to use the information we found for Germany in 1998 as a reference. 
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It is assumed that approximately 40% of the operational costs of the incumbent 
are fixed13. Therefore, the initial marginal cost of the French (Latvian, Portuguese, 
Swedish) incumbent is 0.17 (0.1, 0.18, 0.16) euros. The structure of competitors is 
more flexible than the structure of the historical operator. Hence, the percentage 
of fixed costs of the entrant is smaller than that of the incumbent. Competitors 
have a smaller infrastructure than the incumbent because the former has almost no 
private customers, has few postal outlets, sorting centres and delivery offices. 
Table 2 summarises the assumed cost structure of the incumbent and of the 
entrant. 
 
Table 2: Cost structure of the incumbent and entrant 
 
Collection Processing Delivery Overhead Total 
Percentage of total costs 10 30 55 5 100% 
I 50 80 50 10 57% Fraction of variable costs 
E 75 85 60 50 69% 
Source: Adapted from Dietl et al. (2005) 
 
The major differences in terms of costs between the entrant and the incumbent are 
that the entrant: 1) has a smaller infrastructure which allows smaller overhead 
costs; 2) focuses on business customers which allows the extensive use of 
computerised sorting in the printing stage; 3) pays lower wages than the 
incumbent and these represent the major share of the total costs (80%); and 4) is 
likely to have more recent technology. The wage premium is estimated to be 
approximately 15% (Dietl et al., 2005).  
In order to account for these differences in terms of costs, the entrant is assumed 
to have a cost saving of 30% in collection and processing. The cost saving in 
delivery is smaller, approximately 5%, because most business mailings are 
business-to-customer originating a huge number of delivery points. Also, 
                                                           
13 This is a typical figure (in the medium run applicable to pricing decisions) for postal 
incumbents. See the discussion in Cohen et al. (2006) and d’Alcantara and Amerlynck (2006). 
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innovation to reduce delivery costs is very limited since delivery depends 
basically on manpower (Dietl et al., 2005). Finally, it is assumed that the entrant 
has a cost saving of 33% in overhead costs (Dietl and Waller, 2002).  
The elasticity of innovation cost (parameter γ ) changes accordingly to the size of 
the operator. A large operator14 has to invest much more than a small operator in 
order to obtain the same percentage of cost reduction in the marginal cost. For 
instance the letter volume of La Poste (France) is 23 times larger than the letter 
volume of CTT-Correios de Portugal (Portugal). Hence, a reduction of 10 percent 
in the marginal cost in La Poste will demand larger investments than a reduction 
of 10 percent in CTT-Correios de Portugal. Therefore a large operator will have a 
smaller elasticity of innovation cost and a small operator will have a larger 
elasticity of innovation cost. 
The estimate of parameter γ  is based on the cost of achieving a reduction of the 
marginal cost of 10%. The resulting investment in innovation ( k ) for the values 
of γ  considered are the following (Table 3): 
 
Table 3: Values of parameter γ  considered for each historical operator 
Country  cI(k) / cI0    gamma            k 
(million Euros) 
LV 0.9 2.5E-07 421 
PT 0.9 1.0E-08 10.536 
SE 0.9 2.5E-09 42.144 
FR 0.9 5.0E-10 210.721 
 
Figure 2, Figure 3, Figure 4, and Figure 5 depict the relationship between the 
investment in new processes and technologies and the cost reduction obtained for 
2.5 07Eγ = − , 1.0 08Eγ = − , 2.5 09Eγ = − , and 5.0 10Eγ = − , respectively, 
which are the values of γ  chosen to calibrate the model. A sensitivity analysis for 
this parameter will be performed in section 4.3.6. 
                                                           
14 We assume that the size of the operator is proxied by the letter volume handled by the operator. 
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Figure 2: Relationship between the investment in new processes and technologies 
and the cost reduction obtained for Latvia ( 2.5 07Eγ = − ) 
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Figure 3: Relationship between the investment in new processes and technologies 
and the cost reduction obtained for Portugal ( 1.0 08Eγ = − ) 
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Figure 4: Relationship between the investment in new processes and technologies 
and the cost reduction obtained for Sweden ( 2.5 09Eγ = −  ) 
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Figure 5: Relationship between the investment in new processes and technologies 
and the cost reduction obtained for France ( 5.0 10Eγ = − ) 
 
The results of the model, using the calibration just described, are presented and 
discussed in the next section. 
4.3 Results 
This section presents the results of a number of computational experiments for the 
model.  
Only the results for France are presented here. However, reference is always made 
to the similarities and differences between the results of France and those of 
Latvia, Portugal, and Sweden. The tables and figures corresponding to these three 
countries can be found in Annexes 2 , 3 , and 4, respectively. 
Although the model was calibrated with data from the postal sector, the results 
can in general be extrapolated to other industries, namely to other network 
industries.  
Firstly, we present the general results of the model for the calibration values 
(section 4.3.1). After, the influence of competition on the incentives to innovate is 
analysed (section 4.3.2). We then focus on the individual effect that the 
incumbent’s price elasticity of demand (under monopoly and duopoly), the 
entrant’s price elasticity, and the cross elasticity of demand have on the incentives 
to innovate (section 4.3.3). The combined effect of the incumbent’s market share 
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and elasticity of demand on innovation is studied in section 4.3.4. Then the role of 
the different objectives of the incumbent on the incentives to innovate is 
investigated (section 4.3.5). Finally, the robustness of the results is tested for 
changes in the degree of product/service differentiation ( e ) and the elasticity of 
innovation cost (γ ) (section 4.3.6).    
4.3.1 General results for the calibration values 
Table 4 shows the main results of the model for the calibration values presented in 
the previous section, namely:  
• elastIM equal to -0.4 
• elastID equal to -0.5 
• elastE equal to -0.6 
• crosselast equal to 0.1 
• degree of substitution ( e ) equal to 0.8 
• elasticity of innovation cost (γ ) equal to 5E-10 
• incumbent’s market share equal to 80% 
The first column of Table 4 ( 1 2 31, 0, 0, 0α α α λ= = = ≥ ) corresponds to 
maximising revenue subject to the breakeven constraint. The second column 
( 1 2 30, 1, 0, 0α α α λ= = = = ) refers to the profit maximisation case. Finally, the 
third column ( 1 2 30, 0, 1, 0α α α λ= = = ≥ ) regards the profit-constrained welfare 
maximising case or Ramsey case.  
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Table 4: Results for France (I)  
alpha1 1 0 0 
alpha2 0 1 0 
alpha3 0 0 1 
lambda ≥  0 = 0 ≥  0 
Monopoly 
average price 
0.80 0.86 0.23 
quantity 
18'040 16'684 30'940 
welfare 
15'633 14'667 21'165 
consumer surplus 
7'195 6'154 21'165 
profit 
8'438 8'513 0 
k 
775 619 1'854 
Duopoly 
I 0.63 0.70 0.59 
average price 
E 0.64 0.67 0.62 
I 17'483 15'731 18'518 
quantity 
E 4'066 4'295 3'930 
welfare  
15'331 14'486 15'589 
consumer surplus 
10'548 9'268 11'359 
I 5'198 5'402 4'777 
profit 
E -416 -184 -547 
k 
612 400 0 
k duopoly - k monopoly -164 -219 -1'854 
Units: prices are in euros, quantities are in millions of items and the remaining variables are in millions of 
euros. 
 
Firstly, it is interesting to note that for the calibration values the investment in 
process innovations is always larger under monopoly than under duopoly, 
independently of the weight given to revenue, profit, and welfare.  
However, when the objective is either revenue or profit maximisation, prices are 
higher, while the quantity supplied is smaller under monopoly than under 
duopoly. When the objective is welfare maximisation, the quantity supplied is 
higher, with prices being smaller under monopoly than under duopoly. Welfare is 
always higher under monopoly than under duopoly. 
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4.3.2 The effect of competition on innovation 
The market share of the incumbent has a non-linear influence on innovation under 
duopoly (Figure 6). Until a certain point, the effect of the incumbent’s market 
share on the incentive to innovate is positive, and from that point on it is negative. 
When the market share of the incumbent is sufficiently small, the net effect of 
competition on cost efficiency, and therefore on the incentives to process 
innovation, is also small. This is because competition does not reduce operating 
costs sufficiently to offset the higher fixed costs of operation. Competition may 
force firms to minimise cost for a given output, but each firm produces less 
output, fails to achieve minimum efficient scale, and suffers excess unit cost 
(Kwoka, 2006).  
The incentives to innovate strongly depend on the quantity supplied by the firm. 
The result that with a larger mail volume the gains from reducing the unit delivery 
cost by a given amount are larger, was also found by Gautier and Bloch (2008). 
When the incumbent preserves a certain market share, competition has a stronger 
positive effect on cost efficiency.  
After a certain value of the incumbent’s market share, once the pressure of 
competition is very low, the investment in innovation decreases as the market 
share of the incumbent increases.  
These results also apply to Latvia, Portugal, and Sweden. 
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Figure 6: Effect of the incumbent’s market share on k ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 3α =0.2, 
e=0.8, γ =5E-10, elastIM=-0.4, elastID=-0.5, elastE=-0.6, 
crosselast=0.1)  
 
From Figure 6 one can anticipate that if a change in the parameters’ values makes 
the curve of investment in innovation under duopoly shift upwards, then there will 
be an interval where the incentives to innovate under duopoly are larger than 
under monopoly. In this case, the incumbent’s market share under duopoly will be 
relevant to determine which market structure creates more incentives to innovate. 
4.3.3 The effect of the various elasticities of demand on innovation 
In this part we analyse the individual effect that the elasticity of demand of the 
incumbent under monopoly and duopoly, the elasticity of demand of the entrant, 
and the cross elasticity of demand have on the incentive to innovate. We perform 
several simple sensitivity analyses where only one parameter changes at a time. In 
the next section we present a more complex analysis where each elasticity of 
demand assumes two or more values that are combined in all possible ways (more 
than one elasticity of demand changing simultaneously). 
Figure 7 shows that the investment in innovation under monopoly has a negative 
relationship with elastIM (the larger the value of elastIM, the smaller the k under 
monopoly). We can also see that the value of elastIM also determines which of the 
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market structures creates more incentive to innovate. The turning point 
corresponds to elastIM close to -0.2. The same results are obtained for Latvia, 
Portugal, and Sweden including the value of the turning point, which is 
approximately the same. 
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Figure 7: Sensitivity analysis for elastIM ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 3α =0.2, e=0.8, 
γ =5E-10, mktshareI=80%, elastID=-0.5, elastE=-0.6, crosselast=0.1)  
 
In a similar way, an increase in the elasticity of demand of the incumbent under 
duopoly leads to a decrease in the incentives to innovate under duopoly (Figure 
8). Again, if the other parameters are held constant, there is a region where 
duopoly creates more incentives to innovate than monopoly, and another region 
where the contrary happens.  
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Figure 8: Sensitivity analysis for elastID ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 3α =0.2, e=0.8, 
γ =5E-10, mktshareI=80%, elastIM=-0.4, elastE=-0.6, crosselast=0.1) 
 
As we can observe in Figure 9, changes in elastE almost do not affect the 
incumbent’s investment in innovation.  
 
200000
400000
600000
800000
1000000
-0.9 -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2
elastE
k 
(th
ou
sa
nd
s 
of
 e
ur
os
)
k_monopoly k_duopoly
 
Figure 9: Sensitivity analysis for elastE ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 3α =0.2, e=0.8, 
γ =5E-10, mktshareI=80%, elastIM=-0.4, elastID=-0.5, 
crosselast=0.1) 
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The cross elasticity of demand has a non-linear impact on k under duopoly (Figure 
10). This parameter does not seem to have an important role in determining which 
market structure creates more incentives to innovate.  
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Figure 10: Sensitivity analysis for crosselast ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 3α =0.2, e=0.8, 
γ =5E-10, mktshareI=80%, elastIM=-0.4, elastID=-0.5, elastE=-0.6) 
 
The results obtained in this section also apply to Latvia, Portugal, and Sweden and 
will be further investigated in the analysis that follows. 
4.3.4 The combined effect of the various elasticities of demand and of 
competition on innovation 
We now allow the elasticity of demand of the incumbent under monopoly and 
duopoly, the elasticity of demand of the entrant, and the cross elasticity of demand 
to vary simultaneously. Since we are only interested in studying the impact of 
elasticity of demand on innovation, we held the degree of differentiability, the 
elasticity of innovation cost, the weight given to revenue, to profit, and to welfare 
constant at 0.9, 6E-10, 0.2, 0.6, and 0.2, respectively. The market share of the 
incumbent is also held constant, first at 60% (Figure 11) and then at 90% (Figure 
12). As we have seen before, the incumbent’s market share under duopoly has a 
significant impact on the incentives to innovate under duopoly. Therefore, it is 
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important to perform the analysis that follows for a market share that creates few 
incentives for the incumbent to innovate under duopoly (e.g. 60%) and for a 
market share close to the one that creates the highest incentives for the incumbent 
to innovate under duopoly (e.g. 90%). In part 4.3.6, we discuss the results for 
other values of the degree of differentiability and of the elasticity of innovation 
cost.  
Figure 11 shows that when the incumbent has a market share of 60%, the 
investment in innovation under duopoly is larger than that under monopoly only if 
elastID is significantly larger than elastIM. We can also note that, the point where 
the investment in innovation is the same under monopoly and under duopoly 
slightly moves to the right as crosselast decreases. As elastE decreases, there is 
almost no change in the intercept of the difference between investment in 
innovation under monopoly and duopoly with the horizontal axis. 
When the incumbent’s market share is 90% (Figure 1215) and crosselast is low, 
elastID does not need to be much larger than elastIM in order to obtain more 
incentives to innovate under duopoly than under monopoly. For larger values of 
crosselast, the difference between elastID and elastIM needs to be larger in order 
to obtain that same result. When the incumbent’s market share is 90%, there is an 
accentuated movement of the curves to the right as crosselast decreases. This 
means that investment in innovation under duopoly starts to be larger than that 
under monopoly at a lower value of elastID (in absolute value). As elastE 
decreases, the point where investment under monopoly and duopoly are equal 
slightly moves to the right. 
 
                                                           
15 The top-left graph in Figure 12 does not present any points because there were no feasible 
solutions for the combination of parameters that correspond to this graph. 
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Figure 11: Effect of simultaneous changes in elastIM, elastID, elastE, and 
crosselast on innovation ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 3α =0.2, e=0.9, γ =6E-10, 
and mktshareI=60%) 
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Figure 12: Effect of simultaneous changes in elastIM, elastID, elastE, and 
crosselast on innovation ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 3α =0.2, e=0.9, γ =6E-10, 
and mktshareI=90%) 
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In short, the incumbent’s market share and the differential between elastIM and 
elastID govern the relationship between k under monopoly and duopoly. Let us 
focus on the interval where k is larger under duopoly than under monopoly. The 
smaller elastIM is (in absolute value), or the larger (in absolute value) elastID is, 
the wider this interval is (holding the incumbent’s market share constant). In other 
words, the incumbent’s market share needed for k under duopoly to be larger than 
k under monopoly reduces as elastIM gets smaller (in absolute value) and as 
elastID gets larger (in absolute value). 
When the market share of the incumbent is 90%, crosselast is important to 
determine which market structure originates larger investment in innovation 
whereas when the market share of the incumbent is 60%, crosselast plays almost 
no role. The role of elastE is always very reduced. 
Figure 13 shows the combined effect of the incumbent’s market share, elastIM, 
and elastID on innovation under monopoly and duopoly (holding 1α =0.2, 
2α =0.6, 3α =0.2, e=0.8, γ =5E-10, elastE=-0.6, and crosselast=0.1). 
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Figure 13: Combined effect of the incumbent’s market share, elastIM, and elastID 
on k under monopoly and duopoly ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 3α =0.2, e=0.8, 
γ =5E-10, elastE=-0.6, and crosselast=0.1)  
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For certain values of the incumbent’s market share and of the incumbent’s 
elasticity of demand under monopoly and duopoly it exists an interval where 
investment in innovation under duopoly is larger than that under monopoly.  The 
size of this interval depends on the incumbent’s market share and elasticities of 
demand under monopoly and duopoly.  
Given this result, it is important to analyse the general results of the model (i.e. 
redo Table 4) for an incumbent’s market share and elasticity of demand under 
duopoly and monopoly where the incentives to innovate are smaller under 
monopoly than under duopoly (e.g. incumbent’s market share equal to 90%, 
elastIM equal to -0.3, and elastID equal to -0.6). The remaining parameters are 
held constant at the values presented in section 4.2 (i.e. elastE equal to -0.6, 
crosselast equal to 0.1, degree of substitution ( e ) equal to 0.8, elasticity of 
innovation cost (γ ) equal to 5E-10). 
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Table 5: Results for France (II) 
alpha1 1 0 0 
alpha2 0 1 0 
alpha3 0 0 1 
lambda ≥  0 = 0 ≥  0 
Monopoly 
average price 
0.99 1.05 0.23 
quantity 
16'751 15'668 29'516 
welfare 
19'012 18'041 25'681 
consumer surplus 
8'272 7'237 25'681 
profit 
10'740 10'804 0 
k 
627 493 1'760 
Duopoly 
I 0.62 0.69 0.60 
average price 
E 0.71 0.76 0.69 
I 20'032 18'267 20'647 
quantity 
E 2'257 2'464 2'185 
welfare  
19'939 19'084 19'891 
consumer surplus 
14'811 13'439 15'306 
I 6'279 6'553 5'815 
profit 
E -1'151 -908 -1'230 
k 
807 623 0 
k duopoly - k monopoly 180 129 -1'760 
Units: prices are in euros, quantities are in millions of items and the remaining variables are in millions of 
euros. 
 
Here, the difference between the investment in process innovation under 
monopoly and under duopoly depends on the weight of welfare. When the 
objective of the firm is revenue or profit maximisation, investment in innovation 
under duopoly is larger than under monopoly.  
The price and the profit of the incumbent are larger under monopoly than under 
duopoly, except when the objective is welfare maximisation (i.e 3 1α = ). The 
contrary happens with the quantity supplied and welfare.  
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All the results presented in this section also apply to Latvia, Portugal, and 
Sweden16. 
4.3.5 The role of revenue, profit and welfare maximisation 
In this part, we investigate how changes in the weight given to revenue ( 1α ), 
profit ( 2α ), and welfare ( 3α ) affect the investment in innovation. This analysis is 
made for several combinations of the remaining parameters of the model. We fix 
elastE at -0.6 and crosselast at 0.1 because, as we have seen in section 4.3.3, these 
two parameters per se do not play an important role in determining which market 
structure creates more incentives to innovate. The other parameters can assume 
two extreme values:  
• elastIM is equal to -0.3 or to -0.7 
• elastID is equal to -0.4 or to -0.8 
• e is equal to 0.6 or to 0.9 
• γ  is equal to 4E-10 or to 6E-10. 
All the possible combinations of these values originate sixteen graphs for each 
market share of the incumbent, which also assumes two different values: 60% 
(Figure 14) and 90% (Figure 15).  
Each graph in Figure 14 and Figure 15 depicts the evolution of investment in 
innovation according to changes in the alphas (holding other parameters 
constants). 1α  is fixed along each line in the graph but it changes across lines. 3α  
is equal to 1α  and 2α  subtracted from one ( 3 1 21α α α= − − ).  
 
                                                           
16 The only difference is that in the case of Portugal, as crosselast and elastE decrease there are a 
series of points that are not feasible and, therefore, are not represented (Annex 3, Figure 70). A 
point is not feasible either because it does not satisfy condition (3) or condition (20). 
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Figure 14: Effect of changes in 1α , 2α  and 3α  on k  (elastE=-0.6, 
crosselast=0.1, mktshareI=60%) 
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Figure 15: Effect of changes in 1α , 2α  and 3α  on k  (elastE=-0.6, 
crosselast=0.1, mktshareI=90%) 
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Figure 14 and Figure 15 show that as 2α  increases, holding 1α  constant, the 
incentives to innovate decrease. An increase in 1α , for 2α  constant, also 
originates a decrease in k . Moreover, the larger the sum of 1α  and 2α  relatively 
to 3α  is, the smaller the investment in innovation under both monopoly and 
duopoly is. An increase in the weight associated with welfare ( 3α ), holding 1α  
constant, stimulates innovation up to the point where the incumbent’s profit 
reaches zero. This conclusion is independent of the market share of the 
incumbent. 
This means that regulation which motivates the incumbent to place greater weight 
on welfare maximisation favours innovation.  
When the market share of the incumbent is 60% (Figure 14), there is more 
stimulus to innovate under monopoly than under duopoly in almost all the 
scenarios. The only case where the investment in innovation under duopoly is 
very close to, or slightly larger than, the investment made under monopoly is 
when elastIM is -0.3 and elastID is -0.8, i.e. when elastIM is very small compared 
to elastID. 
When the incumbent’s market share is equal to 90% (Figure 15) the relationship 
between investment in innovation under monopoly and duopoly clearly depends 
on the differential between elastIM and elastID. When elastIM=-0.7 and elastID=-
0.4, elastIM=-0.3 and elastID=-0.4, and elastIM=-0.7 and elastID=-0.8 the 
incentive to innovate under monopoly is larger than under duopoly. When 
elastIM=-0.3 and elastID=-0.8, the incentive to innovate under monopoly is 
smaller than under duopoly17. The fact that the difference between the incentives 
to innovate under monopoly and duopoly is larger for the combination elastIM=-
0.3 and elastID=-0.4 than for the combination elastIM=-0.7 and elastID=-0.8 
                                                           
17 In some cases, for this result to be verified, we also have to impose that the weight given to 
revenue ( 1α ) and to profit ( 2α ) are not both very small, i.e. zero or 0.2. 
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indicates that it is not only the differential between elastIM and elastID that 
matters but also the level of elastID. 
The lowest level of investment is registered when the incumbent is exclusively 
concerned with profit maximisation. Contrarily to what could be expected, a 
larger level of investment is registered under the revenue maximisation case 
( 1α =1) than under the profit maximisation case ( 2α =1). This happens because 
when the incumbent maximises revenue it does not take into account the cost of 
innovation, which is what prevents the incumbent from investing more when the 
objective is profit maximisation. Also, more innovation results in smaller 
marginal costs and, consequently, in a price decrease in order to increase the 
quantity supplied. The price decreases up to the point where the product of the 
quantity supplied and the price is maximised.  
The same results are obtained for Latvia, Portugal and Sweden. 
4.3.6 Sensitivity analysis for the degree of differentiability ( e ) and elasticity of 
innovation cost (γ ) 
From the analyses performed earlier, the degree of differentiability and the 
elasticity of innovation cost do not seem to be relevant to determine which market 
structure is more favourable to innovation. In order to verify this preliminary 
result, we will investigate in detail the role these two parameters play in the 
investment in innovation. We start by examining the impact of a change in e  and 
γ  holding other parameters constant at the values defined in section 4.2. 
According to Figure 16 the degree of differentiability does not have any impact on 
the investment to innovate for the values chosen to calibrate the model, which 
confirms previous results. The same applies to Latvia, Portugal, and Sweden. 
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Figure 16: Sensitivity analysis for e ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 3α =0.2, γ =5E-10, 
mktshareI=80%, elastIM=-0.4, elastID=-0.5, elastE=-0.6, 
crosselast=0.1) 
 
The elasticity of innovation cost (Figure 17) has a positive effect on the incentives 
to innovate, i.e. the incentives to innovate increase as γ  increases. This effect is 
nonlinear. For all the values of γ  analysed, k under monopoly is always larger 
than under duopoly. However, the difference between these two variables reduces 
as γ  increases. The same result is obtained for Latvia, Portugal, and Sweden. 
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Figure 17: Sensitivity analysis for γ  ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 3α =0.2, e=0.8, 
mktshareI=80%, elastIM=-0.4, elastID=-0.5, elastE=-0.6, 
crosselast=0.1) 
 
Next, we present a series of experiments where we test whether the results just 
described still hold true for other combinations of values of the remaining 
parameters.  
We have previously presented results for γ =6E-10, e=0.9, mktshareI=60% 
(Figure 11, page 87) and mktshareI=90% (Figure 12, page 88) (for different 
values of elastIM, elastID, elastE, and crosselast holding 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, and 
3α =0.2). Now, we present the results for γ =4E-10 (Figure 18 and Figure 19). 
By comparing Figure 11 and Figure 12 with Figure 18 and Figure 19, 
respectively, we can analyse the effect of a change in γ  on the investment in 
innovation for different values of elastIM, elastID, elastE, and crosselast holding 
1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 3α =0.2, and e=0.9. 
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Figure 18: Results for e=0.9, γ =4E-10 and mktshareI=60% (for different values 
of elastIM, elastID, elastE, and crosselast holding 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 
and 3α =0.2) 
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Figure 19: Results for e=0.9, γ =4E-10 and mktshareI=90% (for different values 
of elastIM, elastID, elastE, and crosselast holding 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 
and 3α =0.2) 
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The results in Figure 11 and Figure 18 are similar with the exception that with 
γ =4E-10 the difference between k under monopoly and under duopoly remains 
constant when elastID is larger than -0.5 (approximately). Also, from Figure 12 to 
Figure 19 there are no considerable changes. The results for Latvia, Portugal, and 
Sweden are very similar to those of France.  
The same sets of graphs were constructed for e=0.6 and no change in the results 
was observed relatively to the graphs were e=0.9 (see Annex 1). 
In conclusion, the main results of the model are robust to changes in the elasticity 
of innovation cost and to changes in the degree of service differentiation. 
4.4 Concluding remarks 
The model presented in this chapter investigates the incumbent’s optimal 
investment in innovation under monopoly and under duopoly.  
The results show that the difference between investment in innovation under 
monopoly and under duopoly is determined by the incumbent’s market share, as 
well as by the incumbent’s elasticity of demand under monopoly and under 
duopoly. 
The incumbent’s market share has a non-linear impact on innovation under 
duopoly. Until a certain point an increase in the incumbent’s market share creates 
more incentives to innovate under duopoly and from that point on the contrary 
happens. Once the pressure of competition is very low (incumbent’s market share 
is very large) the investment in innovation decreases as the market share of the 
incumbent increases.  
The elasticity of demand of the incumbent has a negative impact on the level of 
investment in innovation both under monopoly and duopoly. As for the elasticity 
of demand of the entrant, it has almost no impact on the incentives to innovate 
under duopoly, while the cross elasticity of demand has a reduced impact. 
For certain values of the incumbent’s market share and elasticities of demand 
under monopoly and duopoly, there exists an interval where investment in 
innovation under duopoly is larger than that under monopoly (except when 
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welfare maximisation is the sole objective or has a sufficiently high weight in the 
incumbent’s objective function). The size of this interval depends upon the 
incumbent’s market share and elasticities of demand under monopoly and 
duopoly.  
The market share where investment in innovation under monopoly is equal to 
investment under duopoly depends on the elasticity of demand of the incumbent 
in both situations. The smaller (in absolute value) elastIM is, or the larger (in 
absolute value) elastID is, the widest is the interval where k under duopoly is 
larger than k under monopoly. The incumbent’s market share needed for k under 
duopoly to be larger than k under monopoly decreases as elastIM gets smaller (in 
absolute value) and as elastID gets larger (in absolute value). 
Even in the cases where levels of investment in innovation are higher under 
monopoly, there is a price to pay in the form of the usual deadweight losses of 
monopoly. The extent of these losses will depend upon the incumbent’s 
“commercial orientation”, i.e. on its objective function. 
It was also proven that the incentives to innovate decrease as the weight given to 
revenue and/or to profit increases. In other words, the more regulation can push 
the incumbent to act as a welfare maximiser, the larger the investment in 
innovation is. This conclusion is independent of the market share of the 
incumbent. The more sensible way to induce the incumbent to behave like a 
welfare-maximising firm, at least with respect to cost-reducing innovations, is 
through price cap regulation. 
Although the results were derived from the model calibration for a specific sector, 
the postal sector, the model development is generic, and the conclusions above 
apply to the network industries with similar characteristics. 
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5. Empirical analysis – The case of the postal sector 
This chapter presents an empirical analysis of the impact of liberalisation and 
competition on incumbents’ innovation. The predictions from Chapter 3 and the 
results from the theoretical model developed in Chapter 4 are tested here for a 
particular network industry: the postal sector.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.3, there are two models of competition in the 
postal sector: end-to-end competition and competition with access to the 
incumbent’s network. Access to the incumbent’s network can be of two types 
(according to the stage at which access occurs): worksharing or upstream access, 
and downstream access.  
The effects of liberalisation and end-to-end competition on the incumbent’s 
innovation are analysed through an econometric analysis (section 5.1), which does 
not take access into account.  
In order to perform the econometric analysis, we collected data on liberalisation 
and competition in the postal sector, and on innovation performed by the postal 
incumbents. Additionally, we collected data on the following control variables: 
quantity supplied, average number of employees, percentage of public ownership 
of the incumbents, population density, and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per 
capita in the countries being studied. The dataset used for the econometric 
analysis includes seventeen member countries of the European Union (EU), over 
ten years.  
An index of liberalisation was built in order to measure the degree of 
liberalisation. The index is an approximation of the percentage of letter mail 
volume liberalised (includes correspondence and inbound cross border mail, direct 
mail and outbound cross border mail). This approximation is based on the 
reserved area weight limit.  
The degree of end-to-end competition in the market is measured through the 
market share of the entrants.  
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Regarding innovation, seventeen critical innovations were identified and the 
postal operators were surveyed, about their date of introduction. Based on this 
information, an innovation index and the accumulated number of innovations 
were computed. Additionally, a measure of productivity was also computed. 
Several models were estimated using the three innovation proxies and the results 
were compared. 
The effects of worksharing and downstream access on incumbents’ innovation are 
analysed separately through three case studies (section 5.2) due to the lack of 
quantitative data available on the volumes of worksharing and downstream access. 
The countries analysed in the case studies are France (FR), the United Kingdom 
(UK) and the United States of America (USA). 
5.1 Evidence on the impact of liberalisation and end-to-end 
competition on incumbents’ innovation 
The impact of liberalisation and end-to-end competition on innovation in the 
postal sector is empirically analysed in this section. In particular, we test the 
results obtained in Chapters 3 and 4. 
The structure of this section is as follows. Firstly, the hypotheses being tested are 
presented. Then, the data used is described and analysed in detail. It follows the 
presentation of the model and of the estimation procedures. Finally, the results are 
discussed. 
5.1.1 Hypotheses 
The hypotheses being tested in this section, which follow from Chapters 3 and 4, 
are the following: 
Hypothesis 1: Liberalisation in the postal sector has stimulated operators to be 
more efficient and therefore, more innovative (Chapter 3). 
Hypothesis 2: When the incumbents preserve a relatively high market share, 
competition favours innovation (Chapter 4). Therefore, a positive effect of end-to-
Empirical analysis 
105 
end competition on innovation and efficiency is expected because the incumbents 
analysed here kept market shares of at least 90%. 
Hypothesis 3: A decrease in public ownership is expected to have a negative 
impact on innovation under the assumption that public ownership is the most 
likely ownership structure to promote welfare maximisation. In fact, the 
theoretical model (Chapter 4) predicts a positive effect of welfare maximisation 
on innovation, i.e. the larger the weight given to welfare (and the smaller the 
weight given to both profit and revenue) in the incumbent’s objective function, the 
larger is the investment in innovation.  
Hypothesis 4: The larger the amount of goods and services supplied (letter 
volume) the more efficient and innovative the operator is (Chapter 4). 
5.1.2 Data analysis 
The dataset presented here results from the compilation of different sources and 
from a survey conducted by the author. It constitutes a unique source of 
information for analysing the liberalisation process, the development of 
competition, and the development of incumbents’ innovation in the postal sector 
in the last decade. 
We collected data to measure the degree of liberalisation and competition in the 
postal market, and the innovativeness of the incumbents (including the letter mail 
volume and the average number of employees). Some additional control variables, 
namely the percentage of capital owned by the state, population density, and GDP 
per capita, were also collected. 
All these variables were collected for the period between 1995 and 2005 (some 
were also collected for 2006), in seventeen European countries and operators:  
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Table 6: Countries and operators included in sample 
Country Operator 
Bulgaria (BG) Bulgarian Posts plc 
Croatia (HR) Hrvatska pošta d.d. 
Estonia (EE) Eesti Post Ltd 
Finland (FI) Itella Oyj 
France (FR) La Poste 
Germany (DE) Deutsche Post AG 
Ireland (IE) An Post 
Italy (IT) Poste Italiane S.p.A. 
Latvia (LV) Latvijas Pasts 
Poland (PL) Poczta Polska 
Portugal (PT) CTT - Correios de Portugal, S.A. 
Romania (RO) C.N. Posta Romana S.A. 
Spain (ES) Correos y Telégrafos S.A. 
Sweden (SE) Posten AB 
Switzerland (CH) Die Post/La Poste/La Posta 
The Netherlands (NL) TNT Post 
United Kingdom (UK) Royal Mail Group PLC 
 
The data used to build the liberalisation index was collected from the several 
studies mandated by the European Commission, as well as the regulators’ reports, 
the annual reports of the operators, and the International Post Corporation (IPC) 
regulatory database (see Annex 5 with list of references). The same sources were 
used to collect the data on the degree of competition, i.e. market shares. 
The data necessary to build the innovation index and the accumulated number of 
innovations, two of the three measures of innovation used, was collected through 
a survey (see Annex 6). In that survey, incumbents were asked about the data of 
introduction of 17 critical innovations identified by the author. 
We first analyse the different measures of innovation and the liberalisation index. 
After, we examine the degree of competition and the remaining variables. 
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5.1.2.1 Measures of innovation 
Three proxies for innovation are used: an innovation index (inindex), the 
accumulated number of innovations (accuminno), and labour productivity 
(itemperempl).  
The innovation index developed in this thesis aims to measure innovativeness in 
the postal sector. It corresponds to the average delay or advance, in years, in 
introducing the critical innovations. 
If a certain innovation was already introduced by a country (called the pioneer 
country) and the country being analysed did not introduce that innovation yet, 
then the latter will be penalised with the number of years that elapsed from the 
year the innovation was first introduced until the year in question. On the 
contrary, if the country being analysed has already introduced a certain 
innovation, then it is beneficed with the number of years that elapsed from the 
year that country introduced the innovation until the year in question. 
In this way, we computed for each country and each year the number of years the 
country is, on average, late or advanced in introducing the critical innovations (the 
same weight was given to all innovations). 
The pioneer country is identified among the seventeen countries plus the United 
States of America18. 
In our sample, the innovation index ranges from -18 until 18, which are the 
maximum average delay and the maximum average advance a country can have, 
respectively. 
This measure is richer than the simple count of the number of innovations because 
it takes into account whether the innovation is more or less recent, i.e. it takes into 
account the year the innovation was first introduced. As explained before, for each 
year that elapses without the introduction of an innovation, the country is 
                                                           
18 The USA is not included in the econometric analysis because it does not have end-to-end 
competition. However, the USA was considered when deciding the date of introduction by the 
pioneering country because, traditionally, the USA has indeed been the pioneer country 
introducing new technologies and processes. 
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penalised. Hence, in order to ensure a symmetric treatment of the innovations that 
were already introduced relative to the ones that were not, a country must benefit 
for each year that elapses from the introduction of an innovation. 
The innovation index and the accumulated number of innovations are based on the 
date of introduction of the following seventeen critical innovations, supplied by 
the incumbents through a questionnaire: 
• Optimisation of collection routes (using software) 
• Hybrid mail 
• Digital stamp 
• Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) used to identify trucks 
• RFID used to identify trolleys 
• RFID used to identify trays or bags 
• RFID used to monitor the performance of the letter post 
• Automated sorting machines using Optical Character Recognition (OCR) 
that can read whole front side of the letter 
• OCR that can read hand-written whole addresses 
• OCR that can read hand-written postal codes 
• OCR that can read machine written postal codes and whole addresses 
• Video coded address reading equipment: online coding 
• Video coded address reading equipment: scanning and remote coding (off-
line video coding equipment) 
• Automated sequence sorting to delivery route 
• Automatic tray handling systems 
• Automated guided vehicles (AGV) 
• Route planning and optimisation software for delivery 
These seventeen critical innovations were identified through the literature (Arthur 
D. Little Limited, 2004, Wik, 2004, Nera, 2004, PricewaterhouseCoopers, 1997), 
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the annual reports of the operators, and interviews with experts in the postal 
sector19. Firstly, the ensemble of the more significant innovations was listed. 
Secondly, the more recent innovations and the ones that have more impact on 
costs and costumers’ satisfaction were selected.  
Figure 20 shows the evolution of the innovation index for all the countries at 
study.  
 
                                                           
19 Mr. Josef Bösch, CEO Postmail, Swiss Post;  Mr. Michel Kunz, CEO Logistics, Swiss Post; Mr. 
Peter Stoop, Responsible Business Technology Center, Swiss Post; Mr. Kenneth 
Lützelschwab, Responsible REMA project, Swiss Post; Mr. Pedro Saldanha, Business Strategy 
and Development, CTT Correios de Portugal, S.A. 
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Figure 20: Innovation index 
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The countries with larger technological delay are Bulgaria, Estonia, Croatia, and 
Latvia. Italy, Romania, and the United Kingdom used to have an innovation index 
much lower than the average. However, in 2003 both the United Kingdom and 
Italy inverted the negative trend and, in 2004, Romania did it too. Today the 
United Kingdom is above the average, Italy just reached the average and Romania 
is very close to it.  
The innovation delay/advance introducing the critical innovations of the 
incumbents from Switzerland, Finland, Ireland, Poland, and Portugal have been 
around the average throughout the period of study.   
Spain, Germany, France, The Netherlands, and Sweden have registered an 
innovation index above the average.  
We now analyse the second measure of innovation: the accumulated number of 
innovations. This variable corresponds to the number of innovations, among the 
critical innovations, that were implemented until the year in analysis. Figure 21 
displays the evolution of the accumulated number of innovations for the seventeen 
countries. The evolution of this variable is consistent with the evolution of the 
innovation index. 
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Figure 21: Accumulated number of innovations 
Empirical analysis 
113 
 
Finally, we consider the third measure of innovation: labour productivity. This 
variable is equal to the letter mail volume (in thousands) divided by the average 
number of employees.  
The data on the volume of letter mail in billions of items (tvolume), which 
includes domestic and international correspondence, registered items, insured 
letters, newspapers, as well as addressed and unaddressed advertising items, is 
available through the Universal Postal Union (UPU) database.  
Figure 22 shows that there have been some small fluctuations in the volumes yet 
not significant ones. The impact of electronic substitution on mail volumes has 
been weaker than predicted by some operators. The expectations are that letter 
post will become more a means of distribution of direct mail than for exchange of 
correspondence. The direct mail growth should partially compensate for the loss 
of correspondence and transaction mail (Wik, 2005).  
The French market is the one with the larger letter mail volume, followed by the 
British and the Deutsch markets. For the remaining countries, the letter mail 
volumes are below 7 billion items per year, in 2005. France, the United Kingdom 
and Portugal have experienced growing mail volumes. The total average has also 
been increasing slightly.  
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Figure 22: Evolution of letter mail volumes 
 
The average number of employees (includes permanent employees and employees 
with a term contract) in thousands (empl) was also collected from the UPU 
database except for Latvia Post. The average number of employees of Latvia Post 
was collected from Amadeus database.  
The countries with most employees are Germany, France and the United Kingdom 
(Figure 23). These three countries are also the ones with larger volumes as 
observed before. Italy stands out because it has a relatively large number of 
employees although its letter mail volume is around the average of the countries 
being studied. The same happens with Poland whose letter mail volumes are 
approximately half of the average, whereas its number of employees is very close 
to the average. 
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Figure 23: Average number of employees for the years 1995, 2000, and 2005 
 
The average number of employees corresponds to the whole company since there 
was no data available by segments.  
The measure “labour productivity” presents some drawbacks, which are important 
to keep in mind. Firstly, labour productivity was computed with the total number 
of employees and not only the employees working in the letter segment. One 
consequence of this is that a postal operator with a large diversification of 
products and where financial services, for instance, have a large weight will have 
a relatively small labour productivity. 
Secondly, an increase in mail volume does not trigger a proportional increase in 
the number of employees because the postal services are characterised by 
economies of scale and scope. Therefore, comparisons among countries with 
different mail volumes have to be cautious.  
It must also be considered that sometimes firms can not lay-off as soon as there is 
a decrease in volumes, which may cause a decrease in labour productivity. 
The evolution of labour productivity is presented in Figure 24. 
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Figure 24: Labour productivity (thousands of items per employee) 
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Since labour productivity is generated from completely different data than the 
innovation index, it is interesting to compare both measures.  
Bulgaria has a labour productivity below the average, which is consistent with the 
technological delay introducing the seventeen innovations mentioned before. In 
the same situation are: Estonia, Croatia, Italy, Latvia, and Romania. In Estonia, 
however, the innovation index is deviating more and more from the average while 
labour productivity is approaching the average. In Latvia, the innovation index is 
also deviating more and more from the average whereas labour productivity 
remains more or less stable. 
The evolution of labour productivity for the French, Dutch, Spanish, Swedish, 
Finnish, and Irish incumbents is also consistent with the evolution of the 
innovation index. The French, Dutch, Spanish, and Swedish incumbents have an 
innovation index above the average and their labour productivity is larger than the 
average labour productivity. In Finland and Ireland, both measures of innovation 
have always been very close to the average. 
In Germany, the innovation index has always been above the average whereas 
labour productivity has been decreasing and is now below the average. 
Switzerland and Portugal have registered, through the years studied, an innovation 
index close to the average while their labour productivity has always been above 
the average. In Portugal labour productivity has been steadily increasing.  
In Poland, there is a divergence between the two indexes: the innovation delay is 
close to the average while labour productivity has always been below the average. 
Finally, in the United Kingdom, the innovation index was very low until 2003, 
when it started to increase, while labour productivity has always been above the 
average. 
5.1.2.2 Measuring the degree of liberalisation 
In 1998, the European Postal Directive 97/67/EC was implemented, which  sets 
the maximum weight limit of the reserved area at 350 grams for items of 
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correspondence and the price limit at five times the basic tariff for a first class 
letter in the lowest weight band. The directive 2002/39/EC reduces the reserved 
area to items of correspondence that weigh less than 100 grams and cost less than 
three times the basic tariff as of January 1st, 2003, and to 50 grams and two and a 
half times the basic tariff as of January 1st, 2006. Furthermore, the outgoing cross-
border mail is required to open to competition on January 1st, 2006 but exceptions 
are accepted if needed to ensure universal service. Directive 2002/39/EC sets the 
full market opening of the postal markets for January 1st, 2009, subject to 
confirmation by the European Parliament and the Council. In 2007, the European 
Parliament voted to delay the full market opening until January 1st, 2011. The new 
member states and posts that work in difficult terrain can delay full liberalisation 
for a further two years. 
The letter post items can be divided into four categories: items of correspondence, 
addressed printed matter, newspapers, and un-addressed printed matter (i.e. un-
addressed direct mail). Items of correspondence include letters, postcards, and 
transaction mail such as bills and bank statements. Included in addressed printed 
matter are: addressed direct mail, catalogues, and magazines or periodicals. 
The reserved area includes the clearance, sorting, transport and delivery of items 
of domestic and incoming cross-border correspondence. It may also include direct 
mail (addressed items only) and outgoing cross-border mail falling in the same 
weight and price limits to the extent necessary to ensure the maintenance of 
universal service. There are nevertheless exceptions to this reserved area. Among 
the countries at study, Germany and Ireland exclude the collection and 
transportation of mail to a post office for final delivery from the reserved area. 
France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain exempt “special 
services” (i.e. services that are “distinct from the universal service”) from the 
reserved area. Also, Portugal does not include “day certain” delivery in the 
reserved area (Wik, 2006).  
The liberalisation index (mktliberalised) developed in this thesis to measure the 
degree of liberalisation in the postal sector corresponds to the percentage of letter 
mail volume opened to competition. The index refers only to items of 
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correspondence and addressed direct mail. It takes into account whether the 
following categories are part of the reserved area:  
• domestic and inbound cross-border correspondence (weight criteria 
transformed in percentage of mail liberalised according to Table 7) 
• local intra-city mail 
• direct mail 
• outbound cross-border correspondence. 
Each category was given a weight according to the composition of the mail 
market in physical terms (Table 8). 
 
Table 7: Correspondence between reserved area and percentage of letter mail 
volume liberalised (domestic and inbound cross border 
correspondence) 
Weight limit of the 
reserved area 
Percentage of mail 
volume 
>0g 100 
>50g 25* 
>100g 18* 
>150g 14 
>200g 10 
>350g 7* 
>500g 2 
>1000g 1 
>2000g 0 
* Wik (2004), page 98 
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Table 8: Composition of the mail market in physical terms 
  Domestic and 
inbound CB 
Direct mail Outbound CB 
FR 74% 23% 2% 
DE 62% 37% 2% 
ES 75% 21% 4% 
SE 73% 23% 4% 
CH 66% 31% 3% 
NL 76% 20% 4% 
UK 69% 28% 3% 
US 73% 26% 0% 
PT 81% 15% 4% 
BG 88% 10% 1% 
CZ 76% 21% 3% 
HR 62% 37% 1% 
EE 85% 11% 4% 
FI 77% 22% 1% 
IE 82% 7% 11% 
IT 67% 32% 1% 
LV 93% 4% 4% 
PL 92% 5% 3% 
RO 75% 24% 2% 
Source: Ecorys (2005), Country reports 
 
Before the Postal Directive 97/67/EC, the incumbents retained monopolies for 
letters, generally up to 1 or 2 kilograms. It was assumed that the maximum 
reserved area for domestic and incoming cross-border mail was two kilograms. 
Figure 25 displays the evolution of the liberalisation index for the seventeen 
countries.  
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Figure 25: Liberalisation index  
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Spain was, among the countries at study, the first one to liberalise a considerable 
part of its letter market. In the 1960s the intra-city mail in Spain was fully opened 
to competition. For decades, the reserved area in Spain has been restricted to 
letters and postcards that are inter-urban or international. Therefore, the Spanish 
market is one of the most competitive European postal markets.  
The liberalisation process in Sweden started in 1985 when the Swedish 
government established quality and profitability as the objectives of Posten. 
Posten was given more freedom in the capital markets in 1987 and measures of 
consumer satisfaction were put in place. Five years later, Posten was given the 
freedom to set prices within certain limits, and in 1993 the letter monopoly was 
abolished (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 1997). Since then, the market share of the 
incumbent (Posten) has been declining. Today, the most important private 
operator (CityMail) has a market share of approximately 8.5%.  
Estonia and Finland have also fully liberalised their postal market. Finland took 
the decision to fully liberalise the mail market in 1991, which took effect in 1994. 
Estonia has liberalised its mail market in 2002. However, competition has not 
developed in these countries due mainly to restrictive licence conditions and 
taxation.  
In the United Kingdom, the Postal Services Act 2000 abolished the reserved area 
and from January 1st, 2006, the Postal Services Commission (“Postcomm”) grants 
licenses to all operators subject only to compliance with certain essential 
requirements, instead of only bulk mail providers and certain other special 
categories of postal services operators as before 2006 (Eccles and Kuipers, 2006). 
In 2004 the Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs, Laurens-Jan Brinkhorst 
published a paper on the future of postal policy in the Netherlands20. In this paper, 
he defends the full market opening of the Dutch market in 2007, but conditioned 
on the full liberalisation of the British and German markets. He justifies this 
position by the need to create a level playing field (Wik, 2004). 
                                                           
20 « Postal Memorandum » available at http://www.ez.nl/content.jsp?objectid=20863 [8/10/2007]. 
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In Germany, letter items weighting more than 200 grams became open to 
competition in 1998. Regarding direct mail, the weight limit was firstly reduced in 
1995 to 250 grams, then in 1996 to 100 grams, and finally in 1998 to 50 grams.  
The liberalisation of direct mail is particularly interesting because direct mail 
represents a great share of the total volume of letter mail. Eight of the countries 
analysed here - Croatia, France, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Poland, Portugal and 
Switzerland - have maintained a reserved area over direct mail (IPC, 2007). In 
Italy and The Netherlands, addressed direct mail is liberalised and substantial 
competition can be observed in this segment. 
The definition of direct mail is not homogeneous in all the countries. In the 
Netherlands direct mail corresponds only to wholly printed matter whereas, for 
instance, in Germany items of direct mail can differ in respect to specific 
elements. In Spain and Italy, direct mail is defined as items whose body is 
“essentially identical”. The Directive considers as direct mail the advertising items 
where the nature of the message is the same even if there are other elements 
specific to each item (Wik, 2006).  
Among the countries at study, seven also reserve outgoing mail. These countries 
are Bulgaria, Italy Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Spain (IPC, 2007).  
5.1.2.3 The degree of competition 
The degree of competition is measured through the market share of the competitor 
postal operators (in terms of volume) (mktshareE) in addressed mail delivery, 
including both reserved and non-reserved areas. The sources of the market share 
of the entrants are the following: Ecorys (2005), Wik (2004), Bundesnetzagentur 
(2006), and the Swedish regulator.  
mktshareE is a discrete variable that assumes the values 1,3,5,7,9, and 11. These 
values correspond to the mid point of the interval to which belongs the market 
share of the entrants. For example, if entrants have a market share that lies on the 
interval [0,2%] then mktshareE assumes the value 1. If entrants have a market 
share that lies on the interval (2%,4%] then mktshareE assumes the value 3, and 
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so on. Figure 26 illustrates the evolution of the market share of the entrants 
between 1995 and 2005.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.2.3, in the majority of the countries under 
study, the entrants’ market share does not exceed the 2%.  
Spain is the country where competition is highest, followed by Sweden. Although 
Finland and Estonia liberalised their mail markets some years ago, the restrictive 
licence conditions and taxation policy has restricted the development of 
competition. In both countries, potential entrants are required to provide postal 
services in the whole territory of the country21. In Finland, potential entrants can 
opt for a restricted license that implies an additional turnover tax of 5-20%, 
depending on the territorial coverage of mail delivery.  
The license requirements to deliver addressed mail in Sweden are not restrictive. 
Moreover, there are no licence requirements to deliver catalogues, magazines and 
un-addressed mail. However, not a lot of competition has developed and the 
incumbent still has a very dominant position currently. This slow development of 
competition is related to different factors. Initially, the legislation was not adapted 
to support or create the preconditions for competition. Also, CityMail (the largest 
competitor of Posten AB) faced numerous internal problems that limited its 
business development and expansion. Finally, Sweden has a large territory with a 
low population density, which creates barriers to entry (Ecorys, 2005). 
After Spain and Sweden, the countries where competition is most developed are 
Germany, The Netherlands, and Estonia. 
 
                                                           
21 With the exception of the Aland islands in Finland. 
Empirical analysis 
125 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
year
m
ar
ke
t s
ha
re
 o
f t
he
 e
nt
ra
nt
 (%
)
DE ES SE NL BG, CH, FI, FR, HR, IE, IT, LV, PL, PT, RO, UK EE
 
Figure 26: Evolution of entrants’ market share  
 
5.1.2.4 Other variables 
In addition to the main variables of interest described above, we also collected 
data on the following control variables: percentage of public ownership, 
population density, and GDP per capita. 
The share of equity owned directly or indirectly by central governments (publick) 
was collected from the operators’ annual reports, the IPC Postal regulatory 
databases, and the operators’ websites. Among the countries at study, only 
Deutsche Post and TNT Post are partially privatised. In 2005, the Deutsche 
government held 45% of the shares of Deutsche Post and only 10% of the shares 
of TNT Post were owned (directly or indirectly) by the Dutch government. 
Population (in millions) was collected from Eurostat and countries’ area is 
available at the UPU database. These two variables were used to build the variable 
population density (popdens), which is plotted in Figure 27, together with 
population. Population density is in number of habitants per squared kilometre. 
France, Germany, United Kingdom, and Italy are the countries with the greatest 
populations. These countries, except France, are among the four countries with the 
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highest population density. The Netherlands is the country with the highest 
population density. 
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Figure 27: Population and population density in 2005 
 
The GDP at 1995 prices was collected from Eurostat’s statistics and used to 
compute the variable GDP per capita (gdppercap). GDP per capita is in 
thousands of euros per habitant. Figure 28 displays the GDP per capita and GDP 
in 2005. The countries with the highest GDP are Germany, France, the United 
Kingdom, and Italy, whereas the countries with the largest GDP per capita are 
Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, Germany, and The Netherlands. 
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Figure 28: GDP per capita and GDP in 2005 
 
Finally, both exchange rates and inflation rates are from Eurostat. 
Table 9 summarises and describes the variables involved in this study. 
 
Table 9: Variables’ description 
Variable Description 
inindex Innovation index 
accuminno Accumulated number of innovations 
itemperempl Labour productivity 
tvolume Volume of letter mail (in billions of items) 
empl Average number of employees (includes permanent employees and 
employees with a term contract) (in thousands) 
mktliberalised Liberalisation index (measures the degree of liberalisation, i.e the 
percentage of letter mail volume opened to competition) 
mktshareE Market share of the competitor postal operators (in terms of volume) 
publick Share of equity owned directly or indirectly by central governments 
popdens Population density 
gdppercap GDP per capita 
 
The detailed descriptive statistics are presented in Annex 7, Table 11. 
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5.1.3 The model 
In this section we present the econometric model estimated in order to test the 
hypotheses presented in section 5.1.1. Its general form is: 
 
1 it 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 itInnovation Xit i t i t itmktliberalised mktliberalised C eα β β β β− += + + + + +  
 
where t represents years, i denotes countries, α  is a constant term, itX  is a vector 
of exogenous explanatory variables, and itC  is the vector of control variables.  
The contemporaneous explanatory variables included in the vector itX  are: 
mktliberalised and mktshareE. Vector itC  includes: publick, tvolume, popdens, 
and gdppercap. 
This model is estimated for the three different measures of innovation presented 
before, which are the innovation index (inindex), the accumulated number of 
innovation (accuminno), and labour productivity (itemperempl). 
The aim of lagging and forwarding mktliberalised one period is to test if firms 
react with delay to liberalisation policies or if firms anticipate future changes 
regarding market liberalisation, respectively. 
The correlation matrix between independent variables is displayed in Annex 7, 
Table 12. The percentage of market liberalised and the percentage of market share 
of the entrants have a correlation of 54%. Although this correlation is not 
extremely high, it must be noted that the inclusion of these two variables in the 
same specification might affect t-statistics. The correlation between mktliberalised 
and popdens is -34% and, therefore, caution must be taken when including both 
variables in the same model. All the other variables have a correlation with 
mktliberalised smaller than 25% and therefore should not cause any problems. 
Regarding mktshareE, its correlations with publick, tvolume, popdens, and 
gdppercap are smaller than 25%. The correlation between publick and gdppercap 
slightly exceeds 25% (it is 28% in absolute value) and it should not cause 
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problems either. However, publick and popdens have a high correlation of -73%, 
which deserves particular attention. It is likely that the inclusion of both variables 
in the same model will distort results, in particular t-statistics. The correlation 
between tvolume and popdens, as well as between tvolume and gdppercap, are 
close to 50% and, hence, there is a risk of impact on the t-statistics. Finally, 
popdens and gdppercap have a correlation of 38%. 
We start by estimating a specification only with the contemporaneous variables 
and control variables. Then, a second model that excludes popdens, because of its 
correlation with mktliberalised, is estimated. After, we estimate a model that 
excludes gdppercap from the second model because of its correlation with 
tvolume. We then investigate if the t-statistics are being affected by the correlation 
between mktliberalised and mktshareE by estimating two other models: one with 
mktliberalised, publick, and tvolume as explanatory variables, and another one 
with mktshareE, publick, and tvolume as explanatory variables. 
5.1.4 Estimation procedures 
Firstly, the models were tested for the presence of heteroskedasticity and 
correlation between and within panels. Table 13, in Annex 7, summarises the 
results of the tests performed.  
By plotting the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) residuals it is possible to see 
(independently of the variable used as proxy for innovation) that the means and 
the dispersion are different across countries. This finding confirms the existence 
of a panel structure. Also, the fact that the second moments are different across 
countries is a first indication of a problem of heteroskedasticity. 
A likelihood-ratio test (lrtest hetero) was performed in order to determine the 
presence of heteroskedasticity. In all the models, the null hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity is rejected, which indicates the presence of heteroskedasticity. 
For the purpose of learning more about the type of heteroskedasticity, namely to 
test for inter-individuals heteroskedasticity, a modified Wald test was performed 
(xttest3). The rejection of the null hypotheses confirms the existence of inter-
individuals hereroskedasticity. 
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It is not possible to perform a Breusch-Pagan test (xttest2) in order to check for 
correlation across panels because the number of firms is larger than the number of 
time periods being analysed (i.e. N>T). Nevertheless, we will assume that there is 
spatial correlation in the errors since it is very common to find this type of 
correlation in panel data models. The first order autocorrelation test of 
Wooldridge (xtserial) indicates the presence of serial autocorrelation in the three 
models since the null hypothesis of independence of the residuals is rejected. 
In the presence of autocorrelation within panels, cross-sectional correlation, and 
heteroskedasticity, the most appropriated estimation procedures are Generalised 
Least Squares (GLS) and Prais-Winsten estimation with Panel Corrected Standard 
Errors (PW-PCSE). Models 1 through 21, in Annex 7, were estimated by GLS and 
models 22 through 42, in Annex 7, using PW-PCSE estimation. 
GLS allows estimation in the presence of a first order autoregressive process 
(AR(1)) within panels and cross-sectional correlation, and heteroskedasticity 
across panels. The coefficient of the AR(1) process can be specified as being 
common to all the panels or as being specific to each panel. We assume that the 
AR(1) coefficient is specific to each model. 
In the PCSE estimation, parameters are estimated by OLS or Prais-Winsten 
regression. Prais-Winsten estimates are provided when autocorrelation is 
specified, which is the case. Otherwise, OLS estimates are provided. As with 
GLS, the coefficient of the AR(1) process can be specified with PCSE estimation 
as being common to all the panels or as being specific to each panel. Again, the 
AR(1) coefficient is assumed to be specific to each model.  
5.1.5 Results 
In this section, the results are presented and discussed. A total of forty two models 
were estimated and reported in Annex 7 (Tables 14 through 19). Tables 14, 15, 
and 16 report the results of GLS estimation. Tables 17, 18, and 19 report the PW-
PCSE estimation. In the models included in Tables 14 and 17 the dependent 
variable is the innovation index. Tables 15 and 18 contain the models that have 
the accumulated number of innovations as dependent variable. Finally, Tables 16 
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and 19 report the models that use labour productivity as proxy for innovation. 
Each table contains seven models. Schematically the models are as follows: 
 
Table 10: Scheme of estimated models  
Dependent variable Estimation procedure 
inindex accuminno itemperempl 
table number 14 15 16 GLS 
model number 1-7 8-14 15-21 
table number 17 18 19 PW-PCSE 
model number 22-28 29-35 36-42 
 
In all the models estimated, the explanatory variables are found to be jointly 
significant. 
5.1.5.1 Models estimated by GLS 
In the models estimated by GLS that include all the contemporaneous explanatory 
variables (including the control variables), the percentage of market liberalised is 
shown not to be significant (Models 1, 8, and 15). However, once the population 
density, which is correlated with mktliberalisedt, publickt, and tvolumet is taken 
out of these regressions, mktliberalisedt becomes statistically significant in two of 
the models (in Model 2 and 16, and not in Model 9). Only when gdppercapt 
(which is correlated with tvolumet and popdenst) is taken out of Model 9, 
mktliberalisedt becomes statistically significant (Model 10).  
Concerning the remaining models that have the innovation index as dependent 
variable, it is observed that in Model 2, tvolumet is not statistically significant but 
when gdppercapt is excluded (Model 3), tvolumet becomes statistically significant 
at a 1% level. In Model 3, the marketshareEt and publickt are also statistically 
significant at a 1% level. 
With Model 4 and 5 we aim to test whether the correlation between 
mktliberalisedt and marketshareEt significantly affects the t-statistics. As one can 
observe, this is not the case.  
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The objective of Models 6 and 7 is to analyse the response of innovation 
(measured through the innovation index) to non-contemporaneous changes in the 
percentage of market liberalised. Therefore, mktliberalisedt is replaced by 
mktliberalisedt-1 and mktliberalisedt+1. It is observed that both variables are 
statistically significant but they have a smaller impact on the innovation index 
than mktliberalisedt.  
Hence, from the set of models estimated using GLS and where innovation is 
measured through the innovation index, Model 3 is selected as the one that best 
fits the data.  
We now turn to the models that have the accumulated number of innovations as 
dependent variable and that have not yet been analysed. 
In Model 10, tvolumet also becomes statistically significant at a 1% level when 
gdppercapt is excluded from the vector of explanatory variables. marketshareEt 
remains statistically significant at a 1% level. However, publickt which was 
significant becomes not significant.  
When we estimate Models 11 and 12, which exclude mktliberalisedt and 
marketshareEt respectively, from the explanatory variables, it is seen that publickt 
becomes statistically significant at a 1% level again. Also, mktliberalisedt and 
marketshareEt have a more significant impact on the accumulated number of 
innovations when they are not included simultaneously in the same regression.  
mktliberalisedt+1 and mktliberalisedt-1 are both found to be statistically significant 
at a 1% level (Models 13 and 14). The coefficient of mktliberalisedt+1 is smaller 
than that of mktliberalisedt whereas the coefficient of mktliberalisedt-1 and its t-
statistics are larger than that of mktliberalisedt. However, marketshareEt is no 
longer statistically significant in Model 14 (probably due to the correlation 
between mktliberalisedt-1 and marketshareEt).  
Concerning the set of models, which have the accumulated number of innovations 
as dependent variable and that are estimated using GLS, Model 10 seems to best 
fit the data. The likelihood-ratio test that compares Model 8 and Model 10 
confirms that Model 10 fits the data better than Model 8 (LR chi2(2)=5.50 and 
Prob>chi2=0.064). When Model 10 is compared to Model 11, the likelihood-ratio 
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test indicates that Model 10 fits the data better (LR chi2(2)=4.43 and 
Prob>chi2=0.035). 
In the set of models estimated by GLS which use labour productivity as proxy for 
innovation (Table 16) Model 16 seems to best fit the data.  
It is apparent that when mktliberalisedt and marketshareEt are included separately 
(Models 18 and 19) both variables are statistically significant at a 1% level while 
in Model 17 mktliberalisedt is not statistically significant. Model 16, despite 
including both mktliberalisedt and marketshareEt, and gdppercapt seems to 
display t-statistics that are not significantly influenced by the correlation between 
mktliberalisedt and marketshareEt, and between gdppercapt and tvolumet. In 
Model 16, marketshareEt, publickt, tvolumet, and gdppercapt are statistically 
significant at a 1% level.  
mktliberalisedt+1 is not statistically significant (Model 21) whereas 
mktliberalisedt-1 is found to be statistically significant at a 1% level (Model 21). 
The coefficient of mktliberalisedt-1 and its t-statistics are larger than that of 
mktliberalisedt. However, marketshareEt is no longer statistically significant in 
Model 21 (again, probably because of the correlation between mktliberalisedt-1 
and marketshareEt). 
When Models 15, 16, 17, and 18 are compared using likelihood-ratio tests the 
results obtained are: (1) Model 16 fits the data better than Model 15 (LR chi2(2)=-
5.51 and Prob>chi2=1); (2) Model 16 is preferable to Model 17 (LR 
chi2(2)=62.98 and Prob>chi2=0.000); and (3) Model 16 fits the data better than 
Model 18 (LR chi2(2)=180.76 and Prob>chi2=0.000). This confirms the 
perception that Model 16 is the one that best fits the data. 
5.1.5.2 Models estimated using PW-PCSE 
We now turn to the estimations using PW-PCSE. We start with the models that 
have the innovation index as a dependent variable (Models 22 through 28). In all 
of these models, mktliberalisedt and marketshareEt are statistically significant at 
at least at a 5% level. mktliberalisedt+1 and mktliberalisedt-1 are also found to be 
statistically significant (Models 27 and 28). Its coefficients and t-statistics are very 
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close to those of mktliberalisedt in Model 23. Model 23 corresponds to Model 22 
without the variable popdenst. publickt is not statistically significant in Model 22 
but once popdenst is eliminated from the regression, publickt becomes significant.  
Taking gdppercapt out of the regression (Model 24) does not change things 
significantly. Since the coefficient of mktliberalisedt in Model 23 is closer to that 
in Model 25, Model 23 is preferred over Model 24. Models 25 and 26 show that 
the t-statistics are not much affected by the correlation between mktliberalisedt 
and marketshareEt. Model 23 is the model that has the highest R-squared. 
Models 29 through 35 correspond to PW-PCSE estimation with the accumulated 
number of innovations as the dependent variable. In this set of models, 
marketshareEt is always statistically significant while mktliberalisedt only 
becomes statistically significant once we exclude both popdenst and gdppercapt 
(Model 31). The same happens with tvolumet. publickt is statistically significant in 
Models 30 through 35. Again, the correlation between mktliberalisedt and 
marketshareEt does not noticeably affect the results in Model 31 since the 
coefficients and t-statistics of these two variables in Model 32 and 33 are very 
close to those of Model 31. In Model 35, mktliberalisedt-1 is found to be 
statistically insignificant whereas mktliberalisedt+1 (Model 34) is statistically 
significant. Models 31 and 34 have a high R-squared and seem to be the models 
that best fit the data.  
The last group of models (Models 36 through 42) have labour productivity as the 
dependent variable and are estimated using PW-PCSE. In this set of models 
neither mktliberalisedt+1 nor mktliberalisedt-1 are found to be statistically 
significant. On the contrary, tvolumet is always statistically significant in this 
group of models. The t-statistics of tvolumet in Model 37 does not seem to be 
affected by the correlation between this variable and gdppercapt. Surprisingly, 
when gdppercapt is excluded, marketshareEt turns out not to be statistically 
significant (Model 38). The results regarding marketshareEt in Model 38 are 
consistent with those of Model 40. Nevertheless, Model 37 is preferred over 
Model 38 because of all the previous evidence regarding the significance of 
marketshareEt. Also, Model 37 has a very high explanatory power (R-
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squared=0.78). For the first time, publickt is not statistically significant in the 
selected model, i.e. Model 37. 
5.1.5.3 Conclusions 
From the results presented above, it can be conclude that the response of the 
incumbent to liberalisation policies occurs either in the same year the policy 
comes into force or in the years that precede that event, that is, the incumbents 
may react to liberalisation policies in advance. Nevertheless, there is less evidence 
concerning the effect of the percentage of market liberalised forward one period 
(mktliberalisedt+1) than of the contemporaneous percentage of market liberalised 
(mktliberalisedt). It may happen that some of the investments in innovation are 
decided in advance but they are only observable in the following year(s).  
If the models that best fit the data are compared (selected models), i.e. Model 3, 
10, 16, 23, 31, 34, and 37, the models estimated by GLS provide stronger results. 
The use of one innovation measure instead of another does not originate 
significantly different results. This shows that the developed innovation index is a 
good measure of innovation and gives certain warranties about the quality of the 
models estimated. If different results had been found depending on the measure of 
innovation used it would be impossible to know which model (if any) was correct. 
All of the selected models indicate a positive effect of liberalisation on innovation. 
In all of these models, the degree of liberalisation is statistically significant and 
has a positive impact on innovation, i.e. the estimated coefficients have the 
expected signs.  
The actual competition, measured by the market share of the entrants, is always 
statistically significant among the selected models and also has a positive effect 
on innovation. As predicted, the larger the market share of the entrants, the more 
innovative the incumbent is, at least until the market share of the entrants reaches 
a certain threshold.   
In the selected models, the percentage of public ownership is statistically 
significant in the majority of the cases but contrary to what was expected, the 
percentage of public ownership is negatively related to innovation. This does not 
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necessarily mean that welfare maximisation does not stimulate innovation. It can 
mean that public ownership is not the ownership structure most likely to promote 
welfare maximisation. In other words, under the hypothesis that public ownership 
creates more incentives to innovate than private ownership is the assumption that 
governments are likely to maximise social welfare, which in reality may not 
always be true. Moreover, the variable “percentage of public ownership” presents 
almost no variability and, therefore, all the results related to this variable should 
be seen as preliminary and taken with considerable caution. 
Concerning the letter volume handled by the operators, there is strong statistical 
evidence that it has a positive impact on the incentives to innovate.  
GDP per capita is always statistically significant and has a positive sign, which 
means that the larger the GDP per capita, the more innovative the incumbent is. 
This reflects the fact that in the most developed economies and countries with 
higher standards of living, the general level of investment in innovation tends to 
be higher. 
5.2 Upstream and downstream access and innovation 
The objective of this section is to analyse the relationship between upstream and 
downstream access, and innovation. As explained above, the lack of data on 
worksharing volumes and discounts for the majority of the countries renders 
impossible the accomplishment of this objective through an econometric analysis. 
For the purpose of drawing conclusions on the effect of upstream and downstream 
access on innovation three case studies are analysed. The cases studied are: the 
United States Postal Service (USPS - United States of America), La Poste 
(France), and Royal Mail (United Kingdom). 
As mentioned before (section 3.3), increased competition is expected to have 
simultaneously a positive and a negative effect on innovation. In the case of 
worksharing, the negative effect, i.e. the reduction in the incumbent’s rents, is 
significantly attenuated since the Universal Service Provider (USP) keeps some of 
the upstream activities as well as the monopoly over delivery. Worksharing works 
as a franchising where the incumbent subcontracts the activities that others can 
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perform in a more efficient way. Still, worksharing exerts a pressure for the 
incumbent to become more efficient, at least in those activities that it does not 
want to alienate to the competitors. Therefore, worksharing is expected to have a 
positive effect on innovation, i.e. a positive relationship between worksharing and 
innovation should be observed. 
When entrants choose downstream access, the incumbent only performs delivery 
of the items processed by the entrants. Compared to the situation of end-to-end 
competition, downstream access allows the incumbent to preserve a larger part of 
the monopolist rents. Therefore, the negative effect of competition is also much 
reduced in this case. The pressure to preserve some upstream activities and 
competition with the new operators is also expected to have a positive impact on 
innovation. 
In the next section (5.2.1) the three case studies are presented, and after, the main 
results summarised (section 5.2.2). 
5.2.1 Case studies 
To analyse the relationship between upstream and downstream access, and the 
incentives to innovate the cases of the USPS, La Poste, and Royal Mail were 
chosen.  
The United States is unavoidable when studying the impact of the liberalisation of 
upstream activities on the investment in innovation. It is the oldest case of 
worksharing and the country where worksharing is the most developed. Also, 
there is a considerable amount of data available on volumes and patents. 
The French case is also very interesting. There is an old tradition of worksharing 
in France and worksharing volumes represent a large share of the total volume of 
letter mail.  
In the United Kingdom, end-to-end competition coexists with both upstream and 
downstream accesses. Contrary to the American and French cases, worksharing in 
the United Kingdom is relatively recent. Another particularity of this case is that 
Royal Mail is obliged to provide downstream access if demanded by a competitor. 
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The first case being analysed is the American one, followed by the French and the 
British cases. 
5.2.1.1 United States Postal Service (USPS) 
The effect of the liberalisation of upstream activities, without the possibility of 
end-to-end competition, on innovation is analysed in this part. The United States 
is the country that best illustrates this situation. 
When discussing innovation in the context of the postal sector, the size of the 
market and, consequently, of the operator is critical. A large market is likely to 
oblige the adoption of certain technologies, capable of processing and treating 
large volumes of mail that a smaller market probably does not require. The 
American market is very large compared to the other European markets studied in 
this thesis (Figure 29). The difference in the average number of employees 
between USPS and La Poste or Royal Mail (Figure 30) also illustrates well the 
difference in the operators’ size.  
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Figure 29: Total letter volume (includes international service, registered items, 
insured letters, newspapers and addressed and unaddressed 
advertising items) (in billions) 
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Figure 30: Average number of employees of USPS (includes field career 
employees and non-career employees), La Poste and Royal Mail (in 
thousands) 
 
Figure 31 shows the evolution of USPS’s operating profit/loss and operating costs 
in nominal terms. Since 1986, USPS has never experienced negative operating 
profits again. In 2005, the operating profits amounted to 1.624 million dollars. 
The operating costs, as well as the operating revenue, have been growing 
substantially in nominal terms. 
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Figure 31: USPS’s operating profit/loss and operating costs 
 
Until 1976, all the mail in the United States was collected, transported, processed 
and delivered exclusively by the USPS and no discount rates were applicable. In 
1976, USPS began to offer discounts to First-Class mailers for pre-sorting cards 
and letters. Discounts for other subclasses of mail and for other kinds of 
worksharing followed. By 1990, USPS was offering discounts for different levels 
of pre-sorting, pre-barcoding, and drop shipping  on several categories of First-
Class, Priority mail, Periodicals (Second Class), and Standard (Third Class) mail 
(Pearsall, 2005). 
The introduction of worksharing in the USA was motivated by the belief that 
some upstream activities like pre-sorting could be performed more efficiently by 
printing and mail preparation houses during the preparation of mail. Therefore, 
USPS would also be able to improve its efficiency because of the improved 
quality of mail preparation. Both effects were observed, although the productivity 
effect occurred with some lag (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2006). 
In the American case, USPS has the monopoly in delivery (no by-pass allowed) 
and the access price is based on avoided cost principles (ACP). The large mailers 
and consolidators pay the end-to-end price subtracted from the cost that USPS 
avoids by not performing certain activities. The competitors negotiate with the 
historical operator the discounts they get from performing the upstream activities. 
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If no agreement is reached the Postal Rate Commission (PRC) intervenes. The 
USPS is obliged to offer the same conditions or rates to all the worksharing firms. 
The USA is an exception concerning the data available on worksharing volumes 
and discounts. Therefore, it is possible to make a more formal analysis for the 
USA than for France and UK.  
In the analysis that follows, two measures of worksharing are used, namely the 
percentage of worksharing volumes and the annual number of accumulated 
worksharing discounts. Innovation is measured through the patenting activity, 
labour productivity, and the innovation index described in part 5.1.2.1, which was 
also calculated for the USA for the period between 1995 and 2006.  
Patents are an imperfect measure of innovation because not all new innovations 
are patented and because patents differ greatly in their economic impact. Many 
other measures of innovations have been used by researchers, but all of them 
present some drawbacks. Patents were used in this analysis because the data on 
patents is available to the general public and because they are one of the most 
commonly used measures. One drawback of patents that should be kept in mind is 
that the application date diverges from the data the patent is granted. It might take 
up to 4 years for a patent to be granted. Nevertheless, the analysis is 
complemented with two other measures of innovation, which are labour 
productivity and the innovation index. 
The annual volumes of worksharing and letter mail were provided by the Postal 
Rate Commission. The annual number of worksharing discounts was collected 
from Cohen et al.(2001). The data on patents was collected from the European 
Patent Office. The remaining data was collect from different sources: Universal 
Postal Union (UPU), International Post Corporation (IPC), Postal Rate 
Commission (PRC), United States Department of Commerce (Bureau of 
Economic Analysis), United States Census Bureau, and annual reports of the 
operators. 
Next, we present the evolution of worksharing and then we analyse the evolution 
of the measures of innovation in order to analyse the relationship between both.  
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Figure 32 shows the evolution of workshared volume compared to the total 
volume of mail. Only letter mail, including non addressed mail, was considered. It 
is possible to see that the increase in the total volume of letter mail has been 
accompanied by a sustained increase in the volume of worksharing. Although 
worksharing was introduced in 1976, it was only in 1979 that a significant 
increase in the percentage of worksharing volume was first observed. But by 
1982, more than half of the total volume of mail (52%) was workshared. In 2005, 
approximately, 77% of the mail was workshared mail. The increase in the volume 
of total letter mail is partially due to the price decrease and new services created 
by worksharing that stimulate demand (Pearsall, 2005).  
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Figure 32: Evolution of workshared volume in the USA 
 
The increase in the number of worksharing discounts since 1976 until 2001 
accompanies the evolution of the workshared volume (Figure 33). 
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Figure 33: Evolution of the number of worksharing discounts in the USA 
 
According to Cohen et al. (2006), the worksharing discounts in 2004 sum 11 
billion euros approximately, and the avoided costs for the USPS also amount to 
the same value. Nevertheless, the worksharing activities are estimated to have cost 
much less than this. The authors estimate economy-wide savings of 9 billion 
euros, approximately. 
We now turn to the analysis of evolution of the measures of innovation.  
The evolution of the number of patents (Figure 34) shows a great increase 2002, 
which does not seem to be related to the evolution of worksharing. In fact, the 
accumulated number of patents displays an exponential behaviour. Therefore, it 
seems appropriate to transform this series using a logarithm function. Apart from 
that, the accumulated number of patents also displays a sustained increase over 
time, like the volume of worksharing.  
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Figure 34: Evolution of the number of patents for USPS 
 
Figure 35 shows the evolution of labour productivity. The number of items per 
employee more than doubled between 1970 and 2005. This evolution is consistent 
with the percentage of worksharing volume, except that in 1979 the percentage of 
worksharing discount increased substantially, something that is not observed in 
labour productivity. 
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Figure 35: Evolution of labour productivity in USPS 
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The innovation index22 between 1995 and 2006 (Figure 36) steadily increases. 
This evolution is also consistent with the evolution of the percentage of 
worksharing volume. 
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Figure 36: Evolution of the innovation index in USPS 
 
Next, we study the correlation between worksharing and the measures of 
innovation in order to obtain a more accurate understanding of the relationship 
between the variables. 
The correlation coefficient between two variables is computed using the following 
formula: 
( )( )
( ) ( )2 2( , )
x x y y
Correlation X Y
x x y y
− −=
− −
∑
∑ ∑
 
where x  and y  are the sample means. The numerator is the sum of the products 
of the deviations from the sample mean. The denominator is the square root of the 
product of the sum of the squared deviations. 
                                                           
22 Presented and discussed in part 5.1.2.1. 
Chapter 5 
146 
It is found that the correlation between the percentage of workshared volume and 
the logarithm of the accumulated number of patents is 0.8. Figure 37 shows that 
there is a strong non-linear positive association between the variables. 
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Figure 37: Relationship between the percentage of workshared volume and the 
logarithm of the accumulated number of patents 
 
The correlation between the accumulated number of worksharing discounts and 
the logarithm of the accumulated number of patents is 0.85, which corroborates 
the positive relationship between worksharing and innovation (see Figure 38). It is 
only possible to speak about a relationship between the two variables since the 
correlation index does not give any information about causality. 
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Figure 38: Relationship between accumulated number of worksharing discounts 
and the logarithm of the accumulated number of patents 
 
There is a correlation of 0.94 between labour productivity and the percentage of 
workshared volume (Figure 39). Labour productivity increases with the 
percentage of workshared volume. In principle, if the incumbent and the entrant 
reach a worksharing agreement it is because that agreement benefits both parts. 
Hence, it is likely that the activities that are performed by other operators are 
those where the incumbent is less efficient. As a consequence, the more letter mail 
is prepared before being handed in to USPS, the more labour productivity 
increases. 
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Figure 39: Relationship between the percentage of workshared volume and 
labour productivity 
 
Finally, we compute the correlation between the percentage of worksharing 
volume and the innovation index between 1995 and 2006, which is equal to 0.995.  
Figure 40 confirms that in the period between 1995 and 2006 there is a strong 
positive relationship between the two variables in analysis.  
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Figure 40: Relationship between the percentage of workshared volume and the 
innovation index 
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According to the data analysed in this part, there is evidence of a positive 
relationship between worksharing and innovation. The correlation between 
worksharing and the several measures of innovation is always larger or equal to 
0.85. The intuition behind this result is that worksharing introduces a type of 
competition where the incumbent has the pressure to become more and more 
efficient, at least in the activities that he does not want to transfer to the 
competitors, without losing market share. Also, even when an activity is 
transferred from the incumbent to a competitor, it is because it is more 
advantageous for the incumbent to pay that service to the competitor than to 
perform it itself.  
5.2.1.2 La Poste 
The French case illustrates the situation in which worksharing and end-to-end 
competition coexist. The history of worksharing in France started in the 1960s. By 
then, La Poste was confronted with large increases in the volume of parcels and of 
direct mail. The solution found was to resort to contracts with third parties to 
perform some upstream activities, like collection, sorting and other types of mail 
preparation. These third parties would then tender the mail to La Poste for 
delivery.  
The first worksharing contract for letter mail was signed in 1969 and concerned 
direct mail products. Large mailers started pre-sorting and performing other types 
of mail preparation while La Poste saved by not performing those activities. Since 
then, worksharing in France has never stopped growing. Today, approximately 
56% of the upstream activities are accounted for by third parties23; that is, mailers 
and consolidators handle approximately half of all letter post items delivered in 
France, which shows the importance of worksharing in the French market.  
Contrary to what happens in other countries, namely The Netherlands, 
Switzerland and Portugal, in France consolidation of volumes is possible. La 
                                                           
23 Source: Mr. Olaf Klargaard, Department of Regulatory Economics, La Poste. 
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Poste accepts prepared mail from large mailers, printing and mail preparation 
houses and consolidators. All these entities are offered the same conditions. 
The agreements between these entities and La Poste are governed by different 
types of contracts: the “product”, the “technical” and the “commercial” contracts. 
The first type of contract defines the general access conditions and service quality 
standards for specific products, namely for direct mail, parcels and transactions 
mail. It also settles the discounts for several levels of worksharing. The “technical 
contract” concerns other specific issues, for example, the time windows to tender 
mail and additional refinements in sortation. The “commercial contracts” stipulate 
periodic rebates on total mailing costs based on the total volume tendered to La 
Poste for delivery by clients, printing and mail preparation houses and 
consolidators (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2006). La Poste does not give discounts 
for dropship because the cost with transportation is considered not to be 
significant. 
Similarly to what happens in the USA, in France access pricing is governed by 
avoided cost rules. Nevertheless, the pricing system is more flexible in France, 
where the final objective is to increase efficiency by providing the right incentives 
for each product class and each technical feature (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2006). 
The discounts or rebates are negotiated between the entity performing 
worksharing and La Poste. When there are conflicts between these two entities the 
French regulatory authority for electronic communications and for post (ARCEP) 
intervenes. Since the adoption of the new postal law in 2005, ARCEP has the 
power to require downstream access and to settle access conditions (Wik, 2006). 
There are approximately two hundred mailing houses and consolidators operating 
in the French market.  Today, the great majority of them are subsidiaries of 
international groups and of advertising groups, and routing companies previously 
owned by the banking sector for their transaction mail24. The remarkable 
evolution registered in the consolidation of transaction and direct mail is due to 
                                                           
24 Transaction mail refers to invoices, bills, financial statements and other bulk mail originated by 
business or government organisations with receiver-specific content (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
2006). 
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the development of the transaction mail consolidation market and the quality 
increase in the direct mail consolidation market. This evolution was associated 
with large investment in automation, quality control and workforce qualification 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2006) 
La Poste is not active as a Direct Mail consolidator but it has a subsidiary active in 
Transaction Mail consolidation with ten percent of market share. There is an 
increased concentration in the sector. The presence of large international, 
investor-owned groups in the consolidation market motivated by costly 
investments (information technology, sorting machines, printing machines) should 
also be noted (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2006). 
Regarding innovation in La Poste, both the innovation index25 (Figure 20) and 
labour productivity (Figure 24) have been steadily increasing since 1995. In fact, 
among the seventeen countries studied in the previous section, France is one of 
the most innovative. Figure 41 shows the evolution of the accumulated number of 
innovations during a longer period, i.e. between 1975 and 2006.  
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Figure 41: Evolution of the accumulated number of innovations for La Poste 
(between 1975 and 2006) 
 
                                                           
25 Presented and discussed in part 5.1.2.1. 
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The evolution of these three measures of innovation is in harmony with the 
evolution of the worksharing volumes, which have been increasing since their 
introduction in the 1960s. Worksharing and innovation also seem to be positively 
correlated in the case of France. 
5.2.1.3 Royal Mail 
In the UK, end-to-end competition coexists with both upstream and downstream 
accesses, which are required by Postcomm, the British postal regulator. End-to-
end competition is, nevertheless, very limited. The reserved area was completely 
abolished in the beginning of 2006. Between 2003 and 2005, the percentage of 
liberalised market, in terms of volume, was estimated to be 44%. In 2006 Royal 
Mail retained approximately 97% market share in the regulated addressed letters 
market.  
Access can be demanded by individual customers, consolidators and entrants. The 
access conditions are negotiated between Royal Mail and the parties in quest of 
access, but when the parties cannot reach an agreement, Postcomm has the power 
to impose access conditions. Downstream access emerged in the UK in 2004, 
when Royal Mail and UK Mail reached an agreement on access prices. Later in 
the same year, TNT and Deutsche Post settled a similar agreement with Royal 
Mail. 
The first access agreements were set on a “geographically averaged cost recovery 
basis”, i.e. the mail handed over to Royal Mail had to be adapted to its overall 
letter volume, on the basis of individual postcode areas. Surcharges would be 
levied by Royal Mail for certain volume increases. Other measures like asking the 
customer to transfer mail to other zones or even terminate the agreement could 
also apply. Access contracts based on “geographically de-averaged access prices” 
or “non-uniform pricing”, which are freely negotiated between Royal Mail and 
other operators and offered on a non discriminatory basis, were introduced by the 
end of 2004 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2006).  
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According to Postcomm (2006), thus far, competitors have mainly entered the 
market in upstream activities by targeting high volume mailers like banks, utilities 
and other large mailers sending regular volumes.  
“Competition has developed most significantly in the part of the market 
where third party suppliers use access to Royal Mail’s delivery network. 
These operators compete with Royal Mail for collection, sortation and 
trunking, accessing Royal Mail’s network for final delivery. […] In 
addition, 10 to 15 large customers have direct access agreements with 
Royal Mail, injecting their mail directly into Royal Mail’s pipeline.” 
(Postcomm, 2006: page 35).  
As of September 2006, Postcomm had issued 17 licences to postal operators in 
addition to Royal Mail (Postcomm, 2006). 
Downstream access, which includes customer direct access26 and alternative 
providers access, accounted for approximately 5.7% of addressed mail volumes. 
Of the 20.3 billion addressed mail items sent in 2006 in the United Kingdom, 1.2 
billion items were handled under access agreements with Royal Mail (contrasted 
with 87 million items in 2005). The end-to-end volume delivered by other 
operators in 2006 remained a very small proportion of total mail volumes. It 
accounted for approximately 39 million items (Postcomm, 2006).  
In the case of the British incumbent, the innovation index (Figure 20) and the 
accumulated number of innovations between 1975 and 2006 (Figure 42) show that 
there was an extraordinary improvement in terms of innovation in 2003. 
Interestingly, this increase almost coincides with the introduction of downstream 
access in the market, which occurred in 2004. From that date forward, both 
innovation and access have been increasing, which indicates a positive correlation 
between these two variables. 
 
                                                           
26 Customer Direct Access (CDA) is where the customer has signed a direct access agreement with 
Royal Mail, allowing the customer to outsource its upstream activities (collection, sortation and 
trucking) and access Royal Mail’s network for final delivery. 
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Figure 42: Evolution of the accumulated number of innovations for Royal Mail 
(between 1975 and 2006) 
 
5.2.2 Results 
The three case studies performed in this section show evidence of a positive 
relationship between innovation and upstream and downstream access. In the 
American case, high correlations between worksharing and the variables used to 
measure innovation are found. In the French and British cases, it is observed that 
the increasing volumes handled by third parties are accompanied by increased 
innovation index, accumulated number of innovations, and labour productivity.  
These results correspond with our initial expectations. With both upstream and 
downstream access, the incumbent preserves some of its monopolist rents and, 
therefore, its capacity to invest in new processes and technologies. 
Simultaneously, it feels the pressure from other operators to become more 
efficient.  
5.3 Concluding remarks 
While the process of liberalising the postal sector was initiated a decade ago in 
Europe, the impact of liberalisation and competition on efficiency and innovation 
had not yet been assessed. 
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This chapter aimed at contributing to the literature with empirical evidence on the 
effect of both liberalisation and competition on innovation in the postal sector. 
The impact of market size was also analysed and there was an attempt to analyse 
the effect of private ownership. 
To this end, a dataset was put together, which constitutes a unique source of 
information for analysing the liberalisation process, the development of 
competition, and the development of innovation in the postal sector in the last 
decade. The dataset includes data for seventeen European countries, over ten 
years. Three measures were used as proxies for innovation: (1) an innovation 
index based on the results of a survey developed for this purpose; (2) the 
accumulated number of innovations (based on that same survey) and; (3) labour 
productivity. We also developed a liberalisation index, which allows for the 
measurement of the percentage of liberalised market (in terms of letter volume). 
Several models were estimated by GLS and using PW-PCSE. In general, the 
models estimated have a high explanatory power. Evidence was found that market 
liberalisation has a positive effect on innovation. This finding is in line with the 
predictions made in Chapter 3. 
This study also found that an increase in the market share of the competitors 
stimulates the investment in innovation, at least until the market share of the 
competitors reaches a certain threshold. Since competition is not very developed 
in the postal sector, it is not possible to draw conclusions for the cases where the 
competitors have a larger market share. Nevertheless, evidence was also found in 
support of the positive impact that mail volume has on the introduction of 
innovative processes. One can anticipate that if the incumbents lose a considerable 
part of their market share, it will be more difficult to have the means to invest in 
innovation and to recover the investments made. 
Contrary to what was expected, there was evidence that the percentage of private 
ownership has a positive effect on innovation. However, the variable “percentage 
of public ownership” presents almost no variability and, therefore, all the results 
related to this variable should be seen as preliminary and taken with considerable 
reserve. 
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The GDP per capita turned out to be very significant and to have a positive 
relationship with innovation in all the models. 
The case studies supported the initial expectations of a positive relationship 
between innovation and both upstream and downstream access. In the American 
case, high correlations were found between worksharing (measured through the 
percentage of worksharing volumes and the accumulated number of worksharing 
discounts) and the variables used to measure innovation (i.e. the accumulated 
number of patents, labour productivity, and the innovation index). In the French 
and British cases, it was observed that the sustained increase in the volumes 
handled by third parties is accompanied by persistent increases in the innovation 
index, accumulated number of innovations, and labour productivity.  
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6. Conclusions 
6.1 Synthesis of contributions and conclusions 
The network industries, namely the postal sector, have been undergoing a reform 
process where liberalisation is one of the main features. The aim of liberalisation 
is to increase productivity, increase the choice available for the consumers and 
decrease prices, by promoting rivalry among firms. 
In this thesis, we were interested in the effect of liberalisation, with and without 
competition, on the incumbent’s incentives to innovate. 
We presented the state of liberalisation and competition in the network industries 
in the European Union (Chapter 3). We also analysed the factors that can hinder 
the development of competition in these industries. We concluded that the efforts 
to liberalise and introduce competition have increased rivalry in the markets, but 
in some industries there is still a long way to go until significant levels of 
competition are reached. This is the case of electricity, gas, and railways. The 
water sector is a particular case where competition in the market is not likely to 
develop. In the postal sector, competition is also currently very low in the mail 
segment, but there are signs that with the full market opening in 2011-13 this 
scenario will change considerably.  In the majority of the network industries, 
interconnection and access to the incumbents’ network is an essential factor for 
the development of competition. 
Because liberalisation is not always synonymous with competition, we decided to 
separately analyse the effect of liberalisation with and without competition on 
innovation. Based on a literature review, we argued that the effect of liberalisation 
without competition on innovation depends upon the presence and intensity of 
natural barriers to entry on the supply side, and on the mechanisms implemented 
to overcome those barriers. If there are no strong barriers to entry, or there is 
legislation that minimises the effect of these barriers, then the threat of 
competition is real. Hence, liberalisation will have a positive impact on 
innovation. On the contrary, if there are barriers to entry and no mechanisms to 
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make the threat of competition real, then liberalisation will not have any effect on 
innovation.   
As for the effect of competition on innovation, the literature shows a lack of 
consensus among the authors. In addition, the majority of the authors use profit 
maximising models, which do not capture the richness associated with different 
ownership and governance structures. These aspects are especially important 
when studying the network industries. 
In order to fill this gap in the literature and to bring additional insights to the 
controversial relationship between competition and innovation, we developed a 
theoretical model that allows the incumbent to have other objectives than profit 
maximisation, namely revenue and welfare maximisation (Chapter 4). We 
analysed the incumbent’s optimal investment in innovation under monopoly and 
duopoly for different objective functions. 
The main results of the model are that the critical determinants of whether 
monopoly or duopoly creates more incentive for the incumbent to innovate are the 
incumbent’s market share under duopoly, as well as the incumbent’s elasticity of 
demand under monopoly and under duopoly. For certain values of these variables, 
there is an interval where duopoly provides more incentives to innovate than 
monopoly.  
The incumbent’s market share has a non-linear impact on innovation under 
duopoly. Until a certain point an increase in the incumbent’s market share creates 
more incentives to innovate under duopoly and from that point on the contrary 
happens. 
The elasticity of demand of the incumbent has a negative impact on the level of 
investment in innovation both under monopoly and duopoly, whereas the 
elasticity of demand of the entrant plays almost no role. As for the cross elasticity 
of demand, the impact is reduced. 
We confirmed that the quantity supplied has a direct effect on innovation 
incentives, as expected from previous literature. However, other results presented 
in this thesis differ in several respects from the literature. In particular, if the 
incumbent places greater weight on social welfare, relative to revenue or profit, 
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then one can expect an increase in investment in innovation. The more sensible 
way of inducing the incumbent to behave like a welfare-maximising firm, at least 
concerning cost-reducing innovations, is through price caps. Price cap regulation 
is likely to focus attention on cost reduction and associated innovation by the 
incumbent, leading to behaviour in line with the welfare-oriented incumbent. 
We have also empirically tested our predictions regarding the effect of 
liberalisation and competition on incumbents’ investments in innovation (Chapter 
5). The impact of the quantity supplied and some control variables was also 
analysed.  
An original dataset was assembled to perform the analysis. The dataset includes 
data for seventeen European countries, over ten years. Innovation was measured 
using three proxies: (1) an innovation index based on the results of a survey 
developed for this purpose; (2) the accumulated number of innovations (based on 
that same survey) and; (3) labour productivity. Moreover, we built a liberalisation 
index in order to measure the percentage of the liberalised market (in terms of 
letter volume).  
From the econometric analysis performed, where several models were estimated 
by Generalised Least Squares (GLS) and Prais-Winsten estimation with Panel 
Corrected Standard Errors (PW-PCSE), we found evidence that market 
liberalisation favours incumbents’ innovation, which confirms our predictions. 
Each model is always estimated using the three proxies for innovation and the 
results are compared. All the models estimated have a high explanatory power and 
the hypothesis that the explanatory variables coefficients are jointly equal to zero 
is always rejected. 
There is also evidence that an increase in the market share of the competitors 
stimulates investment in innovation. Note that this result applies when the 
incumbent preserves a certain market share. When the incumbent’s market share 
is below a certain threshold, an increase in competition is expected to have a 
negative impact on innovation. Since in the countries included in the econometric 
analysis the historical operators have at least ninety percent of market share, we 
could only partially confirm the results from the theoretical model. 
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The mail volume, or more generally the quantity supplied by the firm, was also 
found to have a positive impact on the incumbents’ investment in innovation.  
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita turned out to be very significant 
and to have a positive relationship with innovation in all the models. 
We have also analysed the effect that upstream and downstream accesses, which 
can be viewed as forms of competition, have on innovation. For that, we resorted 
to three case studies, which support the initial expectations of a positive 
relationship between both upstream and downstream access and innovation. In the 
American case, high correlations were found between worksharing and 
innovation. In the French and British cases, the continuous increase in the 
volumes handled by third parties is accompanied by persistent increases in the 
innovation index, accumulated number of innovations, and labour productivity.  
This thesis contributes to clarifying the debate on the impact of different market 
structures on innovation. Our findings corroborate the existence of a non-linear 
relationship between rivalry and innovation. Moreover, these findings are of high 
interest for policy makers since they show that duopoly does not always create 
more innovation than monopoly. When the industry has large fixed costs, as in the 
network industries, and economies of scale are important, the loss of considerable 
volumes makes large investments in new processes and technologies 
impracticable. Firms will therefore invest less in innovation under a competitive 
market where their market share is small, than under monopoly. 
Another major contribution of this work concerns the importance of price caps to 
stimulate innovation. In fact, price cap regulation leads to behaviour in line with 
the welfare oriented incumbent and, therefore, promotes innovation. This 
conclusion was possible because for the first time an objective function with 
several dimensions was considered for the study of the incentives to innovate 
under different market structures.  
We also consider that the empirical results are of high importance since there are 
almost no empirical studies that evaluate the consequences of the liberalisation of 
the network industries on innovation. We also believe that the list of critical 
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innovations and the innovation index developed in this thesis, which allow 
comparisons among different countries, can be very useful for postal operators.  
6.2 Policy implications  
In this section we summarise the conclusions of major importance for policy 
makers and regulators.  
Liberalisation has per se a positive effect on innovation, when the threat of 
competition is real. From this point of view, it seems indisputable that it is 
important to create conditions for a competitive environment. Indeed, we have 
proved that in a first stage, where the incumbent preserves a significant market 
share, an increase in rivalry has a positive effect on innovation. However, only 
under certain conditions the incentive to innovate under duopoly overcomes the 
incentive to innovate under monopoly. Moreover, increased rivalry has a negative 
effect on incumbent’s innovation when the incumbent has a relatively low market 
share. Hence, incumbent’s investment in new technologies and processes is in 
danger when competition is very intense. 
The conditions that ensure a larger investment in innovation and social welfare 
under duopoly than under monopoly regard the incumbent’s market share and its 
elasticity of demand under both monopoly and duopoly. The investment in 
innovation and social welfare are larger under duopoly than under monopoly, for 
instance, when: (1) the incumbent’s market share is between 75 and 95 percent 
(approximately), and (2) the elasticity of demand under duopoly is at least 0.3 
units larger (in absolute value) than the elasticity of demand under monopoly. 
There are other combinations of these parameters’ values that lead to the same 
result but are probably more difficult to attain. 
In principle, demand becomes more elastic when we pass from a monopoly to a 
situation where there is more than one operator in the market. Although regulators 
can not directly control the price elasticity of demand they can contribute to a 
more elastic demand under competition by, for example, promoting flexible 
contractual relationships between firms and consumers. Additionally, regulators 
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can ensure that consumers are well informed about all goods and services 
available in the market.  
Finally, regulators can make use of the fact that increasing concerns with social 
welfare, i.e. placing a larger weight on welfare maximisation and reducing the 
weight given to revenue and profit, has a positive effect on innovation. This can 
be done through price caps, which are likely to induce the incumbent to behave 
like a welfare-maximising firm, at least regarding cost-reducing innovations. 
6.3 Recommendations for future research 
The work developed in this thesis suggests the following topics for future 
research. 
Concerning the theoretical model, there are a series of developments and 
improvements that can be introduced in the analysis. It would be interesting to 
expand the theoretical model in order to encompass oligopolistic settings. The 
introduction of a more general investment game by all competitors (not just the 
incumbent as analysed here) gains additional importance when competitors are 
assumed to have a large market share. Other refinements in the theoretical model 
refer to the cost function assumed. An in-depth study of the elasticity of 
innovation cost could lead to more accurate results in terms of the optimal level of 
investment in innovation. Alternatively, the assumption of more general cost 
function could eventually allow the deduction of analytical results without having 
to resort to the model calibration. Additionally, it would be interesting to 
introduce multi-product firms and dynamics in the model.  
At an empirical level, further work could introduce worksharing (upstream access) 
and downstream access, as explanatory variables in the econometric model. 
Extending the number of countries in the sample could allow withdrawing 
conclusions on the effect of privatisation (another very important aspect of the 
reform of the network industries) on innovation. It would also be interesting to 
replicate this study for other network industries, in particular, the ones where 
competition is more developed. In this way it would be possible to empirically test 
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the effect of competition on innovation when the incumbent has less power in the 
market, i.e. a smaller market share.  
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Annex 1 – Sensitivity analysis for e  (France) 
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Figure 43: Results for e=0.6, γ =6E-10 and mktshareI=60% (for different values 
of elastIM, elastID, elastE, and crosselast holding 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 
and 3α =0.2) 
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Figure 44: Results for e=0.6, γ =6E-10 and mktshareI=90% (for different values 
of elastIM, elastID, elastE, and crosselast holding 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 
and 3α =0.2) 
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Figure 45: Results for e=0.6, γ =4E-10 and mktshareI=60% (for different values 
of elastIM, elastID, elastE, and crosselast holding 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 
and 3α =0.2) 
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Figure 46: Results for e=0.6, γ =4E-10 and mktshareI=90% (for different values 
of elastIM, elastID, elastE, and crosselast holding 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 
and 3α =0.2) 
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Annex 2 – Results for Latvia 
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Figure 47: Effect of the incumbent’s market share on k ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 
3α =0.2, e=0.8, γ =2.5E-7, elastIM=-0.4, elastID=-0.5, elastE=-0.6, 
crosselast=0.1) 
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Figure 48: Sensitivity analysis for elastIM ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 3α =0.2, e=0.8, 
γ =2.5E-7, mktshareI=80%, elastID=-0.5, elastE=-0.6, 
crosselast=0.1) 
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Figure 49: Sensitivity analysis for elastID ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 3α =0.2, e=0.8, 
γ =2.5E-7, mktshareI=80%, elastIM=-0.4, elastE=-0.6, 
crosselast=0.1) 
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Figure 50: Sensitivity analysis for elastE ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 3α =0.2, e=0.8, 
γ =2.5E-7, mktshareI=80%, elastIM=-0.4, elastID=-0.5, 
crosselast=0.1) 
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Figure 51: Sensitivity analysis for crosselast ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 3α =0.2, e=0.8, 
γ =2.5E-7, mktshareI=80%, elastIM=-0.4, elastID=-0.5, elastE=-0.6) 
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Figure 52: Effect of simultaneous changes in elastIM, elastID, elastE, and 
crosselast on innovation ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 3α =0.2, e=0.9, γ =3E-7, 
and mktshareI=60%) 
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Figure 53: Effect of simultaneous changes in elastIM, elastID, elastE, and 
crosselast on innovation ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 3α =0.2, e=0.9, γ =3E-7, 
and mktshareI=90%) 
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Figure 54: Combined effect of the incumbent’s market share, elastIM, and elastID 
on k under monopoly and duopoly ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 3α =0.2, e=0.8, 
γ =5E-10, elastE=-0.6, and crosselast=0.1) 
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Figure 55: Effect of changes in 1α , 2α  and 3α  on k  (elastE=-0.6, 
crosselast=0.1, mktshareI=60%) 
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Figure 56: Effect of changes in 1α , 2α  and 3α  on k  (elastE=-0.6, 
crosselast=0.1, mktshareI=90%) 
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Figure 57: Sensitivity analysis for e ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 3α =0.2, γ =2.5E-7, 
mktshareI=80%, elastIM=-0.4, elastID=-0.5, elastE=-0.6, 
crosselast=0.1) 
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Figure 58: Sensitivity analysis for γ  ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 3α =0.2, e=0.8, 
mktshareI=80%, elastIM=-0.4, elastID=-0.5, elastE=-0.6, 
crosselast=0.1) 
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Figure 59: Results for e=0.9, γ =2E-7 and mktshareI=60% (for different values 
of elastIM, elastID, elastE, and crosselast holding 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 
and 3α =0.2) 
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Figure 60: Results for e=0.9, γ =2E-7 and mktshareI=90% (for different values 
of elastIM, elastID, elastE, and crosselast holding 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 
and 3α =0.2) 
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Figure 61: Results for e=0.6, γ =3E-7 and mktshareI=60% (for different values 
of elastIM, elastID, elastE, and crosselast holding 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 
and 3α =0.2) 
 
 187 
elastE=-0.3, crosselast=0.15, e=0.6
gamma=3.00E-07, mktshareI=90
-2500
-2000
-1500
-1000
-500
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
-1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0
k_
m
on
op
ol
y 
- k
_d
uo
po
ly
 
(th
ou
sa
nd
s 
of
 e
ur
os
)
elastE=-0.5, crosselast=0.15, e=0.6
gamma=3.00E-07, mktshareI=90
-1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0
elastE=-0.7, crosselast=0.15, e=0.6
gamma=3.00E-07, mktshareI=90
-1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0
elastE=-0.3, crosselast=0.1, e=0.6
gamma=3.00E-07, mktshareI=90
-2500
-2000
-1500
-1000
-500
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
-1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0
k_
m
on
op
ol
y 
- k
_d
uo
po
ly
 
(th
ou
sa
nd
s 
of
 e
ur
os
)
elastE=-0.5, crosselast=0.1, e=0.6
gamma=3.00E-07, mktshareI=90
-1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0
elastE=-0.7, crosselast=0.1, e=0.6
gamma=3.00E-07, mktshareI=90
-1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0
elastE=-0.3, crosselast=0.05, e=0.6
gamma=3.00E-07, mktshareI=90
-2500
-2000
-1500
-1000
-500
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
-1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0
elastID
k_
m
on
op
ol
y 
- k
_d
uo
po
ly
 
(th
ou
sa
nd
s 
of
 e
ur
os
)
elastE=-0.5, crosselast=0.05, e=0.6
gamma=3.00E-07, mktshareI=90
-1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0
elastID
elastE=-0.7, crosselast=0.05, e=0.6
gamma=3.00E-07, mktshareI=90
-1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0
elastID
elastIM=-0.2 elastIM=-0.4
elastIM=-0.6 elastIM=-0.8
 
Figure 62: Results for e=0.6, γ =3E-7 and mktshareI=90% (for different values 
of elastIM, elastID, elastE, and crosselast holding 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 
and 3α =0.2) 
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Figure 63: Results for e=0.6, γ =2E-7 and mktshareI=60% (for different values 
of elastIM, elastID, elastE, and crosselast holding 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 
and 3α =0.2) 
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Figure 64: Results for e=0.6, γ =2E-7 and mktshareI=90% (for different values 
of elastIM, elastID, elastE, and crosselast holding 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 
and 3α =0.2) 
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Annex 3 – Results for Portugal 
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Figure 65: Effect of the incumbent’s market share on k ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 
3α =0.2, e=0.8, γ =1E-8, elastIM=-0.4, elastID=-0.5, elastE=-0.6, 
crosselast=0.1) 
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Figure 66: Sensitivity analysis for elastIM ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 3α =0.2, e=0.8, 
γ =1E-8, mktshareI=80%, elastID=-0.5, elastE=-0.6, crosselast=0.1) 
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Figure 67: Sensitivity analysis for elastID ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 3α =0.2, e=0.8, 
γ =1E-8, mktshareI=80%, elastIM=-0.4, elastE=-0.6, crosselast=0.1) 
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Figure 68: Sensitivity analysis for elastE ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 3α =0.2, e=0.8, 
γ =1E-8, mktshareI=80%, elastIM=-0.4, elastID=-0.5, crosselast=0.1) 
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Figure 69: Sensitivity analysis for crosselast ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 3α =0.2, e=0.8, 
γ =1E-8, mktshareI=80%, elastIM=-0.4, elastID=-0.5, elastE=-0.6) 
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Figure 70: Effect of simultaneous changes in elastIM, elastID, elastE, and 
crosselast on innovation ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 3α =0.2, e=0.9, γ =1.2E-8, 
and mktshareI=60%) 
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Figure 71: Effect of simultaneous changes in elastIM, elastID, elastE, and 
crosselast on innovation ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 3α =0.2, e=0.9, γ =1.2E-8, 
and mktshareI=90%) 
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Figure 72: Combined effect of the incumbent’s market share, elastIM, and elastID 
on k under monopoly and duopoly ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 3α =0.2, e=0.8, 
γ =5E-10, elastE=-0.6, and crosselast=0.1) 
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Figure 73: Effect of changes in 1α , 2α  and 3α  on k  (elastE=-0.6, 
crosselast=0.1, mktshareI=60%) 
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Figure 74: Effect of changes in 1α , 2α  and 3α  on k  (elastE=-0.6, 
crosselast=0.1, mktshareI=90%) 
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Figure 75: Sensitivity analysis for e ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 3α =0.2, γ =1E-8, 
mktshareI=80%, elastIM=-0.4, elastID=-0.5, elastE=-0.6, 
crosselast=0.1) 
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Figure 76: Sensitivity analysis for γ  ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 3α =0.2, e=0.8, 
mktshareI=80%, elastIM=-0.4, elastID=-0.5, elastE=-0.6, 
crosselast=0.1) 
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Figure 77: Results for e=0.9, γ =8E-9 and mktshareI=60% (for different values 
of elastIM, elastID, elastE, and crosselast holding 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 
and 3α =0.2) 
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Figure 78: Results for e=0.9, γ =8E-9 and mktshareI=90% (for different values 
of elastIM, elastID, elastE, and crosselast holding 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 
and 3α =0.2) 
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Figure 79: Results for e=0.6, γ =1.2E--8 and mktshareI=60% (for different 
values of elastIM, elastID, elastE, and crosselast holding 1α =0.2, 
2α =0.6, and 3α =0.2) 
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Figure 80: Results for e=0.6, γ =1.2E--8 and mktshareI=90% (for different 
values of elastIM, elastID, elastE, and crosselast holding 1α =0.2, 
2α =0.6, and 3α =0.2) 
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Figure 81: Results for e=0.6, γ =8E-9 and mktshareI=60% (for different values 
of elastIM, elastID, elastE, and crosselast holding 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 
and 3α =0.2) 
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Figure 82: Results for e=0.6, γ =8E-9 and mktshareI=90% (for different values 
of elastIM, elastID, elastE, and crosselast holding 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 
and 3α =0.2) 
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Annex 4 – Results for Sweden 
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Figure 83: Effect of the incumbent’s market share on k ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 
3α =0.2, e=0.8, γ =2.5E-9, elastIM=-0.4, elastID=-0.5, elastE=-0.6, 
crosselast=0.1) 
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Figure 84: Sensitivity analysis for elastIM ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 3α =0.2, e=0.8, 
γ =2.5E-9, mktshareI=80%, elastID=-0.5, elastE=-0.6, 
crosselast=0.1) 
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Figure 85: Sensitivity analysis for elastID ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 3α =0.2, e=0.8, 
γ =2.5E-9, mktshareI=80%, elastIM=-0.4, elastE=-0.6, 
crosselast=0.1) 
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Figure 86: Sensitivity analysis for elastE ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 3α =0.2, e=0.8, 
γ =2.5E-9, mktshareI=80%, elastIM=-0.4, elastID=-0.5, 
crosselast=0.1) 
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Figure 87: Sensitivity analysis for crosselast ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 3α =0.2, e=0.8, 
γ =2.5E-9, mktshareI=80%, elastIM=-0.4, elastID=-0.5, elastE=-0.6) 
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Figure 88: Effect of simultaneous changes in elastIM, elastID, elastE, and 
crosselast on innovation ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 3α =0.2, e=0.9, γ =3E-9, 
and mktshareI=60%) 
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Figure 89: Effect of simultaneous changes in elastIM, elastID, elastE, and 
crosselast on innovation ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 3α =0.2, e=0.9, γ =3E-9, 
and mktshareI=90%) 
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Figure 90: Combined effect of the incumbent’s market share, elastIM, and elastID 
on k under monopoly and duopoly ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 3α =0.2, e=0.8, 
γ =5E-10, elastE=-0.6, and crosselast=0.1) 
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Figure 91: Effect of changes in 1α , 2α  and 3α  on k  (elastE=-0.6, 
crosselast=0.1, mktshareI=60%) 
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Figure 92: Effect of changes in 1α , 2α  and 3α  on k  (elastE=-0.6, 
crosselast=0.1, mktshareI=90%) 
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Figure 93: Sensitivity analysis for e ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 3α =0.2, γ =2.5E-9, 
mktshareI=80%, elastIM=-0.4, elastID=-0.5, elastE=-0.6, 
crosselast=0.1) 
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Figure 94: Sensitivity analysis for γ  ( 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 3α =0.2, e=0.8, 
mktshareI=80%, elastIM=-0.4, elastID=-0.5, elastE=-0.6, 
crosselast=0.1) 
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Figure 95: Results for e=0.9, γ =2E-9 and mktshareI=60% (for different values 
of elastIM, elastID, elastE, and crosselast holding 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 
and 3α =0.2) 
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Figure 96: Results for e=0.9, γ =2E-9 and mktshareI=90% (for different values 
of elastIM, elastID, elastE, and crosselast holding 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 
and 3α =0.2) 
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Figure 97: Results for e=0.6, γ =3E-9 and mktshareI=60% (for different values 
of elastIM, elastID, elastE, and crosselast holding 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 
and 3α =0.2) 
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Figure 98: Results for e=0.6, γ =3E-9 and mktshareI=90% (for different values 
of elastIM, elastID, elastE, and crosselast holding 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 
and 3α =0.2) 
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Figure 99: Results for e=0.6, γ =2E-9 and mktshareI=60% (for different values 
of elastIM, elastID, elastE, and crosselast holding 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 
and 3α =0.2) 
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Figure 100: Results for e=0.6, γ =2E-9 and mktshareI=90% (for different values 
of elastIM, elastID, elastE, and crosselast holding 1α =0.2, 2α =0.6, 
and 3α =0.2) 
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Annex 5 – List of sources for the data collection 
 
ARCEP (2005) Rapport public d’activité 
ARTHUR ANDERSEN (1998) Study on the impact of liberalisation of direct 
mail. 
BUNDESNETZAGENTUR (2006) Ninth market study on licensed postal 
services 
CONSIGNIA (2001) Annual report and accounts 2000/2001 
CONSIGNIA (2002) Annual report and accounts 2001/2002 
CORREOS Y TELÉGRAFOS (1998) Annual report 1998 
CORREOS Y TELÉGRAFOS (1999) Annual report 1999 
CORREOS (2000) Annual report 2000 
CORREOS (2001) Annual report 2001 
CORREOS (2002) Annual report 2002 
CORREOS (2003) Annual report 2003 
CORREOS (2004) Annual report 2004 
CORREOS (2005) Annual report 2005 
CTCON (1998) Study on the impact of weight and price limits of the reserved 
area in the postal sector. 
CTT (2005) Relatório e contas 2005 
CTT (2004) Relatório e contas 2004 
CTT CORREIOS (2003) Relatório e contas 2003 
CTT CORREIOS (2002) Relatório e contas 2002 
CTT CORREIOS (2001) Relatório e contas 2001 
CTT CORREIOS (2000) Relatório e contas 2000 
CTT CORREIOS (1999) Relatório e contas 1999 
CTT CORREIOS (1998) Relatório e contas 1998 
CTT CORREIOS (1997) Relatório e contas 1997 
CTT CORREIOS (1996) Relatório e contas 1996 
CTT CORREIOS (1995) Relatório e contas 1995 
CTT CORREIOS (1994) Relatório e contas 1994 
DEUTSCHE POST AG (1995) Annual Report 1995 
DEUTSCHE POST AG (1996) Annual Report 1996 
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DEUTSCHE POST AG (1997) Annual Report 1997 
DEUTSCHE POST AG (1998) Annual Report 1998 
DEUTSCHE POST WORLD NET (1999) Annual Report 1999 
DEUTSCHE POST WORLD NET (2000) Annual Report 2000 
DEUTSCHE POST WORLD NET (2001) Annual Report 2001 
DEUTSCHE POST WORLD NET (2002) Annual Report 2002 
DEUTSCHE POST WORLD NET (2003) Annual Report 2003 
DEUTSCHE POST WORLD NET (2004) Annual Report 2004 
DEUTSCHE POST WORLD NET (2005) Annual Report 2005 
ECORYS (2005) Study on the development of competition in the European postal 
sector. 
GROUPE LA POSTE (2002) Rapport Annuel 2002 
GROUPE LA POSTE (2003) Annual Report 2003 
GROUPE LA POSTE (2004) Annual Report 2004 
GROUPE LA POSTE (2005) Annual Report 2005 
IPC (2004) Postal Regulatory database – Country Directory 
IPC (2005) Postal Regulatory database – Country Directory 
IPC (2006) Postal Regulatory database – Country Directory 
IPC (2007) Postal Regulatory database – Country Directory 
LA POSTE (1996) Rapport Annuel 1996 
LA POSTE (1997) Rapport Annuel 1997 
LA POSTE (1998) Rapport Annuel 1998 
LA POSTE (2000) Rapport Annuel 2000 
MMD (1999) Modelling and quantifying scenarios for liberalization. 
NERA (2004) Study about the economics of postal services. 
OMEGA PARTNERS (2001) Study on the impact of certain aspects of the 
application of the Directive 97/67 EC on the postal sector. 
PLS Rambøll (2002) Study on employment trends in the European Postal sector. 
POSTEN (2005) Posten year end report 2005 
POSTEN (2004) Posten annual report 2004 
POSTEN (2003) Posten annual report 2003 
POSTEN (2002) Posten annual report 2002  
POSTEN (2001) Posten annual report 2001 
POSTEN (2000) Posten annual report 2000 
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POSTEN (1999) Posten annual report 1999 
POSTEUROP (2000) PostEurop Annual Review 
POSTEUROP (2001) PostEurop Annual Review 
POSTEUROP (2002) PostEurop Annual Review 
POSTEUROP (2003) PostEurop Annual Review 
POSTEUROP (2004) PostEurop Annual Review 
POSTEUROP (2005) PostEurop Annual Review 
POSTCOMM (2006) Competitive market review 
POSTCOMM (2004) The UK letters market 200-2003 
POSTCOMM (2005) Postcomm’s brief on developments in liberalising countries 
Sweden, Germany, Netherlands, Denmark and Norway 
POSTCOMM (2005) Giving customers choice: a fully open postal services 
market, A decision document 
POSTDIENST (1990) Annual Report 1990, Deutsche Bundespost  
POSTDIENST (1991) Annual Report 1990, Deutsche Bundespost  
POSTDIENST (1992) Annual Report 1990, Deutsche Bundespost  
POSTDIENST (1993) Annual Report 1990, Deutsche Bundespost  
PTT (1996) Annual Report 1996 
PTT (1997) Annual Report 1997 
PRICEWATERHOUSE (1997) Employment trends in the European postal sector. 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS (2006) The impact on Universal service of the 
full market accomplishment of the postal internal market in 2009. 
ROLAND BERGER, R. (2004) Monitoring developments in the postal market – 
market survey 
ROYAL MAIL GROUP PLC (2003) Annual Review 2003 
ROYAL MAIL GROUP PLC (2004) Annual Review 2003-04 
ROYAL MAIL GROUP PLC (2005) Annual Review 2004-05 
ROYAL MAIL GROUP PLC (2006) Annual Review 2005-06 
STEVEN-JONES, N. (2004) The implications and consequences of introduction 
of competition 
SWEDEN POST (1998) Annual report 1998 
SWEDEN POST (1997) Annual report 1997 
SWEDEN POST (1996) Annual report 1996 
SWEDEN POST (1995) Annual report 1995 
SWISS POST (1998) Annual Report 1998 
 226 
SWISS POST (1999) Annual Report 1999 
SWISS POST (2000) Annual Report 2000 
SWISS POST (2001) Annual Report 2001 
SWISS POST (2002) Annual Report 2002 
SWISS POST (2003) Annual Report 2003 
SWISS POST (2004) Annual Report 2004 
SWISS POST (2005) Annual Report 2005 
THE POST OFFICE (1994) Annual Report and Accounts 1993/94 
THE POST OFFICE (1996) Annual Report and Accounts 1995/96 
THE POST OFFICE (1997) Annual Report and Accounts 1996/97 
THE POST OFFICE (1998) Annual Report and Accounts 1998 
THE POST OFFICE (1997) Annual Report and Accounts 1996/97 
THE POST OFFICE (1999) Annual Report and Accounts 1998/99 
THE POST OFFICE (2000) Annual Report and Accounts 1999/2000 
TPG (2000) Annual report 2000 
TPG (2001) Annual report 2001 
TPG (2002) Annual report 2002 
TPG (2003) Annual report 2003 
TPG (2004) Annual report 2004 
TPG (2005) Annual report 2005 
USPS (1974) Annual report 1974 
USPS (1978) Annual report 1978 
USPS (1982) Annual report 1982 
USPS (1995) Annual report 1995 
USPS (1986) Annual report 1986 
USPS (1996) Annual report 1996 
USPS (1997) Annual report 1997 
USPS (1998) Annual report 1998 
USPS (1999) Annual report 1999 
USPS (2000) Annual report 2000 
USPS (2001) Annual report 2001 
USPS (2002) Annual report 2002 
USPS (2005) Annual report 2005 
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WIK (2003) Survey on some main aspects of postal networks in EU adhesion 
candidate countries. 
WIK (2004) Study on main developments in the European postal sector. 
WIK (2005) Study on the evolution of the regulatory model for European postal 
services. 
WIK (2006) Main developments in the postal sector (2004-2006). 
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Annex 6 - Survey 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please fill in the dates when each of the innovations was introduced into operation. If the innovation was not introduced 
yet please write “NA”. 
 
Innovation 
 
Specificities 
 
Part of value chain 
concerned 
Year of 
introduction into 
operation 
(not test or pilot) 
Remarks 
(Please write here any 
remarks or notes 
regarding your answers) 
Optimisation of collection routes (using software)        Collection/ Transportation   
Hybrid mail [1]  Collection/All value chain   
Digital stamp [2]  Franking   
Used to identify trucks Upstream/ Transportation   
Used to identify trolleys Upstream/ Transportation   
Used to identify trays or bags Upstream/ Transportation   
 
 
Radio frequency identification (RFID): 
Used to monitor the performance of the 
letter post [3] Upstream/ Transportation   
That can read all front side of the letter Sorting   
That can read hand-written whole addresses Sorting   
That can read hand-written postal codes Sorting   
 
 
Automated sorting machines using Optical Character 
Recognition (OCR): That can read machine written postal codes 
and whole addresses Sorting   
Online coding Sorting   
Video coded address reading equipment [5]: Scanning and remote coding (off-line video 
coding equipment) Sorting   
Automated sequence sorting to delivery route [4]  Sorting/ Delivery   
Automatic tray handling systems  Material handling   
Automated guided vehicles (AGV) [6]  Material handling   
Route planning and optimization software for delivery  Delivery   
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[1] Customers digitally send the information to be printed to the Postal Service Provider, which then sorts the mail electronically, prints it 
and dispatches it in physical form into the conventional mail stream from the site closest to the delivery point. Conversely, hard copy mail 
can be scanned in and sent on directly to an online account. Hybrid mail offers particular advantages for direct-marketing and large-scale 
mailings. Most of the costs involved in the physical handling of traditional paper mail are cut, since the data is handled in real time in 
electronic form until the final phase of the process, when it is printed on paper and physically delivered to the recipient. 
[2] A digital stamp, in mail or philately, is similar to a conventional postage stamp except it is resident on or in a computer. A digital stamp 
can typically be downloaded and printed onto envelopes or packages by authorized individuals. 
[3] RFID tags monitor test letters at key points in the mail processing pipeline. It highlights bottlenecks so that postal operators can free 
them and speed up the mail flow. Test letters with RFID tags in them are seeded into normal mail flow and operators do not know which 
have the tags in them, ensuring objectivity and reliable results. 
[4] This is a letter sorting system to extend mechanization to delivery route sequencing, the last operation in the processing cycle. The goal 
of sequencing systems is to automatically sort mail into delivery point sequence with an aim to significantly cut back on the amount of time 
a letter carrier needs to spend in the office casing mail.  
[5] Video coded address reading equipment: 
Unreadable addresses, e.g. cursive not distinguished by the OCR, unreadable machine print or unmatchable to the address database, are 
digitally imaged and 1) processed by human operators online (online coding), or 2) sent on to a Remote Encoding Centre (REC) and 
processed by human operators there (scanning and remote coding) (Arthur D. Little Limited, 2004). 
[6] Automated guided vehicles (AGVs): 
AGVs are transport systems capable of functioning without driver operation. AGVs are used within sorting offices to move mail around. 
AGVs find their way without a person behind the wheel by using laser guidance, wall-mounted reflectors, and a computer-based human 
controller running the routing software. They can also be run on magnetic paths; this does leave less flexibility for maneuver but can be 
safer when interacting with employees. While the vehicles can be programmed to follow a set route, it is also possible for employees to 
divert the AGVs if required. The vehicles can determine if there are loads waiting at set points by the change in area contrast and load 
monitor systems preclude uneven or overloading. Robotics can also be used to sleeve, lid, unsleeve and unlid mail packages at each end of 
the transportation process (Arthur D. Little Limited, 2004). 
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Annex 7 – Econometric results 
 
Table 11: Descriptive statistics for the variables 
 
Variable 
 
  
Mean 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
Min 
 
Max 
 
Observations 
country overall 9  5  1 17 N=204 
 between  5 1 17 n=17 
 within  0 9 9 T=12 
year overall 2001 3 1995 2006 N=204 
 between  0 2001 2001 n=17 
 within  3 1995 2006 T=12 
mktliberalised overall 34 37 0 100 N=204 
 between  37 3 100 n=17 
 within  9 12 105 T=12 
mktshareE overall 2 2 1 11 N=187 
 between  2 1 8 n=17 
 within  1 -2 6 T=11 
publick overall 95 17 10 100 N=204 
 between  17 34 100 n=17 
 within  6 64 118 T=12 
tvolume overall 6 8 0 29 N=187 
 between  8 0 27 n=17 
 within  1 4 8 T=11 
popdens overall 120 95 15 393 N=187 
 between  97 15 383 n=17 
 within  2 109 130 T=11 
gdppercap overall 15 11 1 38 N=187 
 between  11 1 36 n=17 
 within  1 9 19 T=11 
inindex overall -5 5 -15 5 N=204 
 between  4 -11 3 n=17 
 within  2 -10 2 T=12 
accuminno overall 6 4 0 13 N=204 
 between  3 1 10 n=17 
 within  3 0 14 T=12 
itemperempl overall 66 41 4 166 N=187 
 between  41 7 133 n=17 
 within  12 31 103 T=11 
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Table12: Correlation matrix for the independent variables 
 mktliberalised mktshareE publick tvolume popdens gdppercap 
mktliberalised 1      
mktshareE 0.5438 1     
publick 0.0409 -0.1267 1    
tvolume -0.1522 0.0063 -0.1549 1   
popdens -0.3423 -0.1162 -0.7258 0.462 1  
gdppercap 0.1220 0.1336 -0.2803 0.4819 0.3787 1 
 
Table 13: Summary of heteroskedasticity and correlation tests 
 
Dependent 
variable 
 
Explanatory 
varibles 
 
Likelihood-ratio test 
for 
heteroskedasticity 
 
 
Modified Wald test  
 
Wooldridge test 
LR chi(16)= 88.38 chi2(17)= 5720.62 F(1,16)= 85.61 inindex 
Prob>chi2= 0 Prob>chi2= 0 Prob>F= 0 
LR chi(16)= 113.16 chi2(17)= 682.77 F(1,16)= 67.11 accuminno 
Prob>chi2= 0 Prob>chi2= 0 Prob>F= 0 
LR chi(16)= 312.75 chi2(17)= 87332.65 F(1,16)= 95.70 itemperempl 
 
 
Xit 
Prob>chi2= 0 Prob>chi2= 0 Prob>F= 0 
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Table 14: Results of GLS estimation with inindex as dependent variable 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
mktliberalisedt 0.009 0.017 0.037 0.040    
 
(1.07) (1.79)* (3.74)*** (3.81)***    
mktshareEt 0.351 0.375 0.478  0.645 0.525 0.388 
 
(4.83)*** (4.26)*** (6.37)***  (8.21)*** (6.68)*** (4.43)*** 
publickt -0.108 -0.093 -0.087 -0.094 -0.073 -0.075 -0.072 
 
(4.80)*** (26.89)*** (11.97)*** (11.07)*** (9.97)*** (8.77)*** (11.36)*** 
tvolumet 0.084 0.090 0.298 0.259 0.252 0.384 0.237 
 
(1.46) (1.37) (8.88)*** (7.25)*** (12.17)*** (3.82)*** (7.25)*** 
popdenst -0.021       
 
(2.94)***       
gdppercapt 0.304 0.192      
 
(3.84)*** (2.51)**      
mktliberalisedt+1      0.016  
 
     (2.02)**  
mktliberalisedt-1       0.019 
 
      (1.64)* 
Constant 
2.436  -1.127 0.142 -0.895 -1.492 -0.591 
 
(0.97)  (1.91)* (0.26) (1.68)* (1.83)* (1.33) 
 
       
Observations 
187 187 187 187 187 187 170 
Log likelihood 
1192 - - 1171 - 1215 1264 
Wald chi2 
379 1108 219 213 192 210 148 
Prob>chi2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level 
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Table 15: Results of GLS estimation with accuminno as dependent variable 
 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
mktliberalisedt 0.006 -0.016 0.019 0.031    
 
(0.58) (1.57) (2.05)** (2.97)***    
mktshareEt 0.439 0.517 0.534  0.550 0.387 0.051 
 
(5.79)*** (7.60)*** (4.56)***  (6.00)*** (4.24)*** (0.81) 
publickt -0.056 -0.022 0.000 0.018 0.011 0.007 0.012 
 
(2.76)*** (2.15)** (0.01) (2.78)*** (2.63)*** (1.10) (1.49) 
tvolumet -0.032 0.066 0.274 0.196 0.236 0.278 0.238 
 
(0.52) (1.22) (7.87)*** (1.98)** (2.64)*** (8.38)*** (5.86)*** 
popdenst 0.039       
 
(2.25)**       
gdppercapt 0.398 0.354      
 
(5.65)*** (7.31)***      
mktliberalisedt+1      0.020  
 
     (2.95)***  
mktliberalisedt-1       0.063 
 
      (7.75)*** 
Constant 
       
 
       
 
       
Observations 
187 187 187 187 187 187 170 
Log likelihood 
1184 1179 1181 1179 - 1158 1266 
Wald chi2 
1031 1286 263 19 145 745 298 
Prob>chi2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level 
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Table 16: Results of GLS estimation with itemperempl as dependent variable 
 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 
mktliberalisedt 0.020 0.051 0.021 0.081    
 
(0.92) (2.06)** (0.64) (2.67)***    
mktshareEt 1.944 2.168 1.056  1.728 1.194 0.615 
 
(7.51)*** (6.59)*** (2.63)***  (5.47)*** (7.12)** (1.51) 
publickt -0.251 -0.253 -0.257 -0.282 -0.413 -0.368 -0.751 
 
(6.69)*** (6.04)*** (4.95)*** (7.21)*** (7.37)*** (13.25)*** (18.77)*** 
tvolumet 2.412 1.735 2.074 2.261 2.640 2.664 2.512 
 
(7.97)*** (5.91)*** (7.57)*** (9.51)*** (12.37)*** (20.28)*** (11.59)*** 
popdenst 0.032       
 
(2.18)**       
gdppercapt 2.180 2.346      
 
(16.33)*** (16.07)***      
mktliberalisedt+1      0.006  
 
     (0.58)  
mktliberalisedt-1       0.221 
 
      (5.71)*** 
Constant 
38.482 43.261 77.393 79.528 78.790 74.990 105.667 
 
(9.60)*** (9.54)*** (10.82)*** (12.06)*** (12.60)*** (18.29)*** (19.49)*** 
 
       
Observations 
187 187 187 187 187 187 170 
Log likelihood 
920 923 891 832 - - 916 
Wald chi2 
7026 2031 95 146 261 741 856 
Prob>chi2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level 
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Table 17: Results of PW-PCSE estimation with inindex as dependent variable 
 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 Model 25 Model 26 Model 27 Model 28 
mktliberalisedt 0.032 0.030 0.040 0.032    
 
(2.71)*** (2.25)** (2.59)*** (2.56)***    
mktshareEt 0.276 0.290 0.265  0.388 0.285 0.254 
 
(2.97)*** (3.20)*** (2.97)***  (3.95)*** (3.24)*** (2.86)*** 
publickt -0.021 -0.038 -0.071 -0.088 -0.062 -0.072 -0.063 
 
(1.06) (3.33)*** (4.26)*** (7.08)*** (3.75)*** (4.50)*** (3.96)*** 
tvolumet -0.050 0.045 0.225 0.242 0.248 0.203 0.228 
 
(0.35) (0.28) (1.38) (4.37)*** (1.59) (1.38) (1.39) 
popdenst 0.002       
 
(0.38)       
gdppercapt 0.284 0.252      
 
(7.71)*** (5.57)***      
mktliberalisedt+1      0.035  
 
     (2.47)**  
mktliberalisedt-1       0.036 
 
      (2.18)** 
Constant 
-8.438 -6.616 -1.452 0.357 -1.094 -1.283 -2.291 
 
(3.69)*** (6.39)*** (0.99) (0.39) (0.75) (0.96) (1.68)* 
 
       
Observations 
187 187 187 187 187 187 170 
R-squared 
0.64 0.65 0.34 0.40 0.31 0.39 0.41 
Wald chi2 
139 140 58 94 39 59 50 
Prob>chi2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level 
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Table 18: Results of PW-PCSE estimation with accuminno as dependent variable 
 Model 29 Model 30 Model 31 Model 32 Model 33 Model 34 Model 35 
mktliberalisedt 0.020 0.011 0.023 0.027    
 
(1.44) (1.00) (1.74)* (2.16)**    
mktshareEt 0.356 0.326 0.264  0.328 0.266 0.160 
 
(3.30)*** (3.15)*** (2.44)**  (2.94)*** (2.51)** (2.24)** 
publickt 0.003 -0.033 -0.056 -0.070 -0.049 -0.060 -0.048 
 
(0.16) (2.81)*** (3.68)*** (5.46)*** (3.37)*** (4.06)*** (2.80)*** 
tvolumet 0.238 0.281 0.290 0.196 0.301 0.246 0.265 
 
(1.20) (1.57) (1.99)** (2.72)*** (2.05)** (1.90)* (1.94)* 
popdenst 0.009       
 
(1.79)*       
gdppercapt 0.171 0.174      
 
(4.87)*** (5.24)***      
mktliberalisedt+1      0.024  
 
     (1.82)*  
mktliberalisedt-1       0.018 
 
      (1.41) 
Constant 
-1.596 3.240 7.732 9.452 7.931 8.064 7.586 
 
(0.51) (2.55)** (5.78)*** (11.51)*** (5.92)*** (6.77)*** (5.40)*** 
 
       
Observations 
187 187 187 187 187 187 170 
R-squared 
0.56 0.61 0.53 0.60 0.49 0.55 0.19 
Wald chi2 
114 125 53 50 43 52 34 
Prob>chi2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level 
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Table 19: Results of PW-PCSE estimation with itemperempl as dependent 
variable 
 Model 36 Model 37 Model 38 Model 39 Model 40 Model 41 Model 42 
mktliberalisedt 0.094 0.109 0.161 0.210    
 
(1.70)* (1.76)* (1.63)* (2.36)**    
mktshareEt 1.505 1.122 0.849  1.047 0.901 0.781 
 
(2.11)** (1.78)* (0.94)  (1.04) (1.02) (0.82) 
publickt 0.165 0.161 -0.167 -0.163 -0.214 -0.150 -0.231 
 
(1.06) (1.38) (1.12) (1.21) (1.31) (1.05) (1.61)* 
tvolumet 5.816 5.418 2.210 2.393 2.546 1.976 1.961 
 
(4.28)*** (4.79)*** (5.46)*** (5.83)*** (7.85)*** (3.88)*** (5.00)*** 
popdenst -0.013       
 
(0.35)       
gdppercapt 2.307 2.366      
 
(8.47)*** (8.20)***      
mktliberalisedt+1      0.030  
 
     (0.48)  
mktliberalisedt-1       0.060 
 
      (0.65) 
Constant 
-5.368 -7.181 62.565 65.875 61.457 71.041 77.299 
 
(0.31) (0.57) (3.92)*** (4.60)*** (4.04)*** (4.70)*** (5.33)*** 
 
       
Observations 
187 187 187 187 187 187 170 
R-squared 
0.76 0.78 0.48 0.59 0.40 0.62 0.54 
Wald chi2 
212 207 35 37 63 17 25 
Prob>chi2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level 
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